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Broadcast and verifiable secret sharing (VSS) are central building blocks for
secure multi-party computation. These protocols are required to be resilient against
a Byzantine adversary who controls at most t out of the n parties running the
protocol. In this dissertation, we consider the design of fault-tolerant protocols
for broadcast and verifiable secret sharing with stronger security guarantees and
improved round complexity.
Broadcast allows a party to send the same message to all parties, and all parties
are assured they have received identical messages. Given a public-key infrastructure
(PKI) and digital signatures, it is possible to construct broadcast protocols tolerat-
ing any number of corrupted parties. We address two important issues related to
broadcast: (1) Almost all existing protocols do not distinguish between corrupted
parties (who do not follow the protocol) and honest parties whose secret (signing)
keys have been compromised (but who continue to behave honestly); (2) all existing
protocols for broadcast are insecure against an adaptive adversary who can choose
which parties to corrupt as the protocol progresses. We propose new security models
that capture these issues, and present tight feasibility and impossibility results.
In the problem of verifiable secret sharing, there is a designated player who
shares a secret during an initial sharing phase such that the secret is hidden from
an adversary that corrupts at most t parties. In a subsequent reconstruction phase
of the protocol, a unique secret, well-defined by the view of honest players in the
sharing phase, is reconstructed. The round complexity of VSS protocols is a very
important metric of their efficiency. We show two improvements regarding the round
complexity of information-theoretic VSS. First, we construct an efficient perfectly
secure VSS protocol tolerating t < n/3 corrupted parties that is simultaneously
optimal in both the number of rounds and the number of invocations of broadcast.
Second, we construct a statistically secure VSS protocol tolerating t < n/2 corrupted
parties that has optimal round complexity, and an efficient statistical VSS protocol
tolerating t < n/2 corrupted parties that requires one additional round.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Summary of Results
1.1 Motivation
One of the major achievements of modern cryptography is the design of pro-
tocols for general secure multi-party computation [46, 89, 5, 18]. Loosely speaking,
protocols for secure multi-party computation (MPC) enable participating parties
to correctly compute any functionality while learning their prescribed output and
nothing more. An important property of such protocols is that they are robust to
the malicious behavior of corrupted parties. In this dissertation, we are primarily
concerned with two basic primitives which are central to the design of protocols for
secure multi-party computation.
The first primitive is fault-tolerant broadcast which, informally, allows a party
to distribute a value among a set of mutually mistrusting parties that are connected
by pairwise point-to-point channels in a network. A formal requirement of broad-
cast protocols is that all parties need to agree on the distributed value at the end
of the protocol; agreement needs to be guaranteed even when the party who is dis-
tributing the value is corrupt. MPC protocols are typically designed assuming the
existence of broadcast channels. However, in real networks, links are typically only
point-to-point, and broadcast channels have to be emulated by a secure protocol for
broadcast.
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The second primitive is verifiable secret sharing (VSS) in which a designated
party (dealer) shares a secret among other parties such that the secret is hidden from
faulty subsets of parties (which hold their shares of the secret) while simultaneously
being reconstructible at a later time when all parties disclose their respective shares
of the secret. A scheme for secret sharing is said to be verifiable if the reconstructed
secret is well-defined at the end of sharing even when the dealer is malicious.
In this dissertation, we investigate the problem of broadcast in stronger threat
models, and demonstrate tight feasibility results. We also study round complexity
of VSS protocols, and present round-optimal constructions in some settings.
Early versions of the work in this disseration appeared in [49, 40, 64, 65, 50, 69].
1.2 Broadcast
Formally, broadcast protocols allow a designated player (the dealer) to dis-
tribute an input value to a set of parties such that (1) if the dealer is honest, all
honest parties output the dealer’s value (validity), and (2) even if the dealer is
dishonest, the outputs of all honest parties agree (agreement). Broadcast forms
a critical component of multi-party cryptographic protocols. Indeed such protocols
conveniently abstract away various details of the underlying communication net-
work and allow protocol designers to simply assume the existence of a broadcast
channel. Later, when the protocol is deployed over a real network, participating
parties emulate a broadcast channel by running a secure protocol for broadcast.
Known composition results imply that this approach is sound : namely, given a pro-
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tocol Π proven secure under the assumption that a broadcast channel exists, and
then instantiating the broadcast channel using a secure broadcast protocol BC, the
composed protocol ΠBC is guaranteed to be secure when run over a point-to-point
network.
Early work in the design of broadcast protocols was done in the context of
Byzantine agreement (BA) [79, 71]. In the problem of Byzantine agreement (also
known as the consensus problem), each party has an initial input, and at the end of
the protocol all parties have to output a common value. Further, when all honest
parties have the same input value, the parties are required to output that value. In
the case of honest majority among participating parties, a protocol for Byzantine
agreement implies a protocol for broadcast using one additional round. Indeed, a
protocol in which the dealer sends its message to all parties in the first round, and
then the parties run a Byzantine agreement protocol on the values they received
gives a protocol for broadcast. In the reverse direction, a protocol for broadcast
yields a protocol for Byzantine agreement when there is a honest majority among
participating parties. Indeed, a protocol in which each party runs a broadcast
protocol on its input value, and then the parties take a majority among the values
received gives a protocol for Byzantine agreement. We remark that the problem of
Byzantine agreement is not defined if there is no honest majority.
Classical results of Pease, Shostak, and Lamport [79, 71] show that Byzantine
agreement (and, equivalently, broadcast) is achievable in a synchronous network of
n parties if and only if the number of corrupted parties t satisfies t < n/3. Their
protocol, however, required the processors to send exponentially long messages and
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perform exponentially many steps of computation. Soon after, polynomial-time BA
protocols for t < n/3 were shown [28, 87], and following a long sequence of works,
Garay and Moses [41] showed a polynomial-time BA protocol with optimal resilience
and optimal number of rounds.
To go beyond the bound t < n/3, some form of set-up is required even if
randomization is used [61, 51]. The most commonly studied set-up assumption is the
existence of a public-key infrastructure (PKI) such that each party Pi has a public
signing key pki that is known to all other parties (in addition to the cryptographic
assumption that secure digital signatures [48] exist). Protocols designed in this
setting are termed authenticated. Authenticated broadcast is possible for any t <
n [79, 71, 29]. We remark that secure digital signatures can be constructed from
the minimal cryptographic assumption that one-way functions exist [75, 85], and
the resulting broadcast protocol will be secure against a computationally bounded
adversary. Alternatively, if information-theoretic “pseudo-signatures” [81] are used,
then the resulting broadcast protocol will be secure even against a computationally
unbounded adversary.
In this dissertation, we address two important issues related to broadcast: (1)
Almost all existing protocols do not distinguish between corrupted parties (who do
not follow the protocol), and honest parties whose secret (signing) keys have been
compromised (but who continue to behave honestly). (2) All existing protocols for
broadcast are insecure against an adaptive adversary who can choose which parties
to corrupt as the protocol progresses. We describe our results next.
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1.2.1 Broadcast with a Partially Compromised Public-Key Infras-
tructure
With few exceptions [37, 52], prior work in the PKI model treats each party
as either totally honest, or as completely corrupted and under the control of a
single adversary; the assumption is that the adversary cannot forge signatures of
any honest parties. However, in many situations it makes sense to consider a middle
ground: parties who honestly follow the protocol but whose signatures might be
forged (e.g., because their signing keys have been compromised). Most existing
work treats any such party P as corrupt, and provides no guarantees for P in this
case: the output of P may disagree with the output of other honest parties, and
validity is not guaranteed when P is the dealer. Clearly, it would be preferable to
ensure agreement and validity for honest parties who have simply had the misfortune
of having their signatures forged.
Our Contributions. We consider broadcast protocols providing exactly these
guarantees. Specifically, say ta parties in the network are actively corrupted; as
usual, such parties may behave arbitrarily and we assume their actions are coordi-
nated by a single adversary A. We also allow for tc parties who follow the protocol
honestly, but whose signatures can be forged by A; this is modeled by simply giving
A their secret keys. We refer to such honest-behaving parties as compromised, and
require agreement and validity to hold even for compromised parties.
Say ta, tc satisfy the threshold condition with respect to some total number of
parties n if 2ta + min(ta, tc) < n. In Chapter 3, we show:
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1. For any n and any ta, tc satisfying the threshold condition with respect to n,
there is an efficient (i.e., polynomial in n) protocol achieving the notion of
broadcast outlined above.
2. When the threshold condition is not satisfied, broadcast protocols meeting
our notion of security are impossible, with the exception of the “classical”
case (tc = 0) where standard results like [29] imply feasibility.
3. Except for a few “exceptional” values of n, there is no fixed n-party proto-
col that tolerates all ta, tc satisfying the threshold condition with respect to n.
(The positive result mentioned above relies on two different protocols, depend-
ing on whether ta ≤ tc.) For the exceptional values of n, we show protocols
that do tolerate any ta, tc satisfying the threshold condition.
Taken together, our results provide a complete characterization of the problem.
Early versions of this work appeared in [49, 50].
Related and Subsequent Work. Gupta et al. [52] also consider broadcast pro-
tocols providing agreement and validity for honest-behaving parties whose secret
keys have been compromised. Our results improve upon theirs in several respects.
First, we construct efficient protocols whenever 2ta + min(ta, tc) < n, whereas the
protocols presented in the work of Gupta et al. have message complexity exponential
in n. Although Gupta et al. [52] also claim impossibility when 2ta + min(ta, tc) ≥ n,
our impossibility result is simpler and stronger in that it holds relative to a weaker
adversary.1 Finally, Gupta et al. treat ta, tc as known and do not consider the ques-
1In [52], the adversary is assumed to have access to the random coins used by the compromised
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tion of designing a fixed protocol achieving broadcast for any ta, tc satisfying the
threshold condition (as we do in the third result mentioned above).
Fitzi et al. [37] consider broadcast in a model where the adversary can either
corrupt a few parties and forge signatures of all parties, or corrupt more parties but
forge no signatures. In our notation, their work handles the two extremes ta < n/3,
tc = n and ta < n/2, tc = 0. We stress that, in contrast to [37], our work addresses
the intermediate cases, where an adversary might be able to forge signatures of some
honest parties but not others.
Subsequent to our work, Hirt and Zikas [58] also considered the problem of
Byzantine agreement when honest parties’ signatures may be forged. In their model,
the adversary is no longer restricted by an upper bound on the number of parties
to corrupt. Instead, they use the notion of adversary structures [60, 56] to model a
non-threshold adversary, and obtain a generalized version of our results.
1.2.2 Adaptively Secure Broadcast
While designing cryptographic protocols, it is often assumed that the set of
parties that are corrupted by the adversary remains unchanged throughout the
execution of the protocol. Such adversaries are said to be static. (Indeed this model
is standard, and we consider static adversaries in Chapter 3.) Adversaries without
this restriction, i.e., adversaries that can choose which parties to corrupt as the
protocol is being executed, are known as adaptive adversaries. It is easy to see that
adaptive security (i.e., security against adaptive adversaries) is strictly stronger than
parties when running the protocol, whereas we do not make this assumption.
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static security (i.e., security against static adversaries) for Byzantine adversaries.
Surprisingly, Hirt and Zikas [57] recently observed that all existing protocols
for broadcast (which have been known for over 30 years) are insecure against an
adaptive adversary who can choose which parties to corrupt as the protocol pro-
gresses. Furthermore, they proved that there is no broadcast protocol secure against
an adaptive adversary that can corrupt t > n/2 parties.
Our Contributions. In Chapter 4, we revisit the problem of adaptively secure
broadcast. First, we observe that the Hirt-Zikas attack and impossibility result for
adaptively secure broadcast (when t > n/2) holds in a communication model that
is unrealistically pessimistic and allows the adversary to corrupt a party and then
retroactively change messages that party had already sent. We revisit the problem of
adaptively secure broadcast in the standard communication model (with rushing2).
We observe that attacks demonstrated by Hirt and Zikas [57] on existing broadcast
protocols, succeed even in this model. This immediately raises the question of
whether their impossibility result holds in the communication model we consider.
As our main result, we show that the Hirt-Zikas impossibility result does not
apply in the standard synchronous model, and demonstrate an adaptively secure
broadcast protocol tolerating an arbitrary number of corruptions in this setting
under the assumption that a PKI and digital signatures exist. We stress that our
protocols do not assume erasure. We also prove that our protocol remains secure
even when it is concurrently executed with arbitrarily many other protocols.
2In the rushing model, the adversary is allowed to choose messages of the corrupted parties in
some round after seeing messages sent by the honest parties in that round.
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We also study the impact of adaptive attacks on secure multi-party computa-
tion protocols (where broadcast is commonly used as a subcomponent), and establish
the variants of broadcast that are needed in this setting. Interestingly, we show that
the full functionality of broadcast is not needed in order to obtain secure MPC for
t ≥ n/2; instead, a weaker form of broadcast — which can be realized even in the
Hirt-Zikas communication model — suffices.
A preliminary version of this work appeared in [40].
1.3 Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS)
In secret sharing [7, 86], there is a dealer who shares a secret among a group
of n parties during a sharing phase. The requirements are that, for some parameter
t < n, any set of t colluding parties gets no information about the dealer’s secret
at the end of the sharing phase, yet any set of t+ 1 parties can recover the dealer’s
secret in a later reconstruction phase. Secret sharing assumes the dealer is honest;
verifiable secret sharing (VSS) [19] requires in addition that, no matter what a
cheating dealer does (in conjunction with t − 1 other colluding parties), there is
some unique secret to which the dealer is “committed” by the end of the sharing
phase.
VSS serves as a fundamental building block in the design of protocols for
general secure multi-party computation [5, 84, 46]. VSS can also be viewed as
a special case of broadcast, with an additional privacy requirement (at the end
of the sharing phase). In particular, VSS implies broadcast. VSS was formally
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introduced by Chor et al. [19]. One of the main applications of VSS described in
their paper was to solve the problem of simultaenous broadcast, which is a variant
of broadcast where parties simultaneously broadcast their input messages while
preserving independence of their inputs. (See also [20, 42, 55, 54].) Variants of
VSS, such as moderated VSS [62] or graded VSS [31, 39] are important tools in the
design of expected constant-round protocols for broadcast. (See [68] for a detailed
discussion.) In the other direction, protocols for VSS, as with general protocols
for secure computation, are typically designed assuming the existence of broadcast
channels. Indeed, constant-round protocols (over point-to-point networks) for VSS
do not exist in a model without broadcast channels. We stress that all our VSS
protocols are designed assuming the existence of a broadcast channel.
Protocols for VSS are typically classified by the level of security that they
guarantee. Perfect VSS, where the security guarantees are unconditional (i.e., they
hold even against an unbounded adversary) and hold with probability 1, is known
to be possible if and only if t < n/3 [5, 27]. Statistical VSS, a natural relaxation
where privacy and/or correctness may fail to hold with negligible probability (still
for unbounded adversary), is known to be possible if and only if t < n/2 [83, 84,
23]. Lastly, computational VSS, where security guarantees hold with respect to a
computationally bounded adversary, is achievable if and only if t < n/2 [80, 32, 1].
Protocols for computational VSS typically enjoy better efficiency than protocols for
statistical VSS.
The round complexity of VSS protocols, typically defined as the number of
rounds in the sharing phase, is an important metric of their efficiency, and has been
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the subject of intense study. An important line of research, initiated by Gennaro
et al. [43], has focused on identifying the exact round complexity of VSS protocols
and their variants. The focus on round complexity is by no means exclusive to the
study of VSS protocols. Indeed, much work has been done on establishing bounds
on the round complexity of various cryptographic primitives, including Byzantine
agreement [33, 71, 79, 29, 8, 31, 62], zero-knowledge [9, 30, 45, 4, 53, 16, 82], and
secure computation [26, 59, 89, 44, 3, 66, 67, 63].
In this dissertation, we investigate two important problems related to the
round complexity of VSS: (1) Existing protocols for perfect VSS treat the broadcast
channel as being available “for free” and do not attempt to minimize its usage.
This approach leads to relatively poor round complexity when such protocols are
compiled to run over a point-to-point network. (2) There is a large gap between the
lower bound and upper bound on the number of rounds required for statistical VSS
when t < n/2. We describe our results next.
1.3.1 Round Complexity of Perfect VSS in Point-to-Point Networks
As mentioned earlier, perfect VSS is possible iff t < n/3. Work of Gennaro et
al. [43] and Fitzi et al. [36] shows that, assuming a broadcast channel, three rounds
are necessary and sufficient for efficient VSS. Previous research investigating the
round complexity of VSS, has focused on optimizing the round complexity assuming
a broadcast channel is available “for free”. As argued previously [63, 68], however,
if the ultimate goal is to optimize the round complexity of protocols for point-
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to-point networks (where protocols are likely to be run), then it is preferable to
minimize the number of rounds in which broadcast is used rather than to minimize
the total number of rounds. This is due to the high overhead of emulating a broadcast
channel over a point-to-point network: deterministic broadcast protocols require
Ω(t) rounds [33]; known randomized protocols [31, 35, 62] require only O(1) rounds
in expectation, but the constant is rather high. (The most round-efficient protocol
known [62, 68] requires 18 rounds in expectation for t < n/3.)
Moreover, when using randomized broadcast protocols, if more than one invo-
cation of broadcast is used then special care must be taken to deal with sequential
composition of protocols without simultaneous termination (see [72, 62, 63]), leading
to a substantial increase in the round complexity. As a consequence, a constant-
round protocol that only uses a single round of broadcast is likely to yield a more
round-efficient protocol in a point-to-point setting than any protocol that uses two
rounds of broadcast (even if that protocol uses no additional rounds). Prior work
[73, 36, 63, 68] shows that optimal round complexity as well as optimal use of the
broadcast channel could each be obtained individually for VSS, but it was unknown
whether they could be obtained simultaneously.
Our Contributions. In Chapter 5, show a 3-round VSS protocol which uses one
round of broadcast that is, therefore, optimal in both measures. As a consequence,
we obtain a VSS protocol with the best known round complexity in point-to-point
networks. Our work also leads to an improvement in the round complexity of the
most round-efficient broadcast protocols known [62]. Our protocol is efficient, in
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that the computation and communication are polynomial in n.
Early versions of this work appeared in [64, 65].
1.3.2 Round Complexity of Statistical VSS with Honest Majority
As mentioned earlier, the round complexity of perfect VSS was settled by
Gennaro et al. [43] and Fitzi et al. [36]. Gennaro et al. also showed that three
rounds are necessary for perfect VSS. The 3-round lower bound of Gennaro et al.
was generally believed to apply also to the case of statistical VSS. It was therefore
relatively surprising when Patra et al. [76] showed that statistical VSS could be
realized in two rounds for t < n/3. They also proved that 2-round statistical VSS
is impossible for t ≥ n/3.
The protocol of Patra et al. does not have optimal resilience, and does not
apply when n/3 ≤ t < n/2. Statistical VSS protocols with optimal resilience were
first shown by Rabin and Ben-Or [84, 83]. A more efficient protocol for statistical
VSS was shown later by Cramer et al. [23]. Their statistical VSS protocol required
11 rounds, and enjoyed the best known round complexity for the same.
Our Contributions. In Chapter 6, we close the gap between the upper bound and
the lower bound for the exact round complexity of statistical VSS protocols with
optimal resilience. The work of Patra et al. [76] showed that 2-round statistical
VSS is impossible for t ≥ n/3. We show that 3-round statistical VSS is possible
iff t < n/2. We also give an efficient 4-round protocol for t < n/2. Our protocols
require a 2-round reconstruction phase.
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A preliminary version of this work appeared in [69].
Related and Subsequent Work. Statistical VSS protocols have also been de-
signed assuming some form of a setup (e.g., a PKI). In such a setting, statistical VSS
protocols are often simpler to design, and enjoy better round complexity [35, 63, 68].
For instance, given a setup, the 11-round protocol of [23] can be immediately col-
lapsed to a 6-round protocol (also shown in [23]), and it is known how to collapse
this further into a 4-round protocol [68, 63]. We stress that our protocols do not
assume any setup.
As argued previously, the number of broadcast rounds in VSS protocols con-
tributes significantly to their round complexity in point-to-point networks. Given
a setup, it is known how to design a 5-round statistical VSS protocol tolerating
t < n/2 corrupted parties that uses broadcast in only a single round [63, 68]. In
the plain model (i.e., without any setup), prior work such as our own, has mainly
focused only on the round complexity of statistical VSS protocols when a broadcast
channel exists. Recent work by Garay et al. [38], subsequent to our own, addresses
this issue and shows a 9-round statistical VSS protocol with optimal resilience that
uses broadcast only in three rounds. In contrast, our protocols use broadcast in at
least four rounds.
Subsequent to our work, Backes et al. [1] investigated the round complexity
of computational VSS (with no additional setup) when t < n/2. They obtain an
optimal 2-round protocol for the same. Furthermore, they show that their construc-






In this chapter, we describe the network model, setup assumptions, and secu-
rity models. The basic network model and the security model vary slightly across
the different problems that we discuss. We take sufficient care to emphasize these
differences as we introduce the models. Following this, we present definitions of ba-
sic primitives. Finally, we include the description of the Dolev-Strong protocol [29]
that we employ as a subroutine in some of our constructions.
2.1 Network Model
We consider the standard setting in which a set of n parties, denoted by
P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, communicate in synchronous rounds via private and authenti-
cated channels in a fully connected, point-to-point network. If a channel connecting
two parties is private, then the adversary cannot learn anything about the mes-
sages exchanged between these two parties. If a channel connecting two parties is
authenticated, then the adversary cannot modify the messages or introduce a new
message such that the party who receives the message believes it to originate from
the other party. We remark that authenticated and private channels can be realized
using cryptographic primitives such as signatures and encryption.1 However, for the
1For adaptive adversaries, private channels may be realized using adaptively secure encryption.
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sake of simplicity, we assume that all channels in our network are unconditionally
private and authenticated, with the understanding that these guarantees (and the
guarantees for our protocols) hold only computationally if cryptographic means are
employed to realize them. In Chapters 5 and 6, we further assume the existence
of an authenticated broadcast channel that is available to all parties. A broadcast
channel allows any party to send the same message to all other parties (and all
parties to be assured they have received identical messages) in a single round. We
stress that we do not assume a simultaneous broadcast channel. More generally, we
assume that the adversary is rushing, i.e., in a given round, the adversary may wait
to see messages sent by other parties before computing its own messages to be sent
in the same round.
2.2 Setup Assumptions
Our protocols for verifiable secret sharing, presented in Chapters 5 and 6, do
not require any setup assumptions (other than a physical broadcast channel). How-
ever, our protocols for broadcast, presented in Chapters 3 and 4, are constructed
assuming a public-key infrastructure (PKI) and the existence of secure digital sig-
natures [48]. We give more details below.
A public-key infrastructure is established as follows: each party Pi runs a key-
generation algorithm Gen (specified by the protocol) to obtain public key pki along
with the corresponding secret key ski. Then all parties begin running the protocol
holding the same vector of public keys (pk1, . . . , pkn), and with each Pi holding ski.
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We note that malicious parties can generate their keys in an arbitrary fashion, e.g.,
dependent on the keys generated by parties.
In our protocols, we interpret the public key pki as a verification key for a
secure digital signature scheme, and the secret key ski as the corresponding signing
key. Our protocols for broadcast make extensive use of the signature scheme. For
the sake of clarity, we often omit additional information that must be signed along
with the messages sent across the network. This includes (a) the identity of the
recipient, (b) the current round number, (c) an identifier for the message in case
multiple messages are sent to the same recipient in the same round, and (d) an
identifier for the subprotocol in case multiple subprotocols are being run. Thus, in
general when we say a party signs a message, we implicitly assume that the party
generates a signature over the message concatenated with the additional information
described above. This information is also verified at the time of verification of the
signature.
2.3 Security Model
Our constructions are resilient against a centralized Byzantine (also called
active) adversary, typically denoted A. We say that a protocol tolerates t malicious
parties if it is secure against a centralized Byzantine adversary that can corrupt up
to t parties, and coordinate the actions of these parties. A corrupted party, under
the control of the adversary, might deviate from the prescribed protocol arbitrarily.
We say that a party is honest if it not corrupted.
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It is possible to consider a stronger security model where an adversary decides
which parties to corrupt depending on the protocol execution. Such an adversary
is called an adaptive adversary. In contrast, an adversary that can corrupt only a
fixed (but unknown) set of parties in advance of protocol execution is termed static.
We stress that our adaptively secure protocols do not assume erasure. Another
strengthening of the security model allows an adversary to coordinate its actions
across multiple protocols that are concurrently executed among the same (or a
subset of the) parties. Protocols that remain secure when composed with other
arbitrarily many protocols are said to be universally composable [11].
We give a brief overview of the exact security guarantees that our results pro-
vide. Our constructions in Chapter 3 are demonstrably insecure against an adaptive
adversary. Indeed, our main contribution there is an impossibility result against
static adversaries, which obviously rules out constructions against adaptive adver-
saries as well. In Chapter 4, we design universally composable broadcast protocols
secure against an adaptive adversary. Our protocol for perfect verifiable secret shar-
ing presented in Chapter 5 is proven secure against an adaptive adversary. Using
known composition results for perfectly secure protocols [70, 13], we conclude that
this protocol also achieves security under universal composition. Our protocols for
statistical verifiable secret sharing presented in Chapter 6 are secure in the pres-
ence of a static adversary. We conjecture that our constructions are universally
composable against adaptive adversaries as well.
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2.4 Basic Primitives
In this section we present traditional property-based definitions of broadcast
and verifiable secret sharing. We start with the formal definition of broadcast.
Definition 1 (Broadcast) A protocol for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a dis-
tinguished dealer D ∈ P holds an initial input m in some message spaceM, achieves
broadcast if the following hold (except with negligible probability):
Agreement All honest parties output the same value.
Validity If the dealer is honest, then all honest parties output m. ♦
Observe that the above definition refers to an arbitrary input m for the dealer.
However, while designing protocols, we assume for simplicity that the message space
M for the dealer’s input is {0,1}. Broadcast for arbitrary message spaces can be
obtained from binary broadcast using standard techniques [88].
We now present definitions of VSS and its variants. We require the dealer’s
secret, typically denoted by s, to lie in some finite field F.
First, we present the definition of perfect weak verifiable secret sharing (WSS).
Definition 2 (Perfect weak verifiable secret sharing) A two-phase protocol for
parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a distinguished dealer D ∈ P holds initial input
s ∈ F, is a WSS protocol tolerating t malicious parties if the following conditions hold
for any adversary controlling at most t parties:
Privacy If the dealer is honest at the end of the first phase (the sharing phase), then
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at the end of this phase the joint view of the malicious parties is independent
of the dealer’s input s.
Correctness Each honest party Pi outputs a value si at the end of the second phase
(the reconstruction phase). If the dealer is honest then si = s.
Weak commitment At the end of the sharing phase the joint view of the honest
parties defines a value s′ (which can be computed in polynomial time from this
view) such that each honest party will output either s′ or a default value ⊥ at
the end of the reconstruction phase. ♦
Next, we present the definition of perfect VSS below.
Definition 3 (Perfect verifiable secret sharing) A two-phase protocol for par-
ties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a distinguished dealer D ∈ P holds initial input s ∈ F,
is a VSS protocol tolerating t malicious parties if it satisfies the privacy and correctness
requirements of WSS as well as the following (stronger) commitment requirement:
Commitment At the end of the sharing phase the joint view of the honest parties
defines a value s′ (which can be computed in polynomial time from this view)
such that all honest parties will output s′ at the end of the reconstruction phase.
♦
Next, we present the definition of perfect VSS with 2-level sharing. Such VSS
protocols constitute a useful building block for protocols for general secure multi-
party computation (see, e.g., [63, 68]).
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Definition 4 (Perfect verifiable secret sharing with 2-level sharing) A two-
phase protocol for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a distinguished dealer D ∈ P
holds initial input s ∈ F, is a VSS protocol with 2-level sharing tolerating t malicious
parties if it satisfies the privacy and correctness requirements of VSS as well as the
following requirement:
Commitment with 2-level sharing At the end of the sharing phase each honest
party Pi outputs si and si,j for j ∈ [n], satisfying the following requirements:
1. There exists a polynomial p(x) of degree at most t such that si = p(i)
for every honest party Pi, and furthermore all honest parties will output
s′ = p(0) at the end of the reconstruction phase.
2. For each j ∈ [n], there exists a polynomial pj(x) of degree at most t such
that (1) pj(0) = p(j) and (2) si,j = pj(i) for every honest party Pi. ♦
This implies the commitment property of VSS, since the value s′ = p(0) that will
be output in the reconstruction phase is defined by the view of the honest parties
at the end of the sharing phase.
In the case of statistical VSS, we allow error with probability at most O(1/|F|),
so log |F| is the security parameter. Note that the dealer’s secret can be padded to
lie in a larger field, if desired, to reduce the probability of error.
Our definition of statistical VSS relaxes the correctness/commitment require-
ment, but not the privacy requirement. This is the definition that has been consid-
ered previously in the literature, and is the definition that our protocols in Chapter 6
achieve.
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Definition 5 (Statistical Verifiable Secret Sharing) Let λ be a statistical se-
curity parameter, and let ε = 2−Θ(λ). A two-phase protocol for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn},
where a distinguished dealer D ∈ P holds initial input s ∈ F, is a statistical VSS pro-
tocol tolerating t malicious parties if the following conditions hold for any adversary
controlling at most t parties:
Privacy If the dealer is honest at the end of the first phase (the sharing phase), then
at the end of this phase the joint view of the malicious parties is independent
of the dealer’s input s.
Correctness Each honest party Pi outputs a value si at the end of the second phase
(the reconstruction phase). If the dealer is honest, then except with probability
at most ε, it holds that si = s.
Commitment Except with probability at most ε, the joint view of the honest parties
at the end of the sharing phase defines a value s′ such that si = s
′ for every
honest Pi. ♦
2.5 The Dolev-Strong Protocol
We present a modified version of the Dolev-Strong [29] protocol for authen-
ticated broadcast for t < n. (See Figure 2.1.) The protocol assumes the existence
of a public-key infrastructure (PKI) and digital signature schemes secure against
adaptive chosen-message attacks [48]. The protocol is as secure as the signature
scheme employed.
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We note that the protocol presented in [29] is recursive, and requires parties
to sign over signatures of other parties. We present a simpler version of the Dolev-
Strong protocol that requires parties only to produce signatures over messages from
the message space [34, 81].
Protocol DSφ
The protocol is carried out among a set P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of parties. We let
D ∈ P denote the sender. We let m ∈ {0, 1} denote D’s input, and skD its secret
key.
• Stage 1: D sends (m, {SignskD(m)}) to every party. It then outputs m
and terminates the protocol. Each party initializes ACCi = ∅, SETi0 =
SETi1 = ∅.
• Stage 2: In rounds r = 1, . . . , φ+ 1, execute the following.
– If a pair (v,SET) is received from some Pj , with v ∈ {0, 1}, and if
SET contains valid signatures on v from at least r distinct parties




– Each party Pi checks whether any value v ∈ {0, 1} was newly added
to the set of accepted values ACCi during round r − 1. In this case,
Pi computes Signski(v), and sends (v,SET
i
v ∪ {Signski(v)}) to every
other party.
• Stage 3: If ACCi = {1}, then Pi outputs mi = 1, else it outputs mi = 0.
Figure 2.1: The Dolev-Strong protocol for broadcast.
At a high level, the protocol described in Figure 2.1 works as follows. Each
party Pi maintains an accepted set of values, denoted by ACCi. Furthermore, each
party Pi also collects signatures on the message 0 in SET
i
0, and on the message 1 in
SETi1. At the end of each round, each party Pi checks whether the size of the sets
SETi0, SET
i
1 exceeds a given threshold in which case they update the set of accepted
values ACCi. Finally, each party Pi computes an output depending on ACCi and
terminates the protocol.
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Theorem 1 [29] Suppose A corrupts at most t parties among P. Then, if n > t
and φ = t, protocol DSφ achieves broadcast.
Proof Suppose D is honest with input m then we argue that for every honest
Pi, it holds that ACCi = {m}. In fact, at the end of round 1, each Pi will receive
(m, SignskD(m)) from D, and thus will update ACCi to contain m. Now since an
honest D’s signature cannot be forged, any pair (1 − m, SET) received from any
party Pj, will never have SET contain a valid signature from D. Consequently,
ACCi will never be further updated to contain 1 − m. Thus, every honest Pi will
output mi = m, and we conclude that validity holds for an honest D.
Next, we need to show that agreement holds (even when D is dishonest).
Assume that Pi and Pj are honest. We will show that ACCi = ACCj holds at the
end of the protocol. Without loss of generality, let some value v ∈ ACCi be first
accepted by Pi in some round, say r. Observe that at this point, i.e., at the end of
round r, the set SETiv does not contain signatures from Pi, but contains r signatures
from distinct parties including the dealer D.
If r ≤ φ, then in round r + 1 party Pi sends (v, SETiv ∪ {Signski(v)}) to all
parties including Pj. Clearly, SET
i
v ∪ {Signski(v)} contains at least r + 1 signatures
from distinct parties including dealer D, and Pj will update ACCj to contain v.
On the other hand, when r = φ + 1 > t, then at the end of round r, SETiv
must contain a signature from at least one honest party, say Pk. Since honest
Pk’s signature cannot be forged, this implies that Pk must have sent (v, SET
k
v ∪
{Signskk(v)}) to all parties in some round r
′ ≤ r. In particular, this implies that
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ACCk must contain v and that SET
k
v must contain at least r
′ − 1 valid signatures
from distinct parties including dealer D. Thus, in round r′, both Pi and Pj would
have received (v, SET = SETkv ∪ {Signskk(v)}) from honest Pk. As SET contains r
′
valid signatures from distinct parties including dealer D, parties Pi and Pj must
have added v to ACCi and ACCj respectively. (We note that r
′ = r holds in order
to avoid a contradiction.) We conclude that whenever some value v is contained
in ACCi, it is also contained in ACCj. Thus ACCi = ACCj holds at the end of the
protocol, and agreement follows.
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Chapter 3
Broadcast with a Partially Compromised Public-Key Infrastructure
In this chapter, we give protocols for authenticated broadcast when the un-
derlying public-key infrastructure (PKI) is compromised. We assume a public-key
infrastructure (PKI), established as follows: each party Pi runs a key-generation
algorithm Gen (specified by the protocol) to obtain public key pki along with the
corresponding secret key ski. Then all parties begin running the protocol holding
the same vector of public keys (pk1, . . . , pkn), and with each Pi holding ski.
We model the failure of the PKI by allowing the adversary to learn some of
the secret keys corresponding to honest parties. More formally, we divide the set
of honest parties into those who have been compromised and those who have not
been compromised. If honest party Pi is compromised then the adversary A is given
that Pi’s secret key ski. We stress that compromised parties follow the protocol as
instructed: the only difference is that A is now able to forge signatures on their
behalf. On the other hand, we assume A is unable to forge signatures of any honest
parties who have not been compromised. We assume authenticated point-to-point
channels between all honest parties, even those who have been compromised. In
other words, although the adversary can forge the signature of an honest party Pi
who has been compromised, it cannot falsely inject a point-to-point message on Pi’s
behalf.
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With few exceptions [37, 52], most existing work treats any such compromised
party Pi as corrupt, and provides no guarantees for Pi in this case: the output
of Pi may disagree with the output of other honest parties, and validity is not
guaranteed when Pi is the dealer. As a concrete example, consider the Dolev-Strong
protocol presented in Section 2.5. Clearly, if D is compromised, then A can generate
SignskD(m
′) on its own for any m′ 6= m. Now consider an adversarial strategy in
which a corrupted party sends (m′, SignskD(m
′)) to all parties in round 1. It is easy
to verify that this simple adversarial strategy is sufficient to violate validity when
D is compromised.
We argue that compromised parties are most naturally viewed as honest parties
whose secret (signing) keys have been obtained somehow by the adversary. E.g.,
perhaps an adversary was able to hack into an honest user’s system and obtain their
secret key, but subsequently the honest party’s computer was re-booted and now
behaves honestly. Clearly, it would be preferable to ensure agreement and validity
for honest parties who have simply had the misfortune of having their signatures
forged.
This motivates the following definition of the problem of authenticated broad-
cast in our setting and our modeling of corruptions:
Definition 6 A protocol for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a distinguished dealer
D ∈ P holds an initial input m, is an authenticated broadcast protocol if the following
hold (except with negligible probability):
Agreement All honest parties output the same value.
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Validity If the dealer is honest, then all honest parties output m.
We stress that “honest” in the above includes those honest parties who have been
compromised. ♦
We model our adversary in the following way. An adversary A is called a
(ta, tc)-adversary if A actively corrupts up to ta parties and additionally compro-
mises up to tc of the honest parties. In a network of n parties, we call A a threshold
adversary if A chooses ta, tc subject to the restriction 2ta + min(ta, tc) < n; actively
corrupts up to ta parties; and compromises up to tc honest parties.
Our results. In the model described above, we obtain tight feasibility results for
the problem of authenticated broadcast when the PKI is compromised. Say n, ta, tc
satisfy the threshold condition if 2ta + min(ta, tc) < n. We show:
1. For every n, ta, tc satisfying the threshold condition, there exists an efficient
authenticated broadcast protocol.
2. Authenticated broadcast is impossible whenever ta, tc do not satisfy the thresh-
old condition (except when tc is fixed to 0).
3. Except for a few “exceptional” values of n, there does not exist a single, fixed
protocol achieving authenticated broadcast for all ta, tc satisfying the threshold
condition.
4. We give positive results for the exceptional values of n.
Taken together, our results provide a complete characterization of the problem.
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Organization. In Section 3.1 we show a protocol for broadcast when 2ta+min(ta, tc) <
n holds and the values of ta, tc are known to all parties. We show our impossibility
results in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 we give positive results for the exceptional
values of n. Finally, in Section 3.4, we give a protocol that is more efficient than the
one in Section 3.3, however the protocol works under the assumption that at least
one party in the network is honest and not compromised.
3.1 Broadcast for (ta, tc)-Adversaries
In this section, we prove the following result:
Theorem 2 Fix n, ta, tc with 2ta + min(ta, tc) < n. Then there exists a protocol
achieving broadcast in the presence of a (ta, tc)-adversary.
The case of ta ≤ tc is easy: ta ≤ tc implies 3ta < n and the parties can run a
standard (unauthenticated) broadcast protocol [79, 71] where the PKI is not used
at all. (In this case, it makes no difference whether honest parties are compromised
or not.) The challenge is to design a protocol for tc < ta, and we deal with this case
for the remainder of this section.
Let DSφ refer to the Dolev-Strong protocol [29] that achieves broadcast with a
PKI, in the usual sense (i.e., when no honest parties’ keys can be compromised) when
φ = t, for any t < n corrupted parties. (The Dolev-Strong protocol is presented in
Section 2.5.) We prove a slightly stronger version of Theorem 1.
Lemma 3 Suppose A corrupts at most ta parties, and further compromises at most
tc parties. Then, if n > ta + tc and φ = ta + tc, protocol DSφ achieves the following:
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• If D is honest and non-compromised, then validity holds.
• Agreement holds. Further, if Pi and Pj are honest, then ACCi = ACCj holds
at the end of the protocol.
• If D is honest, and if |ACCi| = 1 holds for some honest party Pi, then validity
holds.
Proof Suppose D is honest and non-compromised with input m then we argue
that for every honest Pi, it holds that ACCi = {m}. In fact, at the end of round 1,
each Pi will receive (m, SignskD(m)) from D, and thus will update ACCi to contain
m. Now since an honest and non-compromised D’s signature cannot be forged, any
pair (1 −m, SET) received from any party Pj, will never have SET contain a valid
signature from D. Consequently, ACCi will never be further updated to contain
1 −m. Thus, every honest Pi will output mi = m, and we conclude that validity
holds for an honest and non-compromised D.
Next, we need to show that agreement holds (even when D is dishonest).
Assume that Pi and Pj are honest. We will show that ACCi = ACCj holds at the
end of the protocol. Without loss of generality, let some value v ∈ ACCi be first
accepted by Pi in some round, say r. Observe that at this point, i.e., at the end of
round r, the set SETiv does not contain signatures from Pi, but contains r signatures
from distinct parties including the dealer D.
If r ≤ φ, then in round r + 1 party Pi sends (v, SETiv ∪ {Signski(v)}) to all
parties including Pj. Clearly, SET
i
v ∪ {Signski(v)} contains at least r + 1 signatures
from distinct parties including dealer D, and Pj will update ACCj to contain v.
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On the other hand, when r = φ+ 1 > ta+ tc, then at the end of round r, SET
i
v
must contain a signature from at least one honest and non-compromised party, say
Pk. Since honest and non-compromised Pk’s signature cannot be forged, this implies
that Pk must have sent (v, SET
k
v ∪ Signskk(v)) to all parties in some round r
′ ≤ r.
In particular, this implies that ACCk must contain v and that SET
k
v must contain at
least r′−1 valid signatures from distinct parties including dealer D. Thus, in round
r′, both Pi and Pj would have received (v, SET = SET
k
v ∪ {Signskk(v)}) from honest
Pk. As SET contains r
′ valid signatures from distinct parties including dealer D,
parties Pi and Pj must have added v to ACCi and ACCj respectively. (We note that
r′ = r holds in order to avoid a contradiction.) We conclude that whenever some
value v is contained in ACCi, then it is also contained in ACCj. Thus ACCi = ACCj
holds at the end of the protocol, and agreement follows.
Finally, consider the case when D is honest but compromised with input m.
In this case, at the end of round 1, each Pi will receive (m, SignskD(m) from D, and
thus will update ACCi to contain m. Observe that once a value is added to ACCi
it is never deleted. Thus, if |ACCi| = 1 holds at the end of the protocol then it
must hold that ACCi = {m}. Recall that when Pi and Pj are honest, it holds that
ACCi = ACCj. Therefore, for every honest Pj, it must also hold that ACCj = {m},
and validity follows.
We say that party Pi declares an execution of DSφ clean if |ACCi| = 1, and
dirty otherwise. From the proof above, we conclude that honest parties agree on
whether an execution of DSφ is clean (or dirty) when n > ta + tc and φ = ta + tc.
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Protocol 1
The protocol is carried out among a set P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of parties. For
notational convenience, we let D denote the dealer (though in fact any party
can act as dealer). We let m ∈ {0, 1} denote D’s input. In the following,
we use DS to denote an execution of DSφ with φ = ta + tc.
• Stage 1: D sends m to all other parties. Let m′i be the value received
by Pi from D in this step (if the dealer sends nothing to Pi, then m
′
i
is taken to be some default value).
• Stage 2: In parallel, each party Pi acts as the dealer in an execution
of DS(m′i) (the original dealer D runs DS(m)). We let |CLEAN0| (resp.,
|CLEAN1|) denote the number of executions of DS that are both clean
and result in output 0 (resp., 1). (Note that all honest parties agree
on sets CLEAN0,CLEAN1.)
• Stage 3: If |CLEAN0| ≥ |CLEAN1| then each Pi sets mi = 0; other-
wise, Pi sets mi = 1. Each Pi outputs mi.
Figure 3.1: A broadcast protocol for tc < ta and 2ta + tc < n.
Observe that DSφ fails to satisfy Definition 6 only when the dealer is honest
but compromised. Our protocol (cf. Figure 3.1) guarantees validity even in this case
(while leaving the other cases unaffected). In our protocol description, and in the
rest of the chapter, we will always set φ = ta + tc. Simplifying the notation, we use
DS to denote an execution of DSφ with φ = ta + tc.
Theorem 4 Let A be a (ta, tc)-adversary with tc < ta and 2ta + tc < n. Then
Protocol 1 achieves broadcast in the presence of A.
Proof We prove agreement and validity. Note that n > ta + tc, so Lemma 3
applies.
Agreement: By Lemma 3, the output of each honest party is the same in every
execution of DS in the second stage of the protocol, and all honest parties agree on
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whether any given execution of DS is clean or dirty. So all honest parties agree on
|CLEAN0| and |CLEAN1|, and agreement follows.
Validity: Assume the dealer is honest (whether compromised or not). Letting th
denote the number of honest, non-compromised parties, we have th + ta + tc = n >
2ta + tc and so th > ta. Thus, there are th honest and non-compromised parties that
act as dealers in the second stage of Protocol 1, and each of these parties runs DS(m)
where m is the initial input of D. By Lemma 3, all honest parties output m in (at
least) these th executions, and each of these th executions is clean. Furthermore,
there can be at most ta clean executions resulting in output 1−m, as only adversarial
parties will possibly run DS(1−m) in the second stage. The majority value output
by the honest parties is therefore always equal to the original dealer’s input m.
3.2 Impossibility Results
In this section we show two different impossibility results. First, we show
that there is no protocol achieving broadcast in the presence of a (ta, tc)-adversary
when n ≤ 2ta + min(ta, tc) and tc > 0, thus proving that Theorem 2 is tight. We
then consider the case when ta, tc are not fixed, but instead all that is guaranteed
is that 2ta + min(ta, tc) < n. (In the previous section, unauthenticated broadcast
was used to handle the case ta ≤ tc and Protocol 1 assumed tc < ta. Here we seek
a single protocol that handles both cases.) We show that in this setting, broadcast
is impossible for almost all n.
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3.2.1 The Three-Party Case
We first present a key lemma involving three parties that will be useful for
the proofs of both results described above. Our presentation of the three-party
impossibility proof closely follows the presentation in [34] which considers a different
security model. The explanatory figures in the proof are inspired by suggestions
from an anonymous reviewer, and the presentation in [58], a subsequent work that
generalizes our results to the non-threshold setting.
Lemma 5 Broadcast among n = 3 parties {P1, P2, P3} with P1 acting as dealer is
not achievable in the presence of an adversary A that can choose to corrupt in one
of the following ways:
• A actively corrupts P1, and compromises the secret key of no other honest
party.
• A actively corrupts P2, and compromises the secret key of P1.
• A actively corrupts P3, and compromises the secret key of P1.
Proof Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there exists a protocol Π for achiev-
ing broadcast in the presence of adversary A as specified in the statement of the
lemma. Let Π1,Π2,Π3 denote the program specified by protocol Π for parties
P1, P2, P3 respectively. (See Figure 3.2.)
We analyze the protocol Π in a modified network shown in Figure 3.3. In the
modified network, two independent identical copies of program Π1, namely Π1,0 and




Figure 3.2: The real network among parties P1, P2, P3 where protocol Π is executed.
to Π3 are discarded, while all messages it sends to Π2 are correctly delivered to Π2.
Similarly, all messages sent by program Π1,1 to Π2 are discarded, while all messages
it sends to Π3 are correctly delivered to Π3. Next, all messages sent by program Π2
to Π1 in the real network are now routed to program Π1,0 in the modified network.
In particular, Π1,1 does not receive any messages from Π2 in the modified network.
Similarly, all messages sent by program Π3 to Π1 in the real network are now routed
to program Π1,1 in the modified network, and Π1,0 does not receive any messages
from Π3. In other words, programs Π1,0 and Π3 never exchange any messages in the
modified network. Similarly, programs Π1,1 and Π2 never exchange any messages in
the modified network. Finally, programs Π2 and Π3 interact with each other in the
modified network in the same way as they would in the real network.
We stress that the secret (and public) key used by each of the programs
Π1,Π1,0, and Π1,1 is identical to the secret (and public) key used by P1. We are
now ready to prove some relationships between executions of Π in the real network
that happen in the presence of A, and executions of Π in the modified network




Figure 3.3: The modified network with two copies Π1,0,Π1,1 of P1’s program Π1.
Note that the modified network disables any interaction (represented by the black
square at the end of the links) between Π1,0 and P3, and also between Π1,1 and P2.
Claim 6 There exists an adversary A that actively corrupts P1 such that the fol-
lowing holds for every protocol Π and for every pair of public/secret keys held by P2
and P3. The joint view of P2 and P3 interacting with programs Π1,0 and Π1,1 in an
execution of Π in the modified network is perfectly indistinguishable from the joint
view of P2 and P3 interacting with A in an execution of Π in the real network.
Proof An adversary A corrupting P1 obviously has access to its secret keys, and
thus access to the secret keys used by programs Π1,0 and Π1,1. Now, instead of exe-
cuting program Π1 in the real network, A perfectly simulates programs Π1,0 and Π1,1
as shown in Figure 3.4. More concretely, A internally runs (independent) programs
Π1,0 and Π1,1 in the following way. A simulates Π1,0 such that Π1,0 exchanges mes-
sages only with P2. Similarly, A simulates Π1,1 such that Π1,1 exchanges messages
only with P3. The claim follows immediately.
Claim 7 There exists an adversary A that actively corrupts P2 and compromises




Figure 3.4: The adversary corrupting P1 simulates Π1,0 and Π1,1 interacting with P2
and P3 in the real network.
pair of public/secret keys held by P1 and P3. The joint view of P1 and P3 interacting
with programs Π2 and Π1,0 in an execution of Π in the modified network is perfectly
indistinguishable from the joint view of P1 and P3 interacting with A in an execution
of Π in the real network.
Proof An adversary A that compromises the secret key of P1 obviously has access
to the secret key used by program Π1,0. Now, instead of allowing program Π2 to
interact with P1 in the real network, A perfectly simulates programs Π1,0 (using
P1’s secret key) and Π2 (using P2’s secret key) as if they are run in the modified
network (see Figure 3.5). More concretely, acting as P2, adversary A discards any
message received from Π1, and instead internally runs program Π1,0 and simulates
its interaction with Π2. In A’s simulation, every message sent by Π2 to Π1 is now
routed to Π1,0, and every message sent by Π1,0 to Π3 is simply discarded by A.
Given this, observe that an execution of Π in the real network exactly mimics an




Figure 3.5: The adversary corrupting P2 and compromising P1’s keys simulates Π1,0
(using P1’s secret key) and Π2 (using P2’s secret key) interacting with P1 and P3 in
the real network.
Claim 8 There exists an adversary A that actively corrupts P3 and compromises
the secret key of P1 such that the following holds for every protocol Π and for every
pair of public/secret keys held by P1 and P2. The joint view of P1 and P2 interacting
with programs Π3 and Π1,0 in an execution of Π in the modified network is perfectly
indistinguishable from the joint view of P1 and P2 interacting with A in an execution
of Π in the real network.
Proof An adversary A that compromises the secret key of P1 obviously has access
to the secret key used by program Π1,0. Now, instead of allowing program Π3 to
interact with P1 in the real network, A perfectly simulates programs Π1,1 (using
P1’s secret key) and Π3 (using P3’s secret key) as if they are run in the modified
network (see Figure 3.6). More concretely, acting as P3, adversary A discards any
message received from Π1, and instead internally runs program Π1,1 and simulates
its interaction with Π3. In A’s simulation, every message sent by Π3 to Π1 is now
routed to Π1,1, and every message sent by Π1,1 to Π2 is simply discarded by A.
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Given this, observe that an execution of Π in the real network exactly mimics an
execution of Π in the modified network. The claim follows immediately.
Π1,0" Π1,1"
Π3"Π2"
Figure 3.6: The adversary corrupting P3 and compromising P1’s keys simulates Π1,1
(using P1’s secret key) and Π3 (using P3’s secret key) interacting with P1 and P2 in
the real network.
We will now focus on executions of Π in the modified network. Recall that in
the modified network, none of the four programs Π1,0,Π1,1,Π2, and Π3 are corrupted.
Further, observe that the modified network has two dealers each running Π1,0 and
Π1,1 respectively. Aiming for a contradiction, suppose that one copy of Π1, say Π1,0,
is initialized with input 0, and the other copy, i.e., Π1,1, is initialized with input 1.
Note that each of the four programs running in the modified network will ultimately
terminate outputting some bit (or a default value). Thus for every execution of Π
in the modified network, there must be one set of adjacent programs, i.e., one
set among S3 = {Π1,0,Π2}, S1 = {Π2,Π3}, S2 = {Π3,Π1,1} such that validity or
agreement does not hold for parties executing programs in that set. This implies
that there exists a set S ∈ {S1, S2, S3} such that over all possible executions, either
validity or agreement does not hold for parties executing programs contained in S
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with probability at least 1/3.
To transfer these observations in the modified network onto the real network,
we will pick one of the following strategies at random.
• Let A be the adversary implied by Claim 8. Observe that A actively corrupts
P3, and compromises the secret key of P1. In this case, we let S
′ = S1.
• Let A be the adversary implied by Claim 6. Observe that A actively corrupts
P1, and compromises the secret key of no other honest party. In this case, we
let S ′ = S2.
• Let A be the adversary implied by Claim 7. Observe that A actively corrupts
P2, and compromises the secret key of P1. In this case, we let S
′ = S3.
In each of the above cases, observe that the joint view of the honest parties
interacting with A in the real network is perfectly indistinguishable from their joint
view in the modified network. Next, note that in each scenario, S ′ denotes exactly
the programs executed by the honest parties in the modified network. Thus, when
S = S ′ holds we conclude that adversary A violates either the validity or agreement
conditions for the honest parties in the real network with probability 1/3. Since S ′
is chosen at random, we have that for every protocol Π, adversary A succeeds in
violating either the validity or agreement for honest parties with probability at least
1/9.
We remark that Lemma 5 holds only when P1 acts as the dealer. Indeed, when
P2 or P3 act as the dealer, it is possible to design a simple protocol for broadcast
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tolerating A described in the statement of Lemma 5. For instance, suppose P2 acts
as the dealer. Observe that A never compromises the secret key of an honest P2.
Consider the following protocol for broadcast. In the first round, P2 sends a signature
on his input message to P1 and P3. In the next round, P1 and P3 exchange the signed
messages received from P2. If P2’s signature appears on different messages, then P1
and P3 output some default value. Else, they output the single value that has P2’s
signature on it. This completes the description of the protocol. To see why this
protocol works, observe that when P2 is honest and non-compromised, P1 and P3
will obtain signatures on the same message, and the adversary cannot create a valid
signature on a different message. Therefore, honest parties will output the same
message in this case. On the other hand, if P2 is malicious, we only need agreement,
and it is easy to see that agreement holds at the end of the second round. As was
also pointed out in [58], the above gives a non-trivial example of a setting where
authenticated broadcast is possible when one party acts as the dealer, and impossible
when a different party acts as the dealer.
3.2.2 Impossibility of Broadcast for 2ta + min(ta, tc) ≥ n
In this section, we extend the three-party impossibility result to the multi-
party setting when thresholds ta, tc are known. We do this using a standard player-
partitioning argument.
Theorem 9 Fix n, ta, tc with n ≥ 3, tc > 0 and 2ta + min(ta, tc) ≥ n. There is no
protocol achieving broadcast in the presence of a (ta, tc)-adversary.
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Proof Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there exists a protocol Π for achieiv-
ing broadcast among n parties in P = {P1, . . . , Pn} in the presence of a (ta, tc)-
adversary.
We partition the set of n parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn} into P1, P2, and P3 in the
following way. P2 and P3 each contain at least one party, and at most ta parties. P1
contains at most min(ta, tc) parties including the dealer. Indeed, such a partition
exists since tc > 0 and 2ta + min(ta, tc) ≥ |P| = n ≥ 3. Let Π1,Π2,Π3 denote the
program specified by protocol Π for parties in the sets P1,P2,P3 respectively. In
more detail, each program Πi (for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) represents the joint input/output
behavior of the individual subprograms executed by parties in Pi.
Consider an adversary A that can choose to corrupt in one of the following
ways:
• A actively corrupts all parties in P1, and compromises the secret key of no
other honest party.
• A actively corrupts all parties in P2, and compromises the secret keys of all
parties in P1.
• A actively corrupts all parties in P3, and compromises the secret keys of all
parties in P1.
Verify that A is indeed a (ta, tc)-adversary since |P1| ≤ min(ta, tc) ≤ ta, and
|P2|, |P3| ≤ ta.
Now the proof proceeds in the same way as the proof of Lemma 5. More
concretely, we analyze executions on Π in a modified network among four programs
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Π1,0,Π1,1,Π2, and Π3. As before, in the modified network two independent identical
copies of program Π1, namely Π1,0 and Π1,1 are run in place of Π1. The modified
network is exactly as shown in Figure 3.3 where a bidirectional link between two
programs is interpreted as a complete network of bidirectional links between the
individual subprograms contained in those two programs. Thus, all messages sent
between individual subprograms run as part of Π1,0 and individual subprograms
run as part of Π2 are discarded. Similarly all messages sent between individual
subprograms run as part of Π1,1 and individual subprograms run as part of Π3 are
discarded. All other messages are exchanged as in the real network.
It is straightforward to verify that each of Claims 6, 7, and 8 still hold when
P1, P2, P3 are replaced by P1,P2,P3 in their respective statements. Thus, we can
conclude that the joint view of honest parties executing protocol Π in the real
network is indistinguishable from the joint view of honest parties executing protocol
Π in the modified network. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the proof of Lemma 5,
assigning the dealer in Π1,0 with input 0, and the dealer in Π1,1 with input 1, we
are guaranteed that there exist at least two honest parties in P for whom either
validity or agreement is violated with probability at least 1/3, and that A succeeds
in violating the same with probability at least 1/9. This completes the proof of the
theorem.
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3.2.3 Impossibility of Broadcast with a Threshold Adversary
We now turn to the case of the threshold adversary. Recall that in this setting
the exact values of ta and tc used by the adversary are not known; we only know
that they satisfy 2ta + min(ta, tc) < n (and we do allow tc = 0). In what follows,
we show that secure broadcast is impossible if n /∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12}. For the
“exceptional” values of n, we demonstrate feasibility in Section 3.3.
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for all n > 1 except n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12}.)
Proof Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there exists a protocol Π for achieiv-
ing broadcast among n parties in P = {P1, . . . , Pn} in the presence of a threshold
adversary.
We partition the set of n parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn} into P1, P2, and P3 in










parties including the dealer. Indeed, such a











Let Π1,Π2,Π3 denote the program specified by protocol Π for parties in the sets
P1,P2,P3 respectively. In more detail, each program Πi (for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) represents
the joint input/output behavior of the individual subprograms executed by parties
in Pi.
Consider an adversary A that can choose to corrupt in one of the following
ways:
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• A actively corrupts all parties in P1, and compromises the secret key of no
other honest party.
• A actively corrupts all parties in P2, and compromises the secret keys of all
parties in P1.
• A actively corrupts all parties in P3, and compromises the secret keys of all
parties in P1.
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Now the proof proceeds in the same way as the proof of Lemma 5. More
concretely, we analyze executions on Π in a modified network among four programs
Π1,0,Π1,1,Π2, and Π3. As before, in the modified network two independent identical
copies of program Π1, namely Π1,0 and Π1,1 are run in place of Π1. The modified
network is exactly as shown in Figure 3.3 where a bidirectional link between two
programs is interpreted as a complete network of bidirectional links between the
individual subprograms contained in those two programs. Thus, all messages sent
between individual subprograms run as part of Π1,0 and individual subprograms
run as part of Π2 are discarded. Similarly, all messages sent between individual
subprograms run as part of Π1,1 and individual subprograms run as part of Π3 are
discarded. All other messages are exchanged correctly.
It is straightforward to verify that each of Claims 6, 7, and 8 still hold when
P1, P2, P3 are replaced by P1,P2,P3 in their respective statements. Thus, we can
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conclude that the joint view of honest parties executing protocol Π in the real
network is indistinguishable from the joint view of honest parties executing protocol
Π in the modified network. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the proof of Lemma 5,
assigning the dealer in Π1,0 with input 0, and the dealer in Π1,1 with input 1, we
are guaranteed that there exist at least two honest parties in P for whom either
validity or agreement is violated with probability at least 1/3, and that A succeeds
in violating the same with probability at least 1/9. This completes the proof of the
theorem.
3.3 Handling the Exceptional Values of n
We refer to {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12} as the set of exceptional values for n. (These
are the only positive, integer values of n for which Theorem 10 does not apply.) We
show for any exceptional value of n a broadcast protocol that is secure against any
threshold adversary. Designing protocols in this setting is more difficult than in the
setting of Section 3.1, since the honest parties are no longer assumed to “know”
whether ta ≤ tc.
Our main construction, which we refer to as ALSP, is an authenticated version
of the exponential broadcast protocol of Lamport et al. [71] with parameter ψ; see
Figure 3.7. Our protocol for broadcast is presented in Figure 3.8. Although the
message complexity of this protocol is exponential in the number of parties, the
maximum number of parties considered here is 12.
Suppose the dealer’s input message is m. In Protocol 2, the dealer signs this
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Protocol ALSP(P, D, m̃, ψ)
Inputs: The protocol is parameterized by an integer ψ. Let D be the dealer
with input m̃ of the form m̃ = (“m”,SignskD(m)).
• Stage 1: D sends m̃ = (“m”,SignskD(m)) to all parties, and outputs m.
Let m̃′i denote the value received by Pi. If m̃
′
i is invalid (in particular, does
not contain a valid signature of D) then it sets m̃′i = 0. If ψ = 0, then each
party Pi outputs m̃i = m̃
′
i, and terminates.
• Stage 2: Each Pi ∈ P \ {D} executes ALSP(P \
{D}, Pi, (“m̃′i”, Sigski(m̃
′





j ”, ?) denote its output of this execution.
• Stage 3: Each Pj ∈ P \ {D} computes PARTjm′ = {Pi | m
(i)
j contains
a valid signature from D on m′}. Pj obtains mj such that |PARTjm′ | is
maximized for m′ = mj . Then, it obtains m̃j as lexicographically first




m′ = ∅ for all m
′, then Pj sets
m̃j = 0.) Finally, Pj outputs m̃j .
Figure 3.7: Protocol ALSP.
message using his secret key skD, and then executes protocol ALSP using input
m̃ = (“m”, SigskD(m)). In general, we use the notation (“m”, ?) to denote such
messages, with ? acting as a placeholder for an arbitrary (possibly invalid) signature.
We let th = n − tc − ta denote the number of honest and non-compromised
parties. One useful observation about threshold adversaries that we will repeatedly





, it follows that th > ta.
The next two lemmas are inspired by [71].
Lemma 11 If D is honest and ψ < n− 2ta holds, then ALSP(P , D, m̃, ψ) achieves
validity and agreement in the following sense. Each honest Pj outputs a message
m̃j which contains a valid signature from D, and further, if m̃ = (“m”, ?), and
m̃j = (“mj”, ?), then m = mj holds for every honest Pj ∈ P \ {D}.
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Proof The proof is by induction on ψ. First observe that when D is honest, it
ensures (perhaps, by setting an invalid message to 0) that m̃ is always valid and
contains its signature. Given this, clearly the lemma is true for ψ = 0. We now
assume that the lemma is true for ψ − 1, and prove it for ψ.
Each honest Pi ∈ P \ {D} executes ALSP with input (“m̃′i”, Sigski(m̃
′
i)) with
m̃′i = m̃. Since by hypothesis ψ < n − 2ta, we have ψ − 1 < n − 1 − 2ta, so





i for honest Pi, and thus each honest Pi ∈ PARTjm since m̃′i = m̃ = (“m”, ?)
contains a valid signature from D. Since there are at most ta corrupt parties, and
n − 1 > 2ta + ψ − 1 ≥ 2ta, a majority of parties in P \ {D} are honest. Thus,
PARTjm′ is maximized only for m
′ = m, so each honest party Pj outputs mj = m.
Lemma 12 If n > 3ψ and ψ ≥ ta, then ALSP(P , D, m̃, ψ) achieves validity and
agreement in the following sense. Suppose m̃ = (“m”, ?), and for each party Pj, let
m̃j = (“mj”, ?) denote its output. Then mj = mk holds for every honest Pj, Pk ∈ P.
Furthermore, if D is honest, then mj = m holds for every honest party Pj ∈ P.
Proof The proof is by induction on ψ. If there is no corrupted party, then no
party sends an invalid signature. Given this, clearly the lemma is true when ψ = 0.
We now assume that the lemma is true for ψ − 1, and prove it for ψ.
We first consider the case when D is honest. Since n > 3ψ and ψ ≥ ta, we
have n > 2ta + ψ, i.e., ψ < n − 2ta. Thus, we can apply Lemma 11 (which proves
something stronger for an honest D) and conclude that this lemma holds. Now we
only need to prove the lemma when D is corrupt.
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Since there are at most ta corrupt parties, andD is one of them, so at most ta−1
of the remaining n−1 parties are corrupt. Furthermore, observe that n−1 > 3(ψ−1),
and ψ−1 ≥ ta−1 still hold. We therefore apply the induction hypothesis to conclude
that the lemma holds for each ALSP execution with ψ− 1. That is, for every honest





Given this, it follows that PARTjm′ = PART
k
m′ holds for every m
′. Thus, the lemma
holds for ALSP executions with parameter ψ.
We now prove several additional lemmas about ALSP.
Lemma 13 If D is honest and non-compromised, then ALSP(P , D, m̃, ψ) achieves
validity and agreement for any ψ.
Proof Clearly, each honest Pj receives a valid message m̃ in Stage 1. Thus, each
honest Pj obtains output m
(j)
j = m̃ from its own ALSP execution in Stage 2. There-
fore, PARTjm̃ is non-empty. Furthermore, since D is honest and non-compromised,
PARTjm′ is empty for every m
′ 6= m̃. PARTjm′ is maximized only for m′ = m̃, so
agreement and validity follow immediately.
Lemma 14 Let th be the number of honest and non-compromised parties in P, and
let ta be the number of actively corrupted parties in P. If D is honest, and th > ta,
then protocol ALSP(P , D, m̃, ψ) achieves validity and agreement for any ψ.
Proof The proof is by induction on ψ. First observe that when D is honest, it
ensures (perhaps, by setting an invalid message to 0) that m̃ is always valid and
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contains its signature. Given this, clearly the lemma is true for ψ = 0. We now
assume that the lemma is true for ψ − 1, and prove it for ψ.
When D is non-compromised, the lemma follows from Lemma 13. Now we
only need to prove the lemma when D is compromised.
Observe that whenD is compromised, the number of honest and non-compromised
parties in P \{D} is still th, and the number of actively corrupted parties in P \{D}
is still ta. Since by hypothesis th > ta, we can apply the induction hypothesis to
conclude that for every honest Pi ∈ P \ {D}, protocol ALSP(P \ {D}, Pi, m̃′i, ψ− 1)
achieves validity and agreement. Since for an honest Pi we have m̃
′
i= m̃, so for every
Pj, PART
j
m̃ contains all honest parties. Furthermore, the number of honest parties
in P \ {D} is at least th which is in turn greater than ta, so PARTjm′ is maximized
only for m′ = m̃. Given this, validity and agreement follow immediately for ALSP
executions with parameter ψ.










, then ψ < n− 2ta holds.
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), we obtain the following corollary.





, then protocol ALSP(P , D, m̃, ψ)
achieves validity and agreement.
The following trivial facts and the corollary above imply our next lemma.




























The protocol is carried out among a set P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of parties. For nota-
tional convenience, we let D denote the dealer (though in fact any party can act
as dealer). We let m ∈ {0, 1} denote D’s input, and skD its signing key.












• Let m̃′i = (m′i, ?) be Pi’s output in the above. Pi outputs mi = m′i and
terminates.
Figure 3.8: Broadcast against a threshold adversary.
Lemma 18 If D is honest, then Protocol 2 achieves broadcast for n ∈ {5, 6, 8, 9, 12}.
Lemma 19 Protocol 2 achieves broadcast for n ∈ {5, 6, 8}.
Proof By Lemma 18, we see that the lemma is true when D is honest. We now
turn to a malicious dealer. Consider the n − 1 ALSP executions in Stage 2. Since
the dealer is malicious, at most ta−1 out of the n−1 parties in P \{D} are corrupt.





for a threshold adversary, so by Fact 16 we have





≥ ta − 1, and n− 1 > 3(ψ − 1). Thus, we can
apply Lemma 12 to conclude that agreement and validity is achieved in all ALSP
executions in Stage 2. Given this, it is easy to see that there is agreement among
the outputs of honest parties in Stage 3. Thus, the lemma holds.
Lemma 20 Protocol 2 achieves broadcast for n ∈ {9, 12}.
Proof By Lemma 18, we see that the lemma is true when D is honest. We now
turn to the case when D is malicious. Consider the n−1 ALSP executions in Stage 2.
Out of these n − 1 executions, we focus first on executions with a honest dealer.












Corollary 15, we conclude that agreement and validity are achieved in all Stage 2
ALSP executions with a honest dealer.
We now turn to the Stage 2 ALSP executions with a malicious dealer D′. Since
the dealer is malicious, at most ta − 2 out of the n − 2 parties in P \ {D,D′} are





+ 1 ≥ ta−2 and n−2 > 3(ψ−2).
Applying Lemma 12, we conclude that agreement and validity are achieved in all
ALSP executions among parties in P\{D,D′}. Given this, it is easy to see that there
is agreement among the outputs of honest parties in ALSP(P \ {D}, D′, ?, ψ − 1).
Thus, we conclude that agreement is achieved in all Stage 2 ALSP executions
in ALSP(P , D, ?, ψ) irrespective of whether the dealer is honest or malicious. Given
this, agreement among the outputs of honest parties in Stage 3 of ALSP(P , D, ?, ψ)
follows immediately, and the lemma holds.
Theorem 21 For any value n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12} there exists a protocol for n
parties that achieves broadcast in the presence of a threshold adversary.
Proof The case n = 2 is trivial. When n = 3, it follows from our constraints that
ta ≤ 1 and tc = 0, so we can run any authenticated byzantine agreement protocol.
When n = 4, it follows from our constraints that ta ≤ 1, and therefore that n > 3ta,
so we can ignore the PKI and run a protocol that is secure without authentication.
By Lemma 19 and Lemma 20, we have that Protocol 2 achieves broadcast when
n ∈ {5, 6, 8, 9, 12}. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
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3.4 A More Efficient Protocol When th > 0
As in the previous section, we refer to {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12} as the set of excep-
tional values for n. We show for any exceptional value of n a broadcast protocol
that is secure against any threshold adversary. A full proof of the above was given
in Section 3.3, but it was based on the exponential algorithm of Lamport et al. [71]
rather than the more efficient protocol of Dolev-Strong [29]. In this section, we
deal with the “easier” case where there is guaranteed to be at least one honest,
non-compromised party1 (i.e., ta + tc < n). This assumption allows us to provide a
protocol that is based on the more efficient construction of Dolev-Strong (cf. Section
2.5), similar to the protocol we presented in Section 3.1.
As in Section 3.1, our protocol begins with the dealer sending its input (here
referred to as m) to each party; each party then runs DS(m). However, because we
no longer know whether ta ≤ tc, the following problem arises: when the dealer is
honest but compromised and ta ≤ tc, we cannot be sure that the value output in
the majority of clean runs is m. It is possible that th < ta, and (recalling that the
adversary can force all executions of DS by compromised parties to be dirty) it is
feasible for the adversary to force the majority of clean runs to have output 1−m.
To address this, we design our protocol to carefully look at the number of clean
runs and use this information in a particular way when determining the output.
1The difficulty that arises when ta + tc = n is that the compromised parties may not agree
on whether an execution of DS is clean or dirty (since Lemma 3 no longer holds). This is not a
problem in Section 3.1 because, there, whenever ta + tc < n, the parties run an unauthenticated
broadcast protocol that does not use a PKI.
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Specifically, notice that if there are many dirty runs d (specifically, d > 2n/3) then
the honest parties can conclude that ta < n/3: this follows because 2n/3 < d ≤
ta + tc, so if ta ≥ n/3 then we would have n ≤ 2ta + min(ta, tc), exceeding the
assumed threshold. Thus, when many dirty runs are detected the parties can switch
to running any unauthenticated broadcast protocol that does not use the PKI at all.
(We use the unauthenticated broadcast protocol based on the consensus protocol
of Berman et al. [6], denoted by BGP as a subprotocol in this case.) On the other
hand, when there are few dirty runs (roughly less than n/3), intuitively the parties
can safely trust the majority output of the clean runs.
The above leaves a “gap” in which there are too few dirty runs to conclude
that n > 3ta, and too many to trust the majority output of the clean runs. This is
only problematic if the number of clean runs resulting in output m is close to the
number of clean runs resulting in output 1 −m, and this balance will allow us to
extract one last piece of information. Such a balance can occur in only two ways.
The first is when a Byzantine dealer gives m to some non-faulty parties and 1−m
to others, splitting the clean runs almost evenly between them. In this case we only
need to worry about agreement since the dealer is Byzantine. The more difficult
case involves a compromised dealer, since then correctness is also required. Here
the key is to note that all clean runs with honest dealers result in output m; thus,
to achieve the assumed balance, almost all the Byzantine parties must run cleanly
with output 1−m. If most of the Byzantine parties give clean executions, it follows
that the dealers in dirty executions are honest (but compromised), and we can rely
on them to correct the majority value back to m. The protocol is described in
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Protocol 3
The protocol is carried out among a set P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of parties. For nota-
tional convenience, we let D denote the dealer (though in fact any party can act
as dealer). We let m ∈ {0, 1} denote D’s input. In the following, we use DS to
denote an execution of DSφ with φ = ta + tc.
• Stage 1: D acts as the dealer in an execution of DS(m). Denote party Pi’s
output by mDSi . If the dealer’s run was clean, then each party Pi outputs
mi = m
DS
i and terminates. Else, D sends m to all other parties. Let m
′
i
be the value received by Pi from D.
• Stage 2: In parallel, each Pi ∈ P \ {D} acts as the dealer in an execution
of DS(m′i). For b ∈ {0, 1}, let CLEANb denote the set of parties whose
execution of DS is clean, and results in an output of b. Initialize flag = 0,
and for b ∈ {0, 1}, set CLEAN′b = CLEANb.
• Stage 3: Let CLEAN = CLEAN0 ∪ CLEAN1, and DIRTY = P \ CLEAN.
Parties execute the following sequentially:










, then output 0 if
|CLEAN′0| ≥ |CLEAN′1|, and output 1 otherwise.





+ 2, then each party Pi participates
in an execution of BGP protocol with input m′i. Let party Pi’s output
be mBGPi . Each party Pi outputs mi = m
BGP
i and terminates.
Each party Pj ∈ DIRTY sends m′j to parties in CLEAN. Each party Pi ∈











in DIRTY sent 1− b to Pi
null otherwise
.
• Stage 4: In parallel, each party Pi ∈ CLEAN runs DS(m′′i ). If for some
Pi ∈ CLEAN0 (resp. CLEAN1), the run DS(m′′i ) is dirty, we add Pi to
DIRTY, remove Pi from CLEAN0 (resp. CLEAN1), and go to Stage 3. Else,
for b ∈ {0, 1}, add to CLEAN′b all parties in CLEAN1−b that gave a clean
run on null, set flag = 1, and goto Stage 3.
Figure 3.9: Broadcast against a threshold adversary, assuming ta + tc < n.
Figure 3.9.
Theorem 22 For n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12}, Protocol 3 achieves broadcast in the
presence of a threshold adversary A under the additional assumption that ta+tc < n.
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then it holds that tc < ta and, consequently ta < th holds.
2 These are
exactly the two cases handled (independently) in Protocol 1. The difficulty here is
to identify which of these scenarios is the “right” one. We prove the correctness of
our protocol in the following three lemmas.
Lemma 23 If D is honest and non-compromised then validity and agreement hold.
Proof When the dealer is honest and non-compromised, then in Stage 1, the
dealer’s execution of DS is clean and results in output m (cf. Lemma 3). Thus, all
honest parties terminate with output m in Stage 1.
Lemma 24 If D is honest but compromised then validity and agreement hold.
Proof Note that when the protocol terminates at Stage 1, we are guaranteed
agreement and validity. For the rest of the proof, we assume that the protocol
















. Let th denote the number of honest and non-compromised





, it follows that





+ 2. Clearly, all honest and non-compromised
2Note that n = ta + tc + th. By the threshold condition, n > 2ta + min(ta, tc). Since ta > tc,
we have n = ta + tc + th > 2ta + tc, i.e., th > ta.
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parties would run DS on input m in Stage 2. By Lemma 3, at least th runs in Stage 2
are clean and result in output m. Therefore, in Stage 2, either CLEAN0 or CLEAN1





. The protocol thus terminates in
Stage 2 and we have agreement. Observe that all honest parties are contained in
either CLEANm or in DIRTY (and not in CLEAN1−m). Validity follows from the fact
that ta < th and |CLEANm| > |CLEAN1−m|.










, the honest parties are in two-thirds
majority, i.e., n > 3ta. Therefore, whenever the parties terminate with an output
obtained by running BGP, it is always guaranteed to be correct, i.e., for every honest
Pi, we have m
BGP




for some b ∈ {0, 1}. Since for every honest party Pi we have m′i = m, the set






only for b = m. Therefore all possible terminations of the protocol result in correct
output.
Lemma 25 When D is corrupt, agreement holds.
Proof Observe that the protocol can terminate in two ways: either (a) by a
termination condition that depends on CLEAN′0 and CLEAN
′
1 in Stage 3, or (b) by
running an instance of BGP in Stage 3. Since all honest parties agree on the values of
CLEAN′0 and CLEAN
′
1, agreement is always guaranteed when the protocol terminates
because of that condition. Hence, we restrict our attention to the case when parties
terminate by running an instance of BGP.










> 3ta, and agreement
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is guaranteed whenever the protocol terminates after running BGP. Therefore, we





. In fact, we will prove that in this
case, parties never terminate after running BGP.
Let th represent the number of honest and non-compromised parties, recall





+ 2. All honest and non-compromised












deed if this is the case, then we have proved that all parties agree on the final











, and thus each of CLEAN0,CLEAN1 contains
at least one honest and non-compromised party.











−2. Since the maximum value of n considered here is 12, we have
|CLEAN′0 \ CLEAN0| + |CLEAN′1 \ CLEAN1| ≤ 1. Thus for some b ∈ {0, 1}, we have
|CLEAN′1−b \CLEAN1−b| = 0. Therefore, every honest (and non-compromised) party




i = b. The following claim implies
that every honest (and non-compromised) party Pj in CLEANb set m
′′
j = null, and
gave a clean run on m′′j .
Claim 26 If for some b ∈ {0, 1}, there exists an honest party Pi ∈ CLEANb that
sets m′′i = b, then all honest parties Pj ∈ CLEAN1−b set m′′j = null.
Proof Consider an honest party Pi ∈ CLEANb, that sets m′′i = b. Let DIRTY
contain t′a corrupt parties and t
′




number of honest but compromised parties who received bit b from D in the first





− |CLEAN1−b|. Otherwise, it is easy to see that Pi would







− |CLEANb|. Suppose that is not















Since n = t′a + t
′





























− |CLEANb| and thus all the honest parties
Pj ∈ CLEAN1−b will set m′′j = null.
Therefore, CLEAN′b contains all honest and non-compromised parties in CLEANb





+ 2 which is a contra-
diction.
This concludes the proof of correctness of Protocol 3 and hence the theorem.
Protocol 3 runs at most O(n2) instances of the DS subprotocol and one in-
stance of the BGP subprotocol. A single DS instance has communication complexity
O(n3) signatures, and a BGP instance has communication complexity O(n2) bits.
Therefore the total communication complexity of Protocol 3 is O(n5) signatures.
In contrast, the protocol ALSP has communication complexity at least O(n!) sig-
natures. We note that even for small values of n as considered here, there is a




Motivated by a recent result by Hirt and Zikas [57] we study adaptive attacks
on existing broadcast protocols in this chapter. They studied the problem of design-
ing broadcast protocols with security against adaptive adversaries who can choose
which parties to corrupt during the course of the protocol (cf. [14]). Hirt and Zikas
showed explicit attacks against all existing broadcast protocols when t ≥ n/3 and,
moreover, proved the impossibility of realizing adaptively secure broadcast with cor-
ruption threshold t > n/2. (They gave constructions of adaptively secure protocols
for the regime n/3 ≤ t ≤ n/2.) Their work calls into question the feasibility of realiz-
ing adaptively secure multi-party computation (MPC) for t > n/2 in point-to-point
networks.
A closer look at the Hirt-Zikas result shows that they make a very strong as-
sumption regarding the adversary (or, alternately, a very weak assumption regarding
the communication network): namely, they assume the adversary has the ability to
corrupt parties in the middle of a round, in between sending messages to two other
parties in the network. Specifically, their impossibility result crucially relies on the
fact that the following sequence of events can occur when an honest party P sends
its messages in some round:
1. The adversary (who has already corrupted some of the other players) receives
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the message(s) sent to it by P .
2. Based on this, the adversary then decides whether to corrupt P .
3. If the adversary corrupts P , it can then send messages of its choice (on behalf
of P ) to the remaining parties in the same round.
While the above is consistent with theoretical models for asynchronous crypto-
graphic protocols, as well as some previous treatments of adaptive security in the
synchronous setting (e.g., [11]), allowing such adversarial behavior seems unrealis-
tically pessimistic: in the real world, implementing such an attack would require
either an exceedingly fast adversary or an extremely slow network. A more realis-
tic model of synchronous communication (see, e.g., [10]) is one in which messages
sent by honest parties within any given round are delivered atomically to all other
parties.1
Importantly, however, the attacks that were demonstrated by Hirt and Zikas [57]
on existing broadcast protocols remain valid even if we assume atomic message de-
livery. Consider, for example, the authenticated broadcast protocol of Dolev and
Strong [29] where, at a high level, in the first round the sender digitally signs and
sends his message to all the other parties, while in subsequent rounds parties ap-
pend their signatures and forward the result. Roughly, if any party ever observes
1We still allow rushing, meaning that corrupted parties may receive their messages in some
round before having to send any of their own. This reflects the fact that corrupted parties can
choose to delay their own communication. However, it seems unrealistic to assume that honest
parties would delay sending any of their own messages.
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valid signatures of the sender on two different messages then that party forwards
both signatures to all other parties and disqualifies the sender (and all parties out-
put some default message). The Hirt-Zikas attack against this protocol works as
follows: a corrupted party P in the network waits to receive the initial message
from the (uncorrupted) sender. If P likes the message sent by the sender then P
runs the protocol honestly. If P does not like the message sent by the sender then
P adaptively corrupts the sender, uses the sender’s signing key to generate a valid
signature on another message (in the next round), and thus ensures that the sender
will be disqualified and the default message used.
While this outcome might be acceptable with respect to a property-based defini-
tion (since the sender is corrupted by the end of the protocol in the second case), the
outcome is not something that should be possible with respect to a simulation-based
definition (since corruption of the sender depends on the sender’s initial input). Re-
alizing the latter, stronger definition is a natural goal; moreover, a simulation-based
definition is especially critical for broadcast which is typically used as a sub-protocol
within some larger protocol.
Given that the Hirt-Zikas attack applies even when atomic message delivery is
assumed, one might wonder whether their impossibility result holds in that model
as well. Alternately, one may be willing to give up on “full” broadcast and hope
that some weaker form of broadcast might be sufficient to achieve secure MPC for
t > n/2. (Indeed, in the presence of a dishonest majority the standard definitions
of secure MPC give up on guaranteed output delivery, so in particular secure MPC
for t > n/2 does not imply broadcast for t > n/2.) These are the questions with
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which we concern ourselves in this chapter.
Our results and techniques. As our main result in this chapter, we show that the
Hirt-Zikas impossibility result does not apply in the synchronous model with atomic
message delivery. That is, we show a construction of an adaptively secure broadcast
protocol tolerating an arbitrary number of corruptions in this communication model.
We prove security of our protocol within the UC framework [11], under the usual
assumptions that a PKI and digital signatures are available. We stress that we
require only a standard PKI where each party chooses their public key and all other
parties know it; in particular, we do not require the stronger “registered public key”
model considered in [2].
The main idea for avoiding the Hirt-Zikas attack is to design a protocol where
the adversary does not learn the (honest) sender’s message until agreement has
already been reached; that way, the adversary must make its decision as to whether
or not to corrupt the sender independently of the sender’s input. This suggests
the following two-stage approach: First, the signer broadcasts a commitment to its
message; once agreement is reached, the signer then decommits. While this does
prevent the above attack, it also introduces a new problem when we try to prove
security, since the simulator must commit to the sender’s message before knowing
what the sender’s message is! (Since the sender might still get corrupted in the
middle of the protocol, it also does not work for the simulator to obtain the output of
the broadcast functionality before starting the simulation.) This could be handled by
using a universally composable commitment scheme (e.g., [15]), which satisfies even
64
stronger properties, but we would prefer to avoid the stronger setup assumptions
that are required for constructing universally composable commitments [15].
Instead, we show that a very weak form of commitment suffices to make the
approach sound. Specifically, we use commitment schemes that (informally) are
hiding and binding for an honest sender, but where binding can be (easily) violated
by a dishonest sender. To see why this works, note that the only time binding
is needed is when the adversary corrupts the sender after the sender has already
committed to its message. Since the sender in that case was honest at the time
the commitment was generated, the binding property holds and the adversary will
not be able to change the committed value. On the other hand, the simulator can
behave as a dishonest sender and generate a commitment that it can later open to
any desired value, and in particular to the sender’s true input in case the sender
remains uncorrupted until the end of the protocol. We show that commitment
schemes with the desired properties can be constructed from one-way functions
(which are, in turn, implied by digital signature schemes); thus, in summary, we
obtain an adaptively secure, universally-composable broadcast protocol assuming a
PKI and digital signatures.
We also study the impact of adaptive attacks on secure multi-party computa-
tion protocols (where broadcast is commonly used as a subcomponent), and establish
the variants of broadcast that are needed in this setting. Interestingly, we show that
the full functionality of broadcast is not needed in order to obtain secure MPC for
t ≥ n/2; instead, a weaker form of broadcast — which can be realized even in the
Hirt-Zikas communication model — suffices.
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Organization. In Section 4.1 we present our network model and elaborate on
simulation-based definitions of security. Section 4.2 defines various notions of broad-
cast. In Section 4.3 we introduce a special type of commitment scheme, and we
show how to construct such schemes in Section 4.3.1. In Section 4.4 we show how
to use such commitments to realize adaptively secure broadcast in the atomic com-
munication model. We discuss the consequences for adaptively secure multi-party
computation in Section 4.5.
4.1 Preliminaries
4.1.1 Network Model
We consider a network with synchronous communication, where there is a set
of n players (probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines) P = {P1, P2, · · · , Pn}
connected by point-to-point authenticated channels. Each round of the protocol
proceeds as follows. The honest parties send their messages for that round, and these
messages are received by all parties (both honest and corrupted). The adversary
may then choose to corrupt additional players, and then it sends messages on behalf
of the parties who were corrupted at the beginning of that round. (This models a
rushing adversary.) When it is done, the adversary must then “advance the clock”
to the next round. We allow the adversary to corrupt any t < n of the parties, and
to behave in an arbitrary (“Byzantine”) manner. We stress that we do not assume
erasures.
We stress that our model is different from that considered by Hirt and Zikas [57],
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where in each round the honest parties’ messages are first delivered to the corrupted
parties only and then the adversary is allowed to corrupt additional parties and
decide what messages to send on behalf of those parties to other honest players. In
contrast, we assume that honest parties’ messages are delivered “atomically”, which
is equivalent to assuming that adversarial corruption cannot occur in the time in-
terval between when a message is sent and when it is received. We sometimes refer
to our model as “atomic”, and to the Hirt-Zikas model as “non-atomic”.
4.1.2 Simulation-Based Security
We use a simulation-based definition of security in Chapter 4, which is in
line with work in the area of cryptographic-protocol design but which differs from
most of the classical work on Byzantine agreement and broadcast. Simulation-based
definition are formulated by defining an “ideal” version of some desired functionality
that is implemented by a trusted third-party; a protocol is secure if the protocol
“emulates” this ideal world no matter what the adversary does. One advantage of a
simulation-based approach is that it simultaneously captures all the properties that
are guaranteed by the ideal world, without having to enumerate some list of desired
properties. Simulation-based definitions are also useful for applying composition
theorems that enable proving security of protocols that use other protocols as sub-
routines.
We formulate our simulation-based definitions by presenting appropriate func-
tionalities within the UC framework. We give a brief introduction to this model,
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and refer readers elsewhere for more details [11]. The basic entities involved are
parties P1, . . . , Pn, an adversary A, and an “environment” Z. The environment Z
gives inputs to and receives outputs from all the parties; it also interacts with A
in an arbitrary way throughout its execution. In the ideal world, the parties and
Z all interact via an ideal functionality F : the parties send their inputs to (with
corrupted parties sending anything they like) and receive outputs from F , and A
interacts with F as specified by F itself. We let idealF ,A,Z(n) denote the output
of Z in this case. In the real world, the parties run some protocol π with the cor-
rupted parties behaving arbitrarily as directed by A. We let realπ,A,Z(n) denote
the output of Z in that case. A protocol π securely realizes the functionality F if for
any probabilistic polynomial-time (ppt) real-world adversary A there exists a ppt
ideal-world adversary S (often called a simulator) such that for all ppt environments
Z the following is negligible:
|Pr[realπ,A,Z(n) = 1]− Pr[idealF ,S,Z(n) = 1]| .
Say we want to design a protocol for some functionality F . It is often helpful
to design and reason about this in a hybrid world where the parties can run a
protocol π while at the same time having access to some ideal functionality G. We
let hybridGπ,A,Z(n) denote the output of Z in that case, and say that π securely
realizes F in the G-hybrid model if for any ppt hybrid-world adversary A there
exists a ppt ideal-world adversary S such that for all ppt environments Z we
have
∣∣Pr[hybridGπ,A,Z(n) = 1]− Pr[idealF ,S,Z(n) = 1]∣∣. In the UC framework, the
following useful composition result holds: if π securely realizes F in the G-hybrid
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Functionality FBC
The functionality interacts with an adversary S and a set P = {P1, . . . , Pn}
of parties.
• Upon receiving (Bcast, sid,m) from Pi, send (Bcast, sid, Pi,m) to all
parties in P and to S.
Figure 4.1: The broadcast functionality.
model, and ρ is any protocol that securely realizes G, then the composed protocol
πρ securely realizes F (in the real world).
4.2 Definitions of Broadcast
As mentioned previously, classical results show that broadcast (or even relaxed
broadcast) cannot be realized for t ≥ n/3 corrupted parties in a “plain model”, and
so some setup must be considered if we wish to go beyond this bound. As stated in
the Introduction, we assume a PKI and digital signatures. Within the UC frame-
work, this is modeled by the certificate functionality FCERT introduced in [12]. This
functionality provides both message-signing capability as well as binding between a
signature and a party in the network, and thus simultaneously captures both the
presence of a PKI and the ability to issue signatures.
Our definitions of broadcast are induced by ideal functionalities in the UC
framework. Namely, we say a protocol π achieves (strong) broadcast if it securely
realizes the functionality FBC shown in Figure 4.1; it achieves relaxed broadcast if
it securely realizes the functionality FRBC given in Figure 4.2. Our definition of
broadcast is essentially standard, though one can also consider a definition where
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the sender’s message m is not revealed to S. (I.e., our definition does not guarantee
secrecy for m; note that this only makes a difference when S corrupts no parties.)
Our definition of relaxed broadcast is from [57].
It is instructive to examine the two functionalities in light of the Hirt-Zikas
attack. Observe that FBC does not allow their attack (and so any protocol securely
realizing FBC must not be susceptible to the attack) since the adversary cannot
change the sender’s message m unless the adversary corrupts the sender Pi in ad-
vance, before it learns m. On the other hand, FRBC allows their attack: this is
so because the adversary can first learn m (in step 1) and then decide whether to
corrupt the sender Pi based on that information; if the adversary decides to corrupt
P1 then the adversary is allowed change the message that will be received by all the
other parties in step 2.
The following result was proved in [57]:
Lemma 27 The Dolev-Strong protocol [29] securely realizes FRBC in the FCERT-
hybrid model against an adaptive adversary corrupting any t < n parties.
In fact, the above result holds even in the non-atomic communication model.
It is also possible to define a stronger variant of FRBC, called F+RBC, that more
closely corresponds to what is actually accomplished by the Hirt-Zikas attack. The
difference between FRBC and F+RBC is that the latter only allows the adversary to
have m′ =⊥. That is, the adversary is allowed to adaptively corrupt the sender
(based on the sender’s original message) and thereby cause agreement on an error,
but is unable to cause agreement on some other valid message. F+RBC can be realized
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fairly easily in the FRBC-hybrid model using the commitment scheme defined in the
following section. Alternately, it can be realized directly in the FCERT-hybrid model
using an appropriate variant of the Dolev-Strong protocol.
Functionality FRBC
The functionality interacts with an adversary S and a set P = {P1, . . . , Pn}
of parties.
1. Upon receiving (Bcast, sid,m) from Pi, send (Bcast, sid, Pi, m) to S.
2. Upon receiving m′ from S, do:
• If Pi is corrupted, send (Bcast, sid, Pi, m′) to all parties in P ;
• If Pi is not corrupted, send (Bcast, sid, Pi, m) to all parties in P .
Figure 4.2: The relaxed broadcast functionality.
4.3 Honest-Binding Commitment Schemes
Commitment schemes are a standard cryptographic tool. Roughly, a com-
mitment scheme allows a sender S to generate a commitment com to a message m
in such a way that (1) the sender can later open the commitment to the original
value m (correctness); (2) the sender cannot generate a commitment that can be
opened to two different values (binding); and (3) the commitment reveals nothing
about the sender’s value m until it is opened (hiding). For our application, we
need a variant of standard commitments that guarantees binding when the sender
is honest but ensures that binding can be violated if the sender is dishonest. (In the
latter case, we need some additional properties as well; these will become clear in
what follows.) Looking ahead, we will use such commitment schemes to construct
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a broadcast protocol in the following way: the sender will first generate and send a
commitment to its message, and then send the decommitment information needed
to open the commitment. In the simulation for the case when the sender Pi starts
out uncorrupted, we will have the simulator S generate a commitment dishonestly.
This will give S the flexibility to break binding and open the commitment to any
desired message (if needed), while also being able to ensure binding (when desired)
by claiming that it generated the commitment honestly.
We consider only non-interactive commitment schemes. For simplicity, we
define our schemes in such a way that the decommitment information consists of
the sender’s random coins ω that it used when generating the commitment.
Definition 7 A (non-interactive) commitment scheme for message space {Mk} is
a pair of ppt algorithms S,R such that for all k ∈ N, all messages m ∈ Mk, and
all random coins ω it holds that R(m,S(1k,m;ω), ω) = 1.
A commitment scheme for message space {Mk} is honest-binding if it satisfies
the following:
Binding (for an honest sender) For all ppt algorithms A (that maintain state through-
out their execution), the following is negligible in k:
Pr
 m← A(1k);ω ← {0, 1}∗; com← S (1k,m;ω); (m′, ω′)← A(com, ω) :




Equivocation There is an algorithm S̃ = (S̃1, S̃2) such that for all ppt A (that
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ω ← {0, 1}∗; com← S (1k,m;ω) :




m← A(1k); ω ← S̃2(st,m) :




Equivocation implies the standard hiding property, namely, that for all ppt
algorithms A (that maintain state throughout their execution) the following is neg-
ligible:∣∣∣∣Pr [ (m0,m1)← A(1k); b← {0, 1}; com← S (1k,mb) : A(com) = b ]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
We also observe that if (com, ω) are generated by (S̃1, S̃2) for some message m as
in the definition above, then binding still holds: namely, no ppt adversary can find
(m′, ω′) with m′ 6= m such that R(m′, com, ω′) = 1.
4.3.1 Constructing Honest-Binding Commitment
We show two constructions of honest-binding commitment schemes. The
proofs that these schemes satisfy Definition 7 are relatively straightforward, and
are therefore omitted.
The first construction, based on the commitment scheme of Naor [74], relies
on the minimal assumption that one-way functions exist. We describe the scheme
for committing single-bit messages, though it could be extended to arbitrary length




parse ω as crs‖r,
with |crs| = 3k
and |r| = k;
c := G(r)⊕ (crs ·m);
com := (crs, c);
return com;
R(m, (crs, c), ω)
parse ω as crs‖r,
with |crs| = 3k
and |r| = k;
if c
?





r0, r1 ← {0, 1}k;
crs := G(r0)⊕G(r1);
c := G(r0);
com := (crs, c);
st := (r0, r1, com);
return (com, st);
S̃2(st,m)
parse st as (r0, r1, com);








Next, we show an efficient scheme that allows for direct committments to
strings. This construction, based on the Pedersen commitment scheme [80], re-
lies on the discrete-logarithm assumption. In the following, we let G be a cyclic
group of order q, with generator g ∈ G. (For simplicity, we view (G, q, g) as public
parameters, though they could just as well be generated by the sender.)
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S (1k,m;ω)
Parse ω as h‖x,
with h ∈ G
and x ∈ Zq;
return com := (h, gmhx);
R(m, com, ω)
Parse ω as h‖x,
with h ∈ G








r, y ← Zq;
com := (gr, gy)




= 0 return ⊥;
x := (y −m) · r−1 mod q;
return ω := gr‖x;
4.4 An Adaptively Secure Broadcast Protocol
In this section we show a protocol that securely realizes FBC in the FCERT-
hybrid model, in the presence of t < n adaptive corruptions. The challenge of
realizing FBC, and the property that is exactly exploited in the Hirt-Zikas attack on
existing protocols, is that when the sender is uncorrupted then the adversary should
not learn the sender’s message unless all honest parties will (eventually) agree on
that message (cf. Figure 4.1). In [57], the authors construct a broadcast protocol for
t < n/2 by having the sender use verifiable secret sharing (VSS) to “commit” to its
message before revealing it. (For t = n/2 they use a slight variant of this idea.) This
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approach works even in the non-atomic communication setting; however, it requires
at least half of the parties to be honest.
Our approach is to use computationally secure commitment schemes in place of
VSS. That is, we first have the sender announce a commitment to its message; once
agreement on this commitment is reached, the sender then decommits. (We add
an additional stage in which the sender’s decommitment is “echoed” by all parties;
this prevents a dishonest sender from sending valid decommitment information to
some honest parties but not others.) In order to simulate this protocol, we have the
sender use honest-binding commitments as introduced in the previous section.
The details of our protocol πBC are presented in Figure 4.3. We describe our
protocol in the FRBC-hybrid model. Since FRBC can be securely realized in the
FCERT-hybrid model (cf. Lemma 27), this implies that FBC can be securely realized
in the FCERT-hybrid model as well.
Theorem 28 Let (S,R) be an honest-binding commitment scheme. Then protocol
πBC securely realizes FBC in the FRBC-hybrid model against an adaptive adversary
corrupting any t < n of the parties.
The above theorem holds only in the atomic communication model considered
here; protocol πBC does not securely realize FBC in the non-atomic communication
model of [57]. (Indeed, by the impossibility result proven in [57], it cannot.) Atomic
communication is used crucially in the second stage of our protocol when the sender
transmits decommitment information to all the parties. (Observe this is the only
step in our protocol in which parties communication directly, rather than via the
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Protocol πBC
The protocol is carried out among a set P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of parties. We let
D ∈ P denote the sender. We let (S,R) be a non-interactive commitment
scheme.
• Stage 1: Upon receiving input (Bcast, sid,m) from the environment
Z, the sender D chooses random ω ← {0, 1}∗, computes com :=
S (1k,m;ω), and sends (Bcast, sid, com) to FRBC. Let com′ denote the
value received by the honest parties in this stage (note that this value
is the same for all honest parties).
• Stage 2: Upon receiving (Bcast, sid, D, com) from FRBC, the sender
D sends (m,ω) to every other party over point-to-point channels.
• Stage 3: The following is done by each party Pi: Let (m′i, ω′i) denote
the value that Pi received from D in stage 2. (If Pi receives nothing,
it takes (m′i, ω
′






• Stage 4: Each party Pj receives messages
{(Bcast, sid, Pi, (m′′i , ω′′i ))}i∈[n] from FRBC, taking (m′′i , ω′′i ) as some
default values if nothing is received (note that the (m′′i , ω
′′
i ) values
are the same for all honest parties). Each party Pj then decides on
its output as follows: Let valid = {i ∈ [n] | R(m′′i , com′, ω′′i ) = 1}. If
valid is empty, then output some default value. Otherwise, let k be
the smallest value in valid and output mj = m
′′
k.
Figure 4.3: A protocol realizing FBC in the FRBC-hybrid model.
ideal functionality FRBC.) If non-atomic communication were assumed, then the ad-
versary could learn the decommitment information (and thus the sender’s message)
first, and then decide to corrupt the sender and not transmit the decommitment
information to any of honest parties.
Proof Let A be an active, adaptive adversary that interacts with players running
the above protocol in the FRBC-hybrid model. We construct an adversary (simula-
tor) S running in the ideal world with access to functionality FBC, such that no ppt
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environment Z can distinguish whether it is interacting with A and parties running
πBC in the FRBC-hybrid model, or whether it is interacting with S and (dummy)
parties communicating directly with FBC. The simulator S starts by internally in-
voking the adversary A, and forwarding all messages between A and Z in the usual
way. The simulator will simulate both the ideal functionality FRBC for A, as well
as an execution of protocol πBC.
In our description of S, we distinguish two cases depending on whether or not
the sender Pi is corrupted at the outset.
Case 1: We first treat the easier case where D is corrupted at the outset. Here,
A requests to corrupt D (in the hybrid world) and so S corrupts D (in the ideal
world). Any additional corruptions that A requests throughout its execution can
be easily simulated by S, so we do not mention them.
When Z provides input to D, this input is read by S who forwards it to A.
Then A begins running the first stage of πBC (on behalf of the corrupted D) by speci-
fying some message (Bcast, sid, com′) to send to FRBC. The simulator S stores com′,
and simulates the response of FRBC by giving (Bcast, sid, D, com′) to A (and all
corrupted parties). Next, A (now executing the second stage of πBC) decides on
messages (m′i, ω
′
i) to send to each honest party Pi on behalf of D. In response, S




i)) to A for every
honest party Pi. For each such Pi, the adversary A may then choose to (corrupt








i ). Once A has sent some
(m′′i , ω
′′
i ) to the appropriate instance of FRBC for all Pi, the simulator simulates the
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output of FRBC for all corrupted parties in the obvious way. Finally A, executing the
third stage of πBC on behalf of the remaining corrupted parties, specifies messages
(Bcast, sid, (m′′i , ω
′′
i )) that each such party Pi should send to FRBC.
S now has values (m′′i , ω′′i ) for every Pi ∈ P , defined by the output of each
appropriate (simulated) instance of FRBC in the (simulated) third stage of the pro-
tocol. S defines a set valid and determines k,m′′k as prescribed by the protocol. It
then sends (Bcast, sid,m′′k) (on behalf of D) to its own ideal functionality FBC.
It is not hard to see that S provides a perfect simulation. The view of A is
clearly identical whether it is running in the FRBC-hybrid model or whether it is
being run as a sub-routine by S in the ideal world with access to FBC. As for the
outputs of the honest parties (i.e., those that are honest by the end of the protocol
execution), note that if A were running in the FRBC-hybrid model then every honest
party Pj would receive com
′ in the first stage and {(m′′i , ω′′i )}Pi∈P in the third stage,
and would thus decide on output m′′k exactly as S does. Since S sends m′′k to FBC,
the output of each honest party in the ideal world is also m′′k. We remark that the
fact that the commitment scheme is not binding (for a malicious sender) is irrelevant
here.
Case 2: We now turn to the more difficult case where D is not corrupted at the
outset. As before, adaptive corruptions of parties other thanD can be handled easily,
so we do not mention it. Corruption of D will, however, be explicitly mentioned.
S begins by computing (com, st)← S̃1(1k). It then simulates the first stage of
πBC (on behalf of the honest D) by giving to A the message (Bcast, sid, D, com) on
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behalf of FRBC. At this point, A can choose whether to corrupt D or not, and we
further divide our description of S depending on which is the case.
If A requests to corrupt D, then S corrupts D and waits until it receives input
(Bcast, sid,m) from Z. At that point, S computes ω ← S̃2(st,m) and gives m and
ω to A as the state of D. The remainder of the simulation then proceeds exactly
as in the case when Pi was corrupted at the outset. (Note in particular that A may
choose to change com to some other value com′.)
IfA does not corruptD, then S waits until it receives a message (Bcast, sid, D,m)
from its ideal functionality FBC. (Note that at this point, the output of every hon-
est party in the ideal world is m.) S then computes ω ← S̃2(st,m), and simulates
the second phase of the protocol by sending (m,ω) to every corrupted party. The
remainder of the protocol is simulated in the obvious way, essentially the same as
before (with the only difference being that it provides state m,ω to A if D is ever
corrupted).
In this case, S provides a computationally indistinguishable simulation for Z.
The only difference between the view of A in the above simulation and the view of A
when it is running in the FRBC-hybrid model is with regard to (com, ω): in the former
case these are produced using (S̃1, S̃2), whereas in the latter case these are produced
using the honest sender algorithm. Definition 7 guarantees that these distributions
are computationally indistinguishable. As for the outputs of the honest parties, if
D is corrupted during stage 1 then the argument is as given previously. If D is
not corrupted during stage 1, then we need to argue that with all but negligible
probability every honest party would output m in that case in the FRBC-hybrid
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world (since, as noted above, every honest party outputs m in that case in the ideal
world). This follows from the honest-binding property of Definition 7.
4.5 Adaptively Secure Multi-Party Computation
In the previous section we showed a protocol (call it bc) that securely realizes
the broadcast functionality FBC in the presence of an adaptive adversary corrupting
any number of parties. Given any protocol π (e.g., the one of [17]) for securely
computing some function f in the presence of an adaptive adversary corrupting
any number of parties in the FBC-hybrid model (i.e., protocol π assumes an ideal
broadcast channel), the composed protocol πbc securely computes f in the presence
of an adaptive adversary corrupting any number of parties in the FCERT-hybrid
model, using point-to-point communication only. The above is stated in the UC
framework, but an analogous composition theorem could be stated with respect to
“stand-alone” notions of security as well [10]. (We refer the reader to [47] for a
detailed treatment of security notions for MPC with dishonest majority.)
Even given the above, it is interesting to explore whether adaptively secure
MPC can be achieved in the weaker FRBC-hybrid model, for at least two reasons:
• If we take as our communication model the non-atomic, point-to-point model
of Hirt-Zikas, it is impossible to realize FBC when t > n/2. Thus, if we want
to realize adaptively secure MPC for t > n/2 in this communication model,
some other approach is needed.
• Even in the atomic communication model, one may prefer to base adaptively
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secure MPC on relaxed broadcast rather than broadcast since protocols for
the former may be more efficient than protocols for the latter.
Note that, in the case of dishonest majority, adaptively secure MPC does not imply
adaptively secure broadcast because the usual notions of security for MPC do not
guarantee output delivery or fairness (see [47] for a more extensive treatment) —
these properties are, in general, not achievable [21] — whereas definitions of security
for broadcast do require guaranteed output delivery. In particular, the Hirt-Zikas
impossibility result for adaptively secure broadcast in the non-atomic communi-
cation model says nothing about the feasibility of adaptively secure MPC in that
setting.
Although we cannot claim that all adaptively secure MPC protocols using
broadcast remain secure when broadcast is replaced with relaxed broadcast, it turns
out that specific protocols from the literature do remain secure in that case. Once
again, we focus on protocols proven secure in the UC framework, though we expect
these results would extend to protocols analyzed in the “stand-alone” setting as
well.
Specifically, consider the adaptively secure MPC protocol π of Canetti, Lindell,
Ostrovsky, and Sahai [17], which relies on a broadcast channel. We first observe that
the protocol remains secure even in the non-atomic communication model. In either
communication model, the protocol also remains secure if the broadcast channel is
replaced with relaxed broadcast. At a high level, the reason is that the messages
that are broadcast are always commitments to some values, except in the last round
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where the broadcast messages reveal the output. The ability to corrupt a sender
based on the message being broadcast is “useless” in the former case; in the latter
case such an attack corresponds to preventing output delivery/violating fairness,
something which is permitted by the definitions of security when there is a dishonest
majority. We remark that the advantage of using relaxed broadcast as opposed to
the “echo broadcast” protocol from [47] is that the former ensures agreement on
abort.
Even given the above, there are several reasons to securely realize FBC rather
than be contended with FRBC. First, one may be interested in broadcast itself, rather
than as a sub-protocol for some larger task. Furthermore, there is an advantage to
working with FBC in that it can be safely used to instantiate the broadcast channel in
arbitrary protocols, so one can avoid having to examine protocols on a case-by-case
basis to determine whether FRBC suffices.
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Chapter 5
Round Complexity of Perfect VSS in Point-to-Point Networks
In this chapter, we study the round complexity of perfect VSS in point-to-
point networks. Perfect VSS is known to be possible if and only if t < n/3 [5, 27].
Previous research investigating the round complexity of VSS, surveyed further below,
has focused on optimizing the round complexity assuming a broadcast channel is
available “for free”. (We remark that broadcast is essential for VSS, in a way we
make precise below.) As argued previously [63], however, if the ultimate goal is
to optimize the round complexity of protocols for point-to-point networks (where
protocols are likely to be run), then it is preferable to minimize the number of
rounds in which broadcast is used rather than to minimize the total number of
rounds. This is due to the high overhead of emulating a broadcast channel over a
point-to-point network: deterministic broadcast protocols require Ω(t) rounds [33];
known randomized protocols [31, 35, 62] require only O(1) rounds in expectation,
but the constant is rather high.
As a concrete example (taken from [63]) to illustrate the point, consider the
VSS protocol of Micali and Rabin [73] and the “round-optimal” VSS protocol of
Fitzi et al. [36]. The former uses 16 rounds but only a single round of broadcast; the
latter uses 3 rounds, two of which require broadcast. Compiling these protocols for
a point-to-point network using the most round-efficient techniques known (see [63]),
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the Micali-Rabin protocol requires 26 rounds in expectation while the protocol of
Fitzi et al. requires at least 60 rounds in expectation!
In light of the above, when discussing the round complexity of protocols that
assume a broadcast channel we keep track of both the number of rounds as well as
the number of rounds in which broadcast is used. (In a given round when broadcast
is used, each party may use the broadcast channel but a rushing adversary is still
assumed. Existing broadcast protocols can be modified so that the round complexity
is unchanged even if many parties broadcast in parallel.) We say a protocol has
round complexity (r, r′) if it uses r rounds in total, and r′ ≤ r of these rounds invoke
broadcast. Recall that the round complexity of VSS refers to the sharing phase
only since most known protocols, as well as the protocols described in this chapter,
utilize only a single round of point-to-point communication in the reconstruction
phase. (Exceptions include [36, 76, 69].)
Our results and techniques. Gennaro et al. [43] show that three rounds are
necessary for perfect VSS, even assuming a broadcast channel. We also observe
that it is impossible to construct a strict constant-round protocol for VSS without
using a broadcast channel at all: VSS implies broadcast using one additional round
(the message to be broadcast can be treated as the input for VSS), and results
of Fischer and Lynch [33] rule out strict constant-round protocols for broadcast.
Prior work [73, 36, 63, 68] shows that optimal round complexity as well as optimal
use of the broadcast channel could each be obtained individually for VSS, but it
was unknown whether they could be obtained simultaneously. Here, we resolve this
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question and show a (3, 1)-round VSS protocol that is optimal in both measures.
As a consequence, we obtain a VSS protocol with the best known round complexity
in point-to-point networks. Our work also leads to an improvement in the round
complexity of the most round-efficient broadcast protocols known [62].
A nice feature of our VSS protocol is that it also satisfies a certain “2-level
sharing” property that is not achieved by the 3-round protocol from [36]. Roughly
speaking, this means that the following conditions hold at the end of the sharing
phase when the dealer’s (effective) input is s:
1. There exists a polynomial f(x) of degree at most t such that f(0) = s and
each honest party Pi holds the value f(i). Said differently, at the end of the
sharing phase each honest party Pi holds a value si with the property that
these {si} all lie on a degree-t polynomial f (whose constant term is s).
2. For each party Pi, there exists a polynomial fi(x) of degree at most t such
that fi(0) = f(i) and each honest party Pj holds the value fi(j).
VSS protocols with these properties (the first one in particular) constitute a useful
building block for protocols for general secure multi-party computation (see, e.g.,
[63, 68]).
Our protocol is efficient, in that the computation and communication are poly-
nomial in n. The communication complexity of our protocol is O(n2t) field elements,
which matches the communication complexity of [36] but is worse than that of [43].
We now summarize the basic techniques used to prove our main result. As
in [36], we begin by constructing a protocol for weak verifiable secret sharing (WSS) [84].
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(In WSS, informally, if the dealer is dishonest then, in the reconstruction phase, each
honest party recovers either the dealer’s input or a special failure symbol.) Fitzi
et al. show a (3, 2)-round WSS protocol that essentially consists of the first three
rounds of the 4-round VSS protocol from [43]. On a high level, their protocol works
as follows: In the first round, the dealer distributes the shares of the secret using a
random bivariate polynomial; in parallel, each pair of parties (Pi, Pj) exchanges a
random pad ri,j. In the second round, Pi and Pj check for an inconsistency between
their shares by broadcasting their common shares masked with the random pad. In
the third round, if there is a disagreement between Pi and Pj in round 2 (note that
all parties agree whether there is disagreement since broadcast is used in round 2),
then the dealer, Pi, and Pj all broadcast the share in question. This allows the rest
of the parties to determine whether the dealer “agrees” with Pi or with Pj.
A (5, 1)-round WSS protocol is implicitly given in [63].1 There, rather than
using the “random pad” technique, a different method is used to detect disagreement
between Pi and Pj. While this saves one round of broadcast, it requires additional
rounds of interaction.
To construct a (3, 1)-round WSS protocol, we modify the (3, 2)-round WSS
protocol from [36] by using the random pad idea with the following twist: in the
second round of the protocol, Pi and Pj check if there is any inconsistency between
their shares by exchanging their common shares over a point-to-point link; they also
send the random pad ri,j to the dealer. In the third round of the protocol, if there
1That work shows a 6-round VSS protocol that uses broadcast in the final two rounds. The
first five rounds of that protocol suffice for WSS.
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is a disagreement between Pi and Pj, then Pi and Pj each broadcast the shares they
hold; otherwise, they broadcast the value of their common share masked with the
random pad. The dealer will broadcast the corresponding share masked with the
random pad (or the share itself if the random pads it received from Pi and Pj are
different). Notice that secrecy of the share is preserved if Pi, Pj, and the dealer are
all honest. On the other hand, if the dealer is malicious and there is a disagreement
between honest parties Pi and Pj, then the dealer can only “agree” with at most
one of Pi and Pj in round 3, but not both of them.
The above is the high-level idea of our WSS protocol. Using the same tech-
niques as in [36], we can then immediately obtain a (3, 1)-round VSS protocol. How-
ever, the VSS protocol constructed in this manner will not have the “2-level sharing”
property; as a consequence, the resulting protocol cannot directly be plugged in to
existing protocols for general secure multi-party computation.
To convert the VSS protocol into one with 2-level sharing we note that, by
the end of the sharing phase, there is a set of honest parties (that we call a “core
set”) who already do have the required 2-level shares; thus, we only need to provide
honest parties outside the core set with their required shares. We achieve this, as
in [25], by having the dealer use a symmetric bivariate polynomial to share its input,
and then modifying the protocol so that honest parties who are not in the core set
can still generate appropriate shares by interpolating the shares of the parties in the
core set. Of course, this process needs to be carefully designed so that no additional
information is leaked to the adversary. We defer the details of this to a later section.
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Other related work. Gennaro et al. [43] initiated a study of the exact round
complexity of VSS. For t < n/3, they show an efficient (i.e., polynomial-time)
(4, 3)-round protocol, and an inefficient (3, 2)-round protocol. (Recall that the round
complexity of VSS is defined as the number of rounds in the sharing phase; unless
otherwise stated, all protocols mentioned use only one round, without broadcast, in
the reconstruction phase.) They also show that three rounds are necessary for VSS
when t < n/3. For t < n/4, they show that two rounds are necessary and sufficient
for efficient VSS. Settling the question of the absolute round complexity of efficient
VSS for t < n/3, Fitzi et al. [36] show an efficient (3, 2)-round VSS protocol. The
reconstruction phase of their protocol, however, requires one round of broadcast.
As discussed extensively already, although the protocol by Fitzi et al. is optimal
in terms of the total number of rounds, it is not optimal in terms of its usage of
the broadcast channel. VSS protocols for t < n/3 using one round of broadcast
are known, but these protocols are not optimal in terms of their overall round
complexity. Micali and Rabin [73] give a (16, 1)-round VSS protocol, and recent
work [63, 68] improved this to give a (7, 1)-round protocol.
All the works referenced above, as well as the results in this chapter, focus
on perfect VSS. A natural relaxation is to consider statistical VSS where privacy
and/or correctness may fail to hold with negligible probability. Surprisingly, work
subsequent to our own [76] shows that the lower bound of Gennaro et al. no longer
holds in this setting, and that there exists a protocol for statistical VSS tolerating
t < n/3 corruptions that uses only two rounds in the sharing phase. Interestingly,
the reconstruction phase of their statistical VSS protocol requires two rounds, and
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so the total round complexity (of the sharing and reconstruction phases combined)
matches the total round complexity of our protocol. It remains open whether the
total round complexity can be improved for statistical VSS.
5.1 Weak Verifiable Secret Sharing
We show a (3, 1)-round WSS protocol tolerating t < n/3 malicious parties.
5.1.1 The Protocol
Sharing phase. The sharing phase consists of three rounds, with broadcast used
in the last round.
Round 1: The dealer holds s. The following steps are carried out in parallel:
– The dealer chooses a random bivariate polynomial F (x, y) of degree at
most t in each variable such that F (0, 0) = s. The dealer then sends to
each party Pi the polynomials fi(x) := F (x, i) and gi(y) := F (i, y).
– Each party Pi picks a random pad ri,j ∈ F for all j 6= i, and sends ri,j to
both Pj and the dealer D.
Round 2: Each player Pi does the following:
– For all j 6= i, send ai,j := fi(j) and bi,j := gi(j) to Pj.
– Let r′j,i be the random pad that Pi received from Pj in the previous round.
For all j 6= i, send r′j,i to D.
Round 3: Each player Pi does the following:
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– Let a′j,i, b
′
j,i be the values Pi received from Pj in the previous round.
– For all j 6= i, if b′j,i 6= fi(j) then Pi broadcasts (j: “disagree-f”, fi(j), ri,j);
otherwise, Pi broadcasts (j: “agree-f”, fi(j) + ri,j).
– For all j 6= i, if a′j,i 6= gi(j) then Pi broadcasts (j: “disagree-g”, gi(j), r′j,i);
otherwise, Pi broadcasts (j: “agree-g”, gi(j) + r
′
j,i).




i,j be the appropriate random pad sent by Pi to D in round 1, and
let r
(2)





i,j , then D broadcasts ((i, j): “not equal”, F (j, i)). Otherwise,
D broadcasts ((i, j): “equal”, F (j, i) + r
(1)
i,j ).
Local computation. An ordered pair of parties (Pi, Pj) is conflicting if, in round 3,
party Pi broadcasts (j : “disagree-f”, fi(j), ri,j); party Pj broadcasts (i: “disagree-
g”, gj(i), r
′
i,j); and ri,j = r
′
i,j. For a pair of conflicting parties (Pi, Pj), we say Pi
(resp., Pj) is unhappy if one of the following conditions hold:
– The dealer broadcasts ((i, j): “not equal”, di,j) and di,j 6= fi(j) (resp., di,j 6=
gj(i)).




A player is happy if it is not unhappy. Note that all parties agree on which players
are happy and which are not. If there are more than t unhappy parties, the dealer
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is disqualified and a default value is shared.
Reconstruction phase. The reconstruction phase is similar to the one in [36],
except that we do not use broadcast.
1. Every happy party Pi sends the polynomials fi(x) and gi(y) to all other parties.
2. Let f ij , g
i
j denote the polynomials that Pj sent to Pi in the previous step. Pi
then constructs a consistency graph Gi whose vertices correspond to the happy
parties:







k(j). (Note that we allow also the case j = k here.)
– If there exists a vertex in Gi whose degree is less than n − t (including
self-loops), then that vertex is removed from Gi. This is repeated until
no more vertices can be removed.
Let Corei denote the parties whose corresponding vertices remain in Gi.
3. If |Corei| < n−t, then Pi outputs⊥. Otherwise, Pi reconstructs the polynomial
F ′(x, y) defined by any t+ 1 parties in Corei, and outputs s
′ := F ′(0, 0).
We remark that, since we do not use broadcast in the reconstruction phase, it
is possible that Corei,Corej are different for different honest parties Pi, Pj.
5.1.2 Proofs
Lemma 29 If the dealer is not corrupted by the end of the sharing phase, then
privacy is preserved.
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Proof Let C denote the set of parties corrupted by the end of the sharing phase.
We show that if the dealer remains uncorrupted, then the information the adversary
has about the dealer’s input at the end of the sharing phase consists of the polyno-
mials {fi(x), gi(y)}Pi∈C. Since F (x, y) is a random bivariate polynomial of degree at
most t and |C| ≤ t, a standard argument implies that the view of the adversary is
independent of the dealer’s input s.
It is immediate that the adversary learns nothing additional about s in rounds 1
or 2. As for the values broadcast in round 3, consider any ordered pair (Pi, Pj) of
parties who remain honest throughout the sharing phase. Since the dealer is hon-
est, we have fi(j) = gj(i) = F (j, i) and, since Pi, Pj are honest, we have ri,j = r
′
i,j.
Thus, in round 3 parties Pi, Pj, and the dealer all broadcast the same “blinded”
value F (j, i) + ri,j. Since ri,j is chosen uniformly at random, the parties in C do not
learn anything about the value of F (j, i).
Lemma 30 If the dealer is not corrupted by the end of the sharing phase, then
correctness holds.
Proof If the dealer remains honest then no honest party will be unhappy. It
follows that the dealer is not disqualified at the end of sharing phase.
Let Pi be honest. In the reconstruction phase, Corei contains all the honest
parties and so |Corei| ≥ n − t. We claim that for any Pj ∈ Corei, it holds that
f ij(x) = F (x, j) and g
i
j(y) = F (j, y), where F is the dealer’s polynomial. When Pj
is honest this is immediate. When Pj is malicious, the fact that Pj ∈ Corei means
that f ij(k) = g
i
k(j) = F (k, j) for at least n−2t ≥ t+1 honest parties Pk. Since f ij(x)
93
has degree at most t, it follows that f ij(x) = F (x, j). A similar argument shows that
gij(y) = F (j, y). Therefore, the polynomial F
′(x, y) reconstructed by Pi is equal to
F (x, y), and Pi outputs s = F (0, 0).
Lemma 31 Weak commitment holds.
Proof The case of an honest dealer follows from the proof of correctness, so we
consider the case of a malicious dealer. If there are more than t unhappy parties,
the dealer is disqualified and weak commitment trivially holds; so, assume there are
at most t unhappy parties. Then there are at least n−2t ≥ t+1 honest parties who
are happy. Let H denote the first t+ 1 such parties. The polynomials fi sent by the
dealer to the parties in H define a bivariate polynomial F̂ (x, y) in the natural way:
namely, let F̂ be such that F̂ (x, i) = fi(x) for each Pi ∈ H. Because parties in H
are happy, it holds also that F̂ (i, y) = gi(y) for all Pi ∈ H. Set s′ := F̂ (0, 0). We
show that every honest party outputs either ⊥ or s′ in the reconstruction phase.
Consider an honest party Pi in the reconstruction phase. If |Corei| < n−t then
Pi outputs⊥ and we are done. Say |Corei| ≥ n−t. We claim that for each Pj ∈ Corei,
it holds that f ij(x) = F̂ (x, j) and g
i
j(y) = F̂ (j, y). When Pj is honest, the fact that Pj
is happy (which is true since Pj ∈ Corei) means that f ij(k) = fj(k) = gk(j) = F̂ (k, j)
for all t + 1 parties Pk ∈ H. Since f ij is a polynomial of degree at most t, this
implies that f ij(x) = F̂ (x, j). A similar argument shows that g
i
j(y) = F̂ (j, y). When
Pj ∈ Corei is malicious, we have that f ij(k) = gik(j) = F̂ (k, j) for at least n−2t ≥ t+1
honest parties Pk ∈ Corei. Again, since f ij(x) has degree at most t it follows that
f ij(x) = F̂ (x, j), and a similar argument shows that g
i
j(y) = F̂ (j, y). Therefore, the
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polynomial reconstructed by Pi is equal to F̂ (x, y), and Pi outputs s
′ = F̂ (0, 0).
As the proof of the above lemma indicates, our WSS protocol also satisfies a
weak variant of 2-level sharing that we state for future reference:
Lemma 32 Say the dealer is not disqualified in an execution of the WSS protocol,
and let H denote the set of all honest parties who are happy. Then there is a
bivariate polynomial F̂ of degree at most t in each variable such that, at the end of
the sharing phase, the polynomials fi, gi held by each Pi ∈ H satisfy fi(x) = F̂ (x, i)
and gi(y) = F̂ (i, y).
As a consequence, each Pi ∈ H can compute si and {si,j}j∈{1,...,n} such that:
1. There is a polynomial p(x) of degree at most t with si = p(i), and furthermore
all honest parties output either s′ = p(0) or ⊥ in the reconstruction phase.
2. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists a polynomial pj(x) of degree at most t
such that (1) pj(0) = p(j) and (2) si,j = pj(i).
Proof When the dealer is honest take F̂ to be the dealer’s polynomial. When
the dealer is dishonest, let F̂ be the bivariate polynomial defined in the proof of
the preceding lemma. Set p(x)
def
= F̂ (0, x) and pj(x)
def
= F̂ (x, j). In what follows we
assume a dishonest dealer, but it is immediate that everything (trivially) holds also
if the dealer is honest.
The proof of the preceding lemma shows that, at the end of the sharing phase,
each Pi ∈ H holds polynomials fi, gi with fi(x) = F̂ (x, i) and gi(y) = F̂ (i, y), and
such that all honest parties output either s′ = F̂ (0, 0) or ⊥ in the reconstruction
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phase. Then each Pi ∈ H can compute si := fi(0) = F̂ (0, i) = p(i) and si,j :=
gi(j) = F̂ (i, j) = pj(i). Furthermore, s
′ = p(0). Finally, pj(0) = F̂ (0, j) = p(j) for
all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, all the stated requirements hold.
5.2 Verifiable Secret Sharing
Before we describe our VSS protocol with 2-level sharing, we review the ideas
used in [36] to transform their WSS protocol into a VSS protocol (that does not
have 2-level sharing). At a high level, the sharing phase of the VSS protocol is more-
or-less the same as the sharing phase of the underlying WSS protocol; the difference
is that now, in the reconstruction phase, each party reveals the random pads they
used in the sharing phase. A problem that arises is to ensure that a malicious party
Pi reveals the “correct” random pads. This is enforced by having each player act as
a dealer in its own execution of WSS, and “binding” the random pads of each party
to this execution of WSS. In more detail: in parallel with the sharing phase of the
larger VSS protocol, each party Pi also acts as a dealer and shares a random secret
using the WSS protocol. Let F padi (x, y) be the corresponding bivariate polynomial
chosen by Pi. Then Pi will use ri,j := F
pad
i (0, j) as the appropriate “random pad” in
the larger VSS protocol. (The pads {ri,j} used by any honest party Pi are thus no
longer independent, but secrecy is still preserved since they lie on a random degree-t
polynomial.) These random pads are then revealed in the reconstruction phase by
using the reconstruction phase of the underlying WSS protocol.
We can use the ideas outlined in the previous paragraph to obtain a (3, 1)-
96
round VSS protocol, but the resulting protocol will not have 2-level sharing. Yet all
is not lost. As observed already in Lemma 32, by the end of the sharing phase the
honest parties who are happy will have the required 2-level shares. To achieve our
desired result we must therefore only enable any unhappy honest party to construct
its 2-level shares.
At a high level, we do this as follows: Suppose F̂ (x, y) is the dealer’s bivariate
polynomial, defined by the end of the sharing phase of the VSS protocol, and let Pi be
an honest party who is unhappy. We need to show how Pi constructs the polynomials
F̂ (x, i) and F̂ (i, y) (which it will use to generate its 2-level shares exactly as in the
proof of Lemma 32). Let Pj be a party such that:
– Pj is happy (in the larger VSS protocol);
– Pj was not disqualified as a dealer it its own execution of WSS; and
– Pi is happy in Pj’s execution of WSS.
From the proof of Lemma 32, we know there is a bivariate polynomial F̂ padj (x, y) for
which Pi holds the univariate polynomial F̂
pad
j (x, i). Furthermore, Pj has effectively
broadcasted the polynomial Bj(x)
def
= F̂ (x, j) + F̂ padj (0, x) in round 3, since it has
broadcasted F̂ (k, j) + F̂ padj (0, k) for all k. Thus, party Pi can compute
F̂ (i, j) := Bj(i)− F̂ padj (0, i) = F̂ (i, j)
for any party Pj satisfying the above conditions. If there are t+ 1 parties satisfying
the above conditions, then Pi can reconstruct the polynomial F̂ (i, y).
Unfortunately, it is not clear how to extend the above approach to enable
Pi to also reconstruct the polynomial F̂ (x, i) in the case when F̂ is an arbitrary
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bivariate polynomial. For this reason, we have the dealer use a symmetric2 bivariate
polynomial. Then F̂ (x, i) = F̂ (i, x) and we are done.
5.2.1 The Protocol
We show a (3, 1)-round VSS protocol with 2-level sharing that tolerates t < n/3
malicious parties.
Sharing phase. The sharing phase consists of three rounds, with broadcast used
in the last round.
Round 1: The dealer holds s. The following steps are carried out in parallel:
– The dealer chooses a random symmetric bivariate polynomial F (x, y) of
degree t in each variable such that F (0, 0) = s. Then D sends to each
party Pi the polynomial fi(x) := F (x, i). Note that F (x, i) = F (i, x)
since F is symmetric.
– Each party Pi picks a random value ŝi and executes the first round of
the WSS protocol described in the previous section, acting as a dealer to
share the “input” ŝi. We refer to this instance of the WSS protocol as
WSSi.
– Let F padi (x, y) denote the bivariate polynomial used by Pi in WSSi (i.e.,
F padi (0, 0) = ŝi). Party Pi sends the polynomial ri(y) := F
pad
i (0, y) to the
dealer D.
2A polynomial F is symmetric if, for all `,m, the coefficient of the term x`ym is equal to the
coefficient of the term xmy`. If F is symmetric then F (i, j) = F (j, i) for all i, j.
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Round 2: Each party Pi does the following:
– Run round 2 of WSSj, for all j.
– For all j 6= i, send ai,j := fi(j) to Pj.
– For all j 6= i, let fpadj,i (x) be the polynomial that Pj sent to Pi in round 1
of WSSj. (If Pj is honest then f
pad
j,i (x) = F
pad
j (x, i).) Party Pi sends
r′j,i := f
pad
j,i (0) to D.
Round 3: Each party Pi does the following:
– Run round 3 of WSSj, for all j.
– For all j 6= i, let a′j,i be the value Pi received from Pj in the previous
round. If a′j,i 6= fi(j), then Pi broadcasts (j: “disagree”, fi(j), F
pad
i (0, j)).
Otherwise, Pi broadcasts (j: “agree”, fi(j) + F
pad
i (0, j)).




i be the polynomial sent by Pi to D in round 1, and let r
(2)
i,j be the
appropriate random pad sent by Pj to D in round 2.
– If r
(1)
i (j) 6= r
(2)
i,j , then D broadcasts ((i, j): “not equal”, F (j, i)). Other-
wise, D broadcasts ((i, j): “equal”, F (j, i) + r
(1)
i (j)).
Local computation. Each party locally carries out the following steps:
1. An ordered pair of parties (Pi, Pj) is conflicting if, in round 3, party Pi broad-
casts (j: “disagree”, fi(j), F
pad




i,j (0)); and it holds that F
pad
i (0, j) = f
pad
i,j (0). For a pair of conflicting
parties (Pi, Pj), we say that Pi (resp., Pj) is unhappy if one of the following
conditions hold:
(.1) D broadcasts ((i, j): “not equal”, di,j) and di,j 6= fi(j) (resp., di,j 6= fj(i)).
(.2) D broadcasts ((i, j): “equal”, di,j) and di,j 6= fi(j) + F padi (0, j) (resp.,
di,j 6= fj(i) + fpadi,j (0)).
A party is happy if it is not unhappy.
Let Core denote the set of parties who are happy with respect to the definition
above. For every Pi who was not disqualified as the dealer in WSSi, let Corei
denote the set of parties who are happy with respect to WSSi. (If Pi was
disqualified in WSSi, then set Corei := ∅.)
Note that all parties have the same view regarding Core and the {Corei}.
2. For all i, j, remove Pj from Corei if either of the following hold for the ordered
pair (i, j) in round 3:
– Pi broadcasts (j: “agree”, y) and Pj did not broadcast (i: “agree”, y).
– Pi broadcasts (j : “disagree”, ?, w) and Pj broadcasts either (i : “agree”, ?)
or (i : “disagree”, ?, w′) with w′ 6= w. (Here, ? denotes an arbitrary
value.)
3. Remove Pi from Core if |Core ∩ Corei| < n− t. (Thus, in particular, if Pi was
disqualified in WSSi then Pi 6∈ Core.)
Note that all parties still have the same view of Core and the {Corei}.
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4. If |Core| < n− t, then the dealer is disqualified and a default value (along with
default 2-level shares) are shared.
5. Each party Pi computes a polynomial f̂i(x) of degree at most t:
(.1) If Pi ∈ Core, then f̂i(x) is the polynomial that Pi received from the dealer
in round 1.
(.2) If Pi /∈ Core, then Pi computes f̂i(x) in the following way:
i. Pi first defines a set Core
′
i as follows: A party Pj is in Core
′
i if and
only if all the following conditions hold:
• Pj ∈ Core and Pi ∈ Corej.
• Define pj,k, for k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, as follows: if in round 3 party Pj
broadcasted (k : “agree”, yj,k), then set pj,k := yj,k. If Pj broad-
casted (k: “disagree”, wj,k, zj,k), then set pj,k := wj,k + zj,k.
We require that the {pj,k} lie on a polynomial Bj(x) of degree at
most t; i.e., such that Bj(k) = pj,k for all k. (If not, then Pj is
not included in Core′i.)
Our proofs will show that |Core′i| ≥ t+ 1 if the dealer is not disqual-
ified.
ii. For each Pj ∈ Core′i, set pj := pj,i−f
pad
j,i (0). Let f̂i be the polynomial
of degree at most t such that f̂i(j) = pj for every Pj ∈ Core′i. (It will
follow from our proof that such an f̂i exists.)
6. Finally, Pi outputs si := f̂i(0) and si,j := f̂i(j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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Reconstruction phase. Each party Pi sends si to all other parties. Let s
′
j,i be the
value that Pj sends to Pi. Using Reed-Solomon decoding, Pi computes a polynomial
f(x) of degree at most t such that f(j) = s′j,i for at least 2t + 1 values of j. The
final output of Pi is f(0).
5.2.2 Proofs
We prove that the protocol given in the previous section is a VSS protocol
with 2-level sharing that tolerates t < n/3 malicious parties.
Lemma 33 If the dealer is not corrupted by the end of the sharing phase, privacy
is preserved.
Proof Let C denote the set of parties corrupted by the end of the sharing phase.
We show that if the dealer remains uncorrupted, then the view of the adversary can
be simulated given the polynomials {fi(x)}Pi∈C. Since F (x, y) is a random symmetric
bivariate polynomial of degree at most t and |C| ≤ t, a standard argument (see, e.g.,
[22]) implies that the view of the adversary is independent of the dealer’s input s.
It is immediate that the adversary learns nothing additional about s in round 2.
As for the values broadcast in round 3, consider an ordered pair (Pi, Pj) of parties
who remain honest throughout the sharing phase. Since the dealer is honest, we
have fi(j) = F (j, i) = F (i, j) = fj(i) and, since Pi, Pj are honest, ri(j) = r
′
i,j. Thus,
in round 3, parties Pi, Pj, and the dealer all broadcast the same “blinded” value
fi(j) + F
pad
i (0, j). Since F
pad
i (0, y) is a random polynomial of degree at most t this
does not leak any information about the {fi(x)}Pi 6∈C that the adversary does not
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already know.
Lemma 34 If the dealer is not corrupted by the end of the sharing phase, then
correctness and commitment with 2-level sharing hold.
Proof If the dealer is honest, then no honest party is unhappy. Also, all honest
parties are in Corei for any honest player Pi. Since there are at least n − t honest
parties, no honest party is removed from Core. It follows that the dealer is not
disqualified.
Since all honest parties are in Core, each honest party Pi sets f̂i(x) := fi(x) =
F (x, i). Defining p(x)
def
= F (0, x) and pj(x)
def
= F (j, x), it is straightforward to verify
that the properties of commitment with 2-level sharing hold:
• Each honest party Pi outputs si := f̂i(0) = F (0, i) = p(i).
• For all j, it holds that pj(0) = F (j, 0) = F (0, j) = p(j).
• For each honest party Pi and all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have
si,j = f̂i(j) = F (j, i) = pj(i).
In the reconstruction phase, s′j,i = sj = p(j) for any honest party Pj. Thus, each
honest party Pi receives at most t values s
′
j,i that do not lie on the polynomial p(x).
It follows that Pi outputs s = p(0) = F (0, 0), the dealer’s input. This completes the
proof.
We now move on to show that commitment with 2-level sharing holds even
when the dealer is malicious. The case of a disqualified dealer is obvious, so we
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focus on the case of a malicious dealer who is not disqualified. We begin by proving
three claims:
Claim 35 If the dealer is not disqualified, then for any honest Pi it holds that
|Core′i| ≥ t+ 1.
Proof If the dealer was not disqualified, then Core contains at least n−2t ≥ t+1
honest parties. We show that any honest Pj ∈ Core is also in Core′i, proving the
claim.
Since Pi and Pj are both honest, Pi ∈ Corej. Set B(x)
def
= fj(x) + F
pad
j (0, x).
This is a polynomial of degree at most t, and the pj,k computed by Pi all lie on Bj(x).
We conclude that Pj ∈ Core′i.
Claim 36 If the dealer is not disqualified in the sharing phase, there is a bivariate
symmetric polynomial F̂ (x, y) of degree at most t in each variable that is consistent
with the polynomials f̂i computed by every honest party in Core; i.e., for every honest
Pi ∈ Core it holds that f̂i(x) = F̂ (x, i).
Proof If the dealer is not disqualified, then there are at least n− t parties in Core
and at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1 of them are honest. Let H denote the first t + 1 such
parties. The polynomials fi sent by the dealer to the parties in H define a bivariate
polynomial F̂ (x, y) in the natural way: namely, let F̂ be such that F̂ (x, i) = fi(x)
for each Pi ∈ H. We show that F̂ satisfies the requirements of the claim.
By definition of F̂ , we have f̂i(x) = fi(x) = F̂ (x, i) for any Pi ∈ H. Next,
observe that for every honest Pi, Pj ∈ Core it holds that f̂i(j) = f̂j(i). Indeed, it
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must be the case that fi(j) = fj(i) (or else one of Pi or Pj would be unhappy), and
since Pi, Pj ∈ Core we have f̂i(x) = fi(x) and f̂j(x) = fj(x). Since H ⊂ Core, this
implies that F̂ is symmetric. It also implies that for every honest Pi ∈ Core (i.e.,
not just the Pi ∈ H) we have f̂i(x) = F̂ (i, x) = F̂ (x, i), proving the claim.
Claim 37 Assume the dealer is not disqualified in the sharing phase, and let F̂ be
the polynomial guaranteed to exist by Claim 36. Then for any honest Pi 6∈ Core, it
holds that f̂i(x) = F̂ (x, i).
Proof Fix an honest Pi 6∈ Core, and an arbitrary Pj ∈ Core′i. (Claim 35 shows
that Core′i is non-empty.) By definition, this means Pj ∈ Core and Pi ∈ Corej. So Pj
was not disqualified as a dealer in WSSj and, by Lemma 32, there exists a bivariate
polynomial F̂ padj of degree at most t in each variable such that f
pad
j,k (x) = F̂
pad
j (x, k)
for all Pk ∈ Corej. (Recall that fpadj,k denotes the polynomial that Pj sent to Pk in
round 1 of WSSj.)
Let pj,k be the values computed by Pi, and let Bj(x) be a polynomial of degree
at most t such that Bj(k) = pj,k for all k. Such a polynomial is guaranteed to exist
because otherwise Pj 6∈ Core′i.
Since Pj remains in Core, we have |Core ∩ Corej| ≥ n − t. This means that
there are at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1 honest parties that are in both Core and Corej.
Letting F̂ be the symmetric polynomial guaranteed by the previous claim, we now
show that for any honest Pk ∈ Core ∩ Corej we have Bj(k) = F̂ (k, j) + F̂ padj (0, k).
There are two cases to consider:
– If in round 3 party Pj broadcasted (k : “agree”, yj,k), then pj,k := yj,k. Since
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Pk ∈ Corej, this implies that party Pk must have broadcasted (j : “agree”, yk,j)
with yk,j = yj,k in that round (cf. step 2 of the local computation phase). Since
Pk is honest we have
Bj(k) = pj,k = yj,k = yk,j
= fk(j) + f
pad
j,k (0)
= F̂ (j, k) + fpadj,k (0) (using Claim 36 and Pk ∈ Core)
= F̂ (j, k) + F̂ padj (0, k) (since Pk ∈ Corej)
= F̂ (k, j) + F̂ padj (0, k),
using the fact that F̂ is symmetric.
– If in round 3 party Pj broadcasted (k : “disagree”, wj,k, zj,k) then, because Pk ∈
Corej, this implies that party Pk must have broadcasted (j : “disagree”, wk,j, zk,j)
with zk,j = zj,k. It must also be the case that wk,j = wj,k or else one of Pj or
Pk would be unhappy. It follows that
Bj(k) = pj,k = wj,k + zj,k = wk,j + zk,j,
and then an argument as before shows that Bj(k) = F̂ (k, j) + F̂
pad
j (0, k).
Summarizing, we have Bj(k) = F̂ (k, j) + F̂
pad
j (0, k) for at least t + 1 values
of k. Since Bj(x) has degree at most t, this means Bj(x) = F̂ (x, j) + F̂
pad
j (0, x).
Party Pi next computes
pj := pj,i − fpadj,i (0) = Bj(i)− F̂
pad
j (0, i)
= F̂ (i, j) + F̂ padj (0, i)− F̂
pad
j (0, i) = F̂ (i, j),
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using the fact that Pi ∈ Corej in the first line. Since this is true for arbitrary
Pj ∈ Core′i, we see that the polynomial f̂i computed by Pi satisfies f̂i(x) = F̂ (i, x) =
F̂ (x, i). This completes the proof.
Lemma 38 Even when the dealer is malicious, commitment with 2-level sharing
holds.
Proof By the preceding two claims, at the end of the sharing phase there exists
a symmetric bivariate polynomial F̂ (x, y) with degree at most t in each variable
such that f̂i(x) = F̂ (x, i) for any honest party Pi. Set p(x) := F̂ (x, 0) and pj(x) :=
F̂ (x, j). One can then verify that the properties of commitment with 2-level sharing
hold:
• Each honest party Pi outputs si
def
= f̂i(0) = F̂ (0, i) = F̂ (i, 0) = p(i).
• At the end of the reconstruction phase, each honest party Pi will output s′ =
p(0).
• For all j, it holds that pj(0) = F̂ (0, j) = p(j).
• For each honest party Pi and all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have
si,j
def
= f̂i(j) = F̂ (j, i) = F̂ (i, j) = pj(i).
This completes the proof.
107
Chapter 6
Round Complexity of Statistical VSS with Honest Majority
In this chapter we study the round complexity of information-theoretic VSS
in the presence of a honest majority. In this setting, we require the security re-
quirements of VSS to hold even when the malicious parties have unbounded com-
putational power. In the previous chapter, we saw perfect VSS, where all security
requirements hold unconditionally (i.e., even against a computationally unbounded
adversary) with zero error probability. However, it is known that perfect VSS is
possible if and only if t < n/3 [5, 27]. On the other hand, statistical VSS (cf.
Definition 5), where security requirements may be violated with negligible proba-
bility, is possible (assuming the existence of a broadcast channel) up to a threshold
t < n/2 [83].
The round complexity of perfect VSS has been extensively studied. For the
case of optimal threshold (i.e., t < n/3), Gennaro et al. [43] showed that 3 rounds1
are necessary and sufficient for perfect VSS, and gave an efficient 4-round protocol
for the task. The 3-round VSS protocol by Gennaro et al. requires communication
exponential in the number of players, but Fitzi et al. [36] later demonstrated that
an efficient 3-round protocol is possible. In Chapter 5, we showed that perfect VSS
can be achieved with optimal round complexity and, at the same time, optimal use
1Following the accepted convention, the round complexity of VSS refers to that of the shar-
ing phase.
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of the broadcast channel.
For the case of statistical VSS, the best known upper bound on the exact
round complexity was obtained by Cramer et al. [23]. Their protocol required eleven
rounds. The 3-round lower bound of Gennaro et al. was generally believed to apply
also to the case of statistical VSS. Surprisingly, Patra et al. [76] showed that sta-
tistical VSS could be realized in two rounds for t < n/3. (The protocol of Patra et
al. does not apply when n/3 ≤ t < n/2.) On the other hand, the work of Patra et
al. proves that 2-round statistical VSS is impossible for t ≥ n/3, which obviously
applies to setting of honest majority as well. Motivated by the discussion above, we
aim to develop a better understanding of the round complexity of statistical VSS in
the presence of an honest majority.
Our results and techniques. We consider a definition of statistical VSS that
relaxes the correctness/commitment requirement, but not the privacy requirement
(cf. Definiton 5). This is the definition that has been considered previously in the
literature [83, 23]. In more detail, we relax the security requirements in the following
way. For a given a statistical security parameter λ, our VSS protocol always achieves
perfect privacy, and may fail to achieve correctness/commitment with probability at
most 2−Θ(λ). Under this relaxation, we obtain the following results. First, we show a
3-round protocol for statistical VSS, thereby settling the exact round complexity of
statistical VSS with optimal threshold. Our construction is inefficient, in that the
computation and communication are exponential in the number of parties. Second,
we show an efficient 4-round protocol for statistical VSS with optimal threshold,
109
i.e., with computation and communication polynomial in n. Our work also leads to
an improvement in the exact round complexity of coin-tossing in the presence of an
honest majority.
We now summarize the basic techniques used to prove our results. As in [84,
23], we build statistical VSS protocols using several instances of a primitive known
as information checking. Loosely speaking, a protocol for information checking al-
lows a sender to send a “signature” on a secret s to a receiver, such that the receiver
can later produce a “proof” that convinces a verifier that it indeed received s from
the sender. Recently, the work of Patra et al. [78, 77] improved and generalized pre-
vious protocols for information checking. More specifically, they construct a 3-round
protocol that allows every party to simultaneously act as a verifier while guaran-
teeing agreement among honest parties’ decision to accept or reject the receiver’s
proof. We employ their information checking protocol as a subroutine in all our
constructions. Indeed, much of the efficiency gains we achieve may be attributed
to the use of their round-efficient information checking protocol. We observe that
prior statistical VSS protocols (e.g., [23]) would also enjoy significant improvements
if they are modified to work with the information checking protocol of Patra et al.
However, this modification alone does not suffice to yield even a five round protocol
for statistical VSS.
We also propose and work with a slightly relaxed definition for information
checking, and observe that Patra et al.’s construction satisfies this weaker defini-
tion without any further modification. More concretely, our definition of informa-
tion checking differs from the traditional definition in the following way. Earlier
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works [23, 78, 77] defined a protocol for information checking as a three-phase pro-
tocol that required to satisfy a privacy property and three additional “correctness”
properties. In contrast, we define a protocol for information checking (cf. Defini-
tion 8) as a two-phase protocol (with the two phases being a sharing phase, and a
reconstruction phase) that satisfies three requirements, namely privacy, correctness,
and a relaxed commitment property. Our reasons for pursuing this alternate defini-
tion of information checking are as follows. First, our definition is sufficient for our
purposes, and further considerably simplifies the design of our VSS protocols and
proofs. Next, we believe that our definition clearly highlights the similarities be-
tween information checking and verifiable secret sharing. In other words, it clearly
shows how information checking is weaker than verifiable secret sharing. Further-
more, our definition of information checking allows us to immediately observe how
a stronger version of information checking directly yields a statistical VSS protocol.
(See Section 6.1.1.)
Our three round statistical VSS protocol may be best viewed as a stronger
version of our information checking protocol. We explain this in detail. Patra et al.
generalized the traditional information checking protocol to simultaneously accom-
modate multiple verifiers. We further extend this idea, and generalize their infor-
mation checking protocol to simultaneously accommodate multiple receivers while
preserving both the security guarantees and the round complexity of information
checking. We do this in two steps. First, we define a primitive called weak infor-
mation checking for multiple receivers, denoted WICP, which extends information
checking to simultaneously accommodate up to t receivers (cf. Definition 9). The
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guarantees provided by WICP are weak, and in particular, correctness and commit-
ment properties are guaranteed only when all receivers are honest. We give a 3-round
protocol for WICP. Our next primitive which we call information checking for mul-
tiple receivers, denoted SICP, builds on, and significantly strengthens the properties
provided by WICP. In SICP, both correctness and commitment are guaranteed as
long as at least one of the receivers is honest (cf. Definition 10). We give a 3-round
protocol for SICP. This protocol runs in time exponential in the number of parties,
but it achieves strong guarantees that are sufficient to construct a simple protocol
for statistical VSS. Indeed, our three round protocol for statistical VSS is obtained
by running exponentially many instances of SICP in parallel, one for each possible
set of receivers. We remark that in order to guarantee that the security properties
fail to hold with probability at most 2−Θ(λ), we assume that the dealer’s (possibly
padded) secret s lies in a finite field F satisfying log |F| = κ > max(λ, 10n).2
As mentioned before, we also construct an efficient 4-round protocol for statis-
tical VSS with optimal threshold. We employ extensively the information checking
protocol of Patra et al. [78, 77] in our construction. In the following description,
we say that party Pi sends a “signature” on a message s to another party Pj, if
Pi acts as a sender with input s and Pj acts as the receiver in an execution of the
sharing phase of an information checking protocol. Similarly, we say Pj reveals a
“signature” on s, if Pj executes the reconstruction phase of the corresponding infor-
mation checking protocol. On a high level, we use the following strategy to design
2Contrast this with the statistical VSS protocol of [23], where the size of the underlying finite
field is simply 2λ, and is independent of the number of parties.
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our protocol. In the first round, the dealer distributes a signature on the shares of
the secret to each party using a random symmetric bivariate polynomial; in paral-
lel, each pair of parties (Pi, Pj) exchanges signatures on a random pad ri,j. Pi also
sends a signature on random pad ri,j to the dealer. In the second round, Pi and
Pj check for an inconsistency between their shares by broadcasting their common
shares masked with the random pad. The dealer will broadcast the corresponding
share masked with the random pad. In the third round, if there is a disagreement
between Pi and Pj in round 2 (note that all parties agree whether there is disagree-
ment since broadcast is used in round 2), then the dealer, Pi, and Pj all broadcast
the share in question. This allows the rest of the parties to determine whether the
dealer “agrees” with Pi or with Pj. Notice that secrecy of the share is preserved if
Pi, Pj, and the dealer are all honest. On the other hand, if the dealer is malicious
and there is a disagreement between honest parties Pi and Pj, then the dealer can
only “agree” with at most one of Pi and Pj in round 3, but not both of them.
Unfortunately, the above is not sufficient when the signatures are implemented
by means of an information checking protocol. This is because information check-
ing provides no security guarantees when both the sender and receiver are dishon-
est. Furthermore, the information checking protocol that we use allows a dishonest
sender to change the message in the very last round of the protocol. To overcome
such adversarial strategies, we require parties to begin the reconstruction phase of
some instances of information checking protocols in order to expose a cheating dealer
by revealing its signatures on inconsistent shares. Such a solution would work, but
unfortunately requires 5 rounds since the reconstruction phase of our information
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checking protocol requires 2 rounds. Our main novelty is to allow the reconstruc-
tion phase of some information checking subprotocols to begin while concurrently
executing the (last round of the) sharing phase of all information checking subpro-
tocols. Of course, this process needs to be carefully designed so that no additional
information is leaked to the adversary. We defer the details of this to Section 6.3,
where we also prove that the above strategy is sufficient to yield an efficient 4-round
statistical VSS protocol.
Other related work. Statistical VSS protocols with optimal resilience were first
shown by Rabin and Ben-Or [84, 83], thereby showing information-theoretic MPC
for t < n/2. A more efficient protocol for statistical VSS, and consequently for
secure computation with an honest majority, was shown later by Cramer et al. [23].
Previous research has also investigated the design of statistical VSS protocols when
a setup (for e.g., a PKI) is available. In such a setting, statistical VSS protocols
are often simpler to design, and enjoy better round complexity [35, 63, 68]. For
instance, given a setup, it is possible to collapse the 11-round protocol of [23] into
a 4-round protocol [68, 63]. We stress that our protocols do not assume any setup.
As observed in Chapter 5, the number of broadcast rounds in VSS protocols
contributes significantly to their round complexity in point-to-point networks. Re-
cent work by Garay et al. [38] addresses this issue and shows a 9-round statistical
VSS protocol with optimal resilience that uses broadcast only in three rounds. In
contrast, we note that our protocols use broadcast in at least four rounds. Subse-
quent to our work, Backes et al. [1] investigated the round complexity of computa-
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tional VSS (with no additional setup) when t < n/2, and show a 2-round protocol
that they prove is round-optimal.
Notation. Let λ denote a statistical security parameter. Our VSS protocols will
fail with probability at most ε = 2−Θ(λ). In our protocols, we use a field F with
|F| = 2κ such that κ > max(λ, 10n). Without loss of generality, we assume that
the dealer’s input s lies in F. Finally, we say that an event happens with negligible
probability if the probability of that event occurring is at most ε = 2−Θ(λ).
Organization. We define information checking, present the information checking
protocol given by Patra et al. [78, 77], and prove its security in Section 6.1.1. Then,
in Section 6.1.2, we define WICP and present our WICP protocol and its proof of
security. Section 6.1.3 contains the definition of SICP and a protocol that meets this
definition. In Section 6.2, we present our inefficient 3-round protocol for statistical
VSS. Finally, Section 6.3 contains our efficient 4-round statistical VSS protocol.
6.1 Building Blocks
6.1.1 Information Checking
Our protocols build on information checking protocol (ICP), a notion first
introduced by Rabin and Ben-Or [84]. The traditional definition of an ICP [84, 23]
involves the dealer, a party who acts as the intermediary, and a party who acts
as the verifier. In an initial phase, the dealer gives a secret value s ∈ F along
with some auxiliary information to the intermediary party and some verification
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information (that reveals nothing about s) to the verifier. Later, using s and the
auxiliary information provided by the dealer, the intermediary party can give s to
the verifier along with a “proof” that s is indeed the value that it received from D.
The basic definition of ICP involves only a single verifier; Patra et al. [78, 77],
extend this definition to allow every party in the network to act as a verifier. En-
abling multiple verifiers considerably simplifies the description of our VSS protocols.
Formally, an information checking protocol (ICP) is defined in the following way.
Definition 8 (Information Checking) A two-phase protocol for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn},
where a dealer D holds initial input s and a receiver Pi, is an information checking
protocol with multiple verifiers if the following conditions hold for any adversary
controlling at most t parties:
Privacy If D and Pi are honest at the end of the first phase (the sharing phase), then
at the end of this phase the joint view of the malicious parties is independent
of the dealer’s input s.
Correctness Each honest party Pk outputs a value sk at the end of the second phase
(the reconstruction phase). If the dealer D is honest then except with negligible
probability, sk = s holds.
Conditional Commitment If Pi is honest, then at the end of the sharing phase,
except with statistically negligible probability, the joint view of the honest par-
ties defines a value s′ such that each honest party will output s′ at the end of
the reconstruction phase. ♦
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We remark that the above definition is a more simplified (and slightly weaker)
version of the traditional definition presented in prior work. Earlier work [84, 23, 78,
77] defines a protocol for ICP as a tuple of algorithms Distr, AuthVal, and Reveal-
Val, and furthermore required perfect correctness when both D and Pi are honest.
However, it is usually the case that Distr and AuthVal are executed successively, and
typically in the “sharing phase” of a larger protocol that uses ICP as a subprotocol.
Indeed, our definition groups the two algorithms together in the sharing phase of
the ICP protocol. Similarly, RevealVal is typically executed in the “reconstruction
phase” of a larger protocol that employs ICP as a subprotocol. Our definition sim-
ply dubs RevealVal as the reconstruction phase. Finally, note that since we are
interested only in developing statistically secure VSS protocols, it is reasonable to
consider a definition which requires correctness to hold only with high probability
(even when both D and Pi are honest). We also note that information checking
protocols are typically employed in constructing protocols for secure computation
when t < n/2. It is well-known that perfect security is impossible in this setting
(or, more generally when t ≥ n/3 [5]).
We believe that our definition is natural (for our purposes) and furthermore,
considerably simplifies the description of our VSS protocols. We will use ICP pro-
tocols as building blocks for designing new (and more complicated) primitives, and
our simplified definition will make it easier to see the successive strengthenings our
new primitives achieve. Indeed, our strategy for obtaining a 3-round VSS protocol
is simply to strengthen the conditional commitment property of a 3-round ICP pro-
tocol. Suppose we design a protocol π with the exact same guarantees as an ICP
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protocol except the commitment property holds even for a dishonest Pi. Now con-
sider the following candidate VSS protocol that employs π as a subprotocol. First,
the dealer additively shares his secret input into n shares. Then, the dealer executes
n instances of π, one with each party Pi using input the ith additive share. It is
easy to see that all VSS properties (namely privacy, correctness, and commitment)
follow directly from the corresponding properties of π, and furthermore the round
complexity of the resulting VSS protocol is the same as the round complexity of π.
(Although this may be viewed as a high level overview of our strategy, we stress
that we are unable to exactly realize protocol π.)
6.1.1.1 The Protocol
Here we present a simple ICP protocol tolerating t < n/2 malicious parties.
Our construction is based on the ICP protocol of Patra et al. [78, 77]. The protocol
requires 3 rounds in an initial sharing phase, and an additional 2 rounds in the
reconstruction phase.
Sharing phase. The sharing phase consists of three rounds.
Round 1: The dealer holds s. The following steps are carried out in parallel:
– The dealer chooses a random degree-t polynomial F (x) such that s =
F (0), and sends F (x) to Pi. In addition, the dealer sends a random
degree-t polynomial R to Pi. Let F
′, R′ denote the polynomials received
by Pi.
– For each Pk ∈ P , the dealer chooses verification points xk ∈ F \ {0} at
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the values received by Pk.
Round 2: Pi chooses a random multiplier d ∈ F\{0}, computes B = dF ′(x)+R′(x),
and broadcasts (d,B(x)).
Round 3: If it does not hold that B(x) = dF (x) +R(x), then the dealer broadcasts
s(D) = s.
Local Computation. If dealer broadcasted s(D) in round 3 of the sharing phase,
then each party sets conflictD,i(s) = 1, else they set conflictD,i(s) = 0.
Reconstruction phase. The reconstruction phase consists of two rounds. For the
sake of clarity, we handle the following two cases separately. First, if D broadcasted
s(D) in round 3 of the sharing phase, i.e., if conflictD,i(s) = 1 holds, each party
Pk ∈ P sets sk = s(D), and terminates the reconstruction protocol.
The remainder of the reconstruction phase deals with the second case where
conflictD,i(s) = 0.
Round 1: Pi broadcasts F
′(x).
Round 2: Each party Pk ∈ P broadcasts “accept” if either of the following condi-
tions hold.
• It holds that y′k = F ′(x′k).
• It holds that B(x′k) 6= dy′k + z′k.
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Local Computation. If at least t + 1 parties broadcasted “accept”, then each
party Pk ∈ P sets sk = F ′(0). If not, else set sk = ⊥.
This completes the description of the protocol.
The following shorthand will be useful in description of more complicated
constructions that follow. We say that Pi conflicts with Pj if in an execution of
ICPi,j(s), it holds that conflicti,j(s) = 1.
6.1.1.2 Proofs
We now prove the protocol ICPD,i(s) given in the previous section is a sta-
tistical ICP protocol tolerating t < n/2 parties when κ > max(λ, 10n). (Recall
|F| = 2κ.)
Claim 39 (Privacy) If D and Pi remain honest throughout the sharing phase, then
privacy is preserved.
Proof Let C denote the set of parties corrupted by the end of the sharing phase.
We show that if the dealer remains uncorrupted, then the view of the adversary
can be simulated given the values {xk}Pk∈C, {F (xk)}Pk∈C, and {R(xk)}Pk∈C. Since
F (x) and R(x) are random polynomials of degree at most t and |C| ≤ t, a standard
argument implies that the view of the adversary at the end of round 1 of the sharing
phase is independent of the dealer’s input s, and the values of polynomials F (x) and
R(x) except at points {xk}Pk∈C.
When Pi is honest, clearly an honest D does not broadcast s
(D) in round 3
of the sharing phase. Thus, it remains to be shown that the view of the adversary
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remains independent of the dealer’s input s even after Pi broadcasts (d,B(x)) in
round 2 of the sharing phase. Recall that the view of the adversary is independent
of the values of the polynomial R(x) except at points {xk}Pk∈C. Thus, using R(x) to
mask the true value of F (x) (as is the case in B(x) = dF (x) +R(x)) does not leak
any information about the {F (xk)}Pk 6∈C that the adversary does not already know.
Claim 40 (Correctness) If the dealer remains uncorrupted throughout the sharing
phase, then correctness holds with all but negligible probability.
Proof Clearly, when conflictD,i(s) equals 1, each party outputs s
(D) which equals
s for an honest D, and correctness follows immediately. For the rest of the proof, we
assume conflictD,i(s) = 0. We first consider the case when Pi is honest. In this case,
Pi broadcasts F
′(x) = F (x). Since the dealer is honest, we have that y′k = F
′(xk)
holds for every honest Pk ∈ P . Therefore, at least n − t ≥ t + 1 parties will
broadcast “accept” in the reconstruction phase. Correctness follows immediately
since s = F ′(0) is reconstructed.
Consider now the case when (a dishonest) Pi broadcasts F
′(x) 6= F (x). We
will prove that for every honest Pk ∈ P , neither y′k = F ′(x′k) nor B(x′k) 6= dy′k + z′k
holds. First, we will show that y′k 6= F ′(x′k) holds with high probability when Pk
is honest. Using (a) two distinct degree-t polynomials are identical at at most t
points, and (b) the value of x′k is completely independent of the adversary’s view,
we conclude that F ′(x′k) = F (x
′
k) holds with probability at most t/(|F| − 1). Since
κ > max(λ, 10n) (recall κ = |F|), we conclude that y′k 6= F ′(x′k) holds with all but
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negligible probability.





k. Observe that an honest D checks in round 3 whether B(x) = dF (x)+R(x)
holds. In case it does not hold, then D broadcasts s(D) which in turn makes every
party update conflictD,i(s) to hold value 1. This contradicts our assumption that
conflictD,i(s) = 0. Therefore, for every honest Pk it must hold that B(x
′
k) = dF (x
′
k)+






k holds for every honest
Pk ∈ P . This completes the proof of the claim.
Claim 41 (Conditional Commitment) If Pi remains uncorrupted throughout the
entire protocol, then commitment holds with all but negligible probability.
Proof It is easy to verify that the claim is true when conflictD,i(s) = 1 holds. For
the rest of the proof we assume that conflictD,i(s) = 0 holds. We will prove that for
every honest Pk ∈ P , either y′k = F ′(x′k) holds, or B(x′k) 6= dy′k + z′k holds. This
suffices because since n > 2t, at least n − t ≥ t + 1 honest parties will broadcast
“accept” and the value F ′(0) held by honest Pi during the sharing phase will be
reconstructed.
By way of contradiction, assume that y′k 6= F ′(x′k) holds. We consider two
cases depending on whether z′k = R(x
′





holds. Then, B(x′k) = dF
′(x′k) +R
′(x′k) 6= dy′k + z′k holds for an honest Pi since d is
chosen from F \ {0} Therefore, in this case, we conclude that with high probability,
party Pk will broadcast “accept”.
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On the other hand, suppose z′k 6= R(x′k) holds. Note that each of x′k, y′k, and
z′k are received by honest Pk in round 1 of the sharing phase (in particular, before
Pi chooses d and broadcasts (d,B(x))), and these values are never modified later.




′(x′k) only in the event that d = (R
′(x′k) −
z′k)/(F
′(x′k)−y′k) holds. However, this event happens only with negligible probability
(more concretely, with probability 1/(|F| − 1)) when Pi is honest. Therefore, we
conclude that with high probability, party Pk will broadcast “accept” in this case
as well. This completes the proof of the claim.
We will denote an ICP protocol with D as dealer with input s, and receiver Pi,
using the notation ICPD,i(s). More generally, we denote an ICP protocol where Pi
acts as dealer with input ri,j and Pj acts as as receiver using the notation ICPi,j(ri,j).
Also, in the protocol constructions that follow, we will execute many instances
of ICP subprotocols (sometimes using the same input) in parallel. In each instance,
honest parties will obviously use independent randomness. This will allow us to
argue the following. Suppose ` instances of ICP subprotocols are executed in parallel.
Then, using a simple union bound, we see that correctness property holds for each of
the ` ICP subprotocols with probability at least 1− (`t/(|F| − 1)). Similarly, we see
that the conditional commitment property holds for each of the ` ICP subprotocols
with probability at least 1− (`/(|F| − 1)).
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6.1.2 Weak Information Checking for Multiple Receivers
We will generalize the ICP protocol by allowing multiple receivers. This will
allow us to leverage the presence of any honest party who acts as a receiver, in
order to obtain stronger commitment guarantees. Second, this will also allow us to
base our commitment and correctness properties on a publicly verifiable condition.
Contrast this with the basic definition of ICP (cf. Definition 8) which guarantees
commitment (resp. correctness) properties only when the receiver (resp. dealer) is
honest, an inherently unverifiable condition.
As mentioned before, we note that our definition is weak in the sense that
the correctness and commitment properties hold only if the view of honest parties
satisfies a certain condition (denoted by cleanS(s)). (We will strengthen this further
in the next section.) Formally, we define weak information checking for multiple
receivers below.
Definition 9 (Weak Information Checking for Multiple Receivers) A two-
phase protocol WICPS(s) for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a dealer D holds
initial input s and a set of receivers S with |S| = t, is a weak information checking
protocol for multiple receivers if the following conditions hold for any adversary
controlling at most t parties:
Privacy If D and all parties in S are honest at the end of the first phase (the
sharing phase), then at the end of this phase the joint view of the malicious
parties is independent of the dealer’s input s.
Conditional Correctness By the end of the sharing phase, all parties in P agree
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on a value cleanS(s) ∈ {0, 1}. Further, if cleanS(s) = 1, each honest party Pk
outputs a value sk at the end of the second phase (the reconstruction phase). If
the dealer is honest then except with statistically negligible probability, sk = s
holds.
Conditional Commitment By the end of the sharing phase, all parties in P agree
on a value cleanS(s) ∈ {0, 1}. Further, if cleanS(s) = 1, then at the end of the
sharing phase, except with statistically negligible probability, the joint view of
the honest parties defines a value s′ such that each honest party will output s′
at the end of the reconstruction phase.
Non-triviality If D and all parties in S are honest at the end of the sharing phase,
then at the end of this phase the value of cleanS(s) will always equal 1. ♦
We briefly mention that our final 3-round statistical VSS protocol is based on
replication-based secret sharing [43, 24, 60], which loosely speaking allows the same
secret share to be held by a set of receivers (rather than just a single receiver).
Indeed, it is easy to see that our definition of WICP naturally leads us towards such
a design. We mention that schemes based on replication-based secret sharing are
typically not linear (this is also the case in our VSS construction).
We mention that our scheme (or more generally, typical replication-based se-
cret sharing schemes e.g., [43]) may be viewed as a simple application of Bracha’s
player-virtualization technique [8], in which a set of parties work together to simu-
late a single virtual party. Looking at our definition, we see that S may be viewed
as a single virtual party being simulated together by each Pi ∈ S. Given this,
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the non-triviality requirement (along with conditional correctness and conditional
commitment) may be viewed as saying that such a simulation is “useful” when per-
formed faithfully. Viewed via this lens, it is easy to verify that a WICP protocol
provides exactly the same guarantees as an ICP protocol between the dealer and a
virtual party S as long as the simulation is faithful. This correctness of simulation
is exactly what we capture by the condition cleanS(s) = 1.
6.1.2.1 The Protocol
We show a statistical WICP (weak information checking for multiple receivers)
protocol that tolerates t < n/2 malicious parties. The protocol requires 3 rounds in
the sharing phase, and an additional 2 rounds in the reconstruction phase.
Sharing phase. The sharing phase consists of three rounds.
Round 1: The dealer holds s. The following steps are carried out in parallel:
– The dealer executes the first round of the ICP protocol (described in
Section 6.1.1) with each Pi ∈ S as receiver on input s. We refer to such
an instance of the ICP protocol as ICPD,i(s). Let s
′
i denote the value




– Each party Pi ∈ S ∪ {D} picks a random value ri,j for every Pj ∈ S ∪
{D} \ {Pi} and executes the first round of the ICP protocol with Pj as
receiver on input ri,j. We refer to this instance of the ICP protocol as
ICPi,j(ri,j). Let r
′
i,j denote the value received by Pj.
3We remark that the variable s′D is used merely to simplify exposition of our claims and proofs.
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Round 2: Each party Pi ∈ S ∪ {D} does the following:
– Run round 2 of ICPi,j(ri,j), for all Pj ∈ S ∪ {D} \ {Pi}.
– For all Pj ∈ S ∪ {D} \ {Pi}, broadcast ai,j := s′i,j + ri,j.
– For all Pj ∈ S ∪ {D} \ {Pi}, broadcast bi,j := s′i,j + r′j,i.
In parallel with the above, the dealer executes the second round of the ICPD,i(s)
with each Pi ∈ S.
Round 3: Each party Pi ∈ S ∪ {D} runs round 3 of ICPi,j(ri,j), for all Pj ∈ S ∪
{D} \ {Pi}.
In parallel with the above, the dealer D does the following for each Pi ∈ S:
– Run round 3 of ICPD,i(s). If D conflicts with Pi, or for some Pj ∈
S∪{D}\{Pi}, either ai,j 6= bj,i, or ai,j = ⊥, then D broadcasts s(D) := s.
In this case, each party in P sets local variable resolvedS(s) = 1.
Local computation. Each party locally carries out the following steps.
1. Each party disqualifies the dealer, and outputs some default secret if the dealer
does not follow the protocol.
2. For each Pi ∈ S, initialize flagi(s) = 1. Reset flagi(s) = 0 if any of the following
is true for some Pj ∈ S \ {Pi}.
(.1) Pi conflicts with Pj.
(.2) It holds that ai,j 6= bj,i.
127
(.3) It holds that aj,i 6= bi,j.
3. Initialize resolvedS(s) = 0. If the dealer broadcasted s
(D) in round 3 of the
sharing phase, then each party Pk ∈ P resets resolvedS(s) = 1.
4. Initialize cleanS(s) = 1. Reset cleanS(s) = 0 if each of the following conditions
are satisfied.
(.1) It holds that resolvedS(s) = 0.
(.2) There is pair of parties Pi, Pj ∈ S such that Pi conflicted with Pj in
round 3 of the sharing phase, and Pj also conflicted with Pi in round 3
of the sharing phase.
Reconstruction phase. The reconstruction phase consists of two rounds.
Round 1: Each party executes the following in parallel for every Pi ∈ S ∪ {D}:
– If Pi 6= D, run round 1 of the reconstruction phase of ICPD,i(s).
– For every Pj ∈ S ∪ {D} \ {Pi}, run round 1 of the reconstruction phase
of ICPi,j(ri,j).
Round 2: Each party executes the following in parallel for every Pi ∈ S ∪ {D}:
– If Pi 6= D, run round 2 of the reconstruction phase of ICPD,i(s).
– For every Pj ∈ S ∪ {D} \ {Pi}, run round 2 of the reconstruction phase
of ICPi,j(ri,j).
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In parallel with the above D broadcasts s̃D := s.
4
Local Computation. Each party locally carries out the following steps.
1. If D broadcasted s(D) in round 3 of the sharing phase, then each party Pk ∈ P
outputs sk = s
(D), and terminates the reconstruction protocol.
2. For every Pi ∈ S ∪ {D}, perform the following:
(.1) If Pi 6= D, carry out the local computation of ICPD,i(s).
Let s̃i denote the reconstructed value.
(.2) For every Pj ∈ S ∪ {D} \ {Pi}, carry out the local computation of
ICPi,j(ri,j).
Let r̃i,j denote the reconstructed value.
3. Initialize REC = {D}. Add Pi ∈ S to REC if s̃i 6= ⊥ holds.
4. Delete D from REC if for some Pi ∈ REC, it holds that s̃D 6= s̃i.
5. Delete Pi from REC if for some Pj ∈ S ∪ {D} \ {Pi} any of the following hold:
(.1) r̃i,j 6= ⊥ and s̃i + r̃i,j 6= ai,j.
(.2) Pj did not conflict with Pi and bi,j − r̃j,i 6= s̃i.
6. If cleanS(s) = 0, then each Pk ∈ P outputs sk = ⊥, and terminates the
reconstruction protocol.5
4We remark that this step is necessary for handling the case when all t parties in S decide to
abort the reconstruction phase.
5We remark that executing this step at the beginning of the reconstruction phase is sufficient.
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7. Each party picks some Pi ∈ REC and outputs s′ = s̃i.
6.1.2.2 Proofs
We now prove that the protocol given in the previous section is a statistical
WICP protocol tolerating t < n/2 parties when κ > max(λ, 10n). (Recall |F| = 2κ.)
Claim 42 (Privacy) If all parties in S ∪ {D} remain uncorrupted throughout the
sharing phase, privacy is preserved.
Proof Let C denote the set of parties corrupted by the end of the sharing phase.
We show that if the dealer remains uncorrupted, then the view of the adversary
can be simulated using simulators for each ICP subprotocol. Observe that when all
parties in S ∪ {D} are honest, every ICP subprotocol is run with an honest dealer
and an honest receiver. We can apply Claim 39 to conclude that each of these ICP
subprotocols when considered individually, preserve privacy of dealer’s input and the
random pads that are exchanged between honest players. Furthermore, since honest
parties use independent randomness (in particular, independent random masks) in
each of these ICP subprotocols (including ones that run using the same input), we
note that parallel executions of these ICP subprotocols still preserves privacy of each
execution. Therefore, simulators that simultaneously preserve privacy for each ICP
subprotocol are implied by Claim 39.
However, since our main goal is to construct a VSS protocol, it will be useful to execute this step
after the set REC is defined. This will simplify our proofs, and especially allow us to state and
prove Corollary 45 which holds even when cleanS(s) = 0.
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Also, honest parties are guaranteed to follow the protocol, and thus will never
conflict (within any ICP subprotocol) with another honest party. Other conditions
that force D to broadcast s(D) are easily verified not to hold when all parties S∪{D}
is honest.
As for the values broadcast in round 2, consider an ordered pair (Pi, Pj) of
parties who remain honest throughout the sharing phase. Since the dealer is honest,
we have that s′i = s = s
′
j holds, and since Pi, Pj are honest, ri,j = r
′
i,j and rj,i = r
′
j,i.
Since ri,j and rj,i are completely random field elements, “blinded” values s
′
i + ri,j
and s′j + rj,i do not leak any information about the secret s that the adversary does
not already know.
Note that the value of cleanS(s) is updated depending on broadcasts made by
parties in S. Thus, by the end of the sharing phase, (honest) parties will agree on the
final value of cleanS(s). Further, since an honest party never conflicts with another
honest party, the value of cleanS(s) always equals 1 when all parties in S ∪ {D} are
honest. Thus, our protocol satisfies the non-triviality requirement when all parties
in S ∪ {D} are honest.
We will now make an observation about executing multiple instances of ICP
subprotocols in parallel with one another. Recall that when ` instances of ICP sub-
protocols are run in parallel, then (a) the correctness property holds for each of the
` instances except with probability O(`t/|F|), and (b) the conditional commitment
property holds for each of the ` instances except with probability O(`/|F|). From
the claim above, we see that rest of the WICP execution other than the ICP subpro-
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tocols yields no information to the adversary that it already does not know. Finally,
in our WICP subprotocol, we see that ` = O(n2), and since |F| > 2max(λ,10n), we
see that except with negligible probability, correctness and conditional commitment
holds for every ICP subprotocol simultaneously. We will use this fact repeatedly
in our proofs. We are now ready to prove that our protocol satisfies the condi-
tional commitment property, and derive the conditional correctness property of our
protocol as a corollary.
Claim 43 (Conditional Commitment) Suppose cleanS(s) = 1. Then, even when
the dealer is malicious, commitment holds with all but negligible probability.
Proof The claim trivially holds when the dealer is disqualified in the sharing
phase, or when the dealer broadcasts s(D) in round 3 of the sharing phase. For the
rest of the proof, we assume that none of these events happened. Since |S∪{D}| > t,
there is at least one honest party Pi ∈ S∪{D}. (For the rest of the proof, we assume
that Pi is honest. Note that Pi could be the dealer.)
First, we show that honest Pi ∈ S ∪ {D} is contained in REC. We start by
considering Pi ∈ S. Note that since D did not conflict with Pi, by the conditional
commitment property of ICPD,i(s) we have that s̃i = s
′
i is true with all but negligible
probability. If s′i = ⊥, then ai,j = ⊥ would hold, and D would be forced to broadcast
s(D) in round 3 of the sharing phase. Since we assume that the latter event did not
happen, we conclude that s̃i 6= ⊥. In this case, Pi is added to REC. Also, observe
REC is initialized with {D}, therefore an (honest) D is always added to REC. We
now argue that with high probability, none of the deletion rules apply to an honest
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Pi ∈ S ∪ {D}.
1. As argued earlier, s̃i = s
′
i must hold except with negligible probability. Thus,
ai,j = s̃i+ri,j holds for honest Pi. Furthermore, since Pi is honest, r̃i,j revealed
by every Pj must satisfy r̃i,j ∈ {⊥, ri,j} with all but negligible probability.
(This follows from the correctness property of ICP subprotocols. Note that
the correctness property is violated only when malicious receiver can guess at
least one “verification point” xk held by an honest party Pk. Since when the
dealer is honest, this value xk is independent of every other ICP execution, and
furthermore, is never revealed either in the sharing or reconstruction phase by
Pk.) We conclude that ai,j = s̃i + r̃i,j holds with high probability.
2. Suppose some Pj ∈ REC did not conflict with Pi. Then, with high probability
it holds that r̃j,i= r
′
j,i. Recalling that when Pi is honest, s̃i= s
′
i holds with
high probability, we see that bi,j − r′j,i = bi,j − r̃j,i = s′i = s̃i holds with high
probability.
(Note that when D is honest, by the correctness property of ICP we have that except
with negligible probability no Pj ∈ S will be able to reveal s̃j 6∈ {⊥, s̃D}. Then,
following an argument similar to the one outlined above, we see that none of the
deletion rules apply to an honest D.) Thus, every honest Pi ∈ S ∪{D} is contained
in REC.
Next, we show that for every Pj ∈ REC, the value of s̃j equals s̃i. For the rest
of the proof we assume that both ai,j = bj,i and aj,i = bi,j hold, since otherwise,
D would be forced to broadcast s(D) and consequently, commitment would follow
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immediately. Since cleanS(s) = 1, then in round 3 of the sharing phase, either Pi
did not conflict with Pj, or Pj did not conflict with Pi.
We consider two cases. First, suppose Pi did not conflict with Pj. In this case,
since Pj is not deleted from REC, we conclude that bj,i− r̃i,j = s̃j holds. Furthermore
since Pi is honest, by the conditional commitment property of ICP, with all but
negligible probability, it must hold that r̃i,j ∈ {⊥, ri,j}. Since bi,j − r̃i,j = s̃j, it
must be the case that r̃i,j = ri,j. Recall that ai,j = bj,i holds by assumption, so we
conclude that ai,j − r̃i,j = s̃j must hold. Observe that for Pi ∈ REC, it holds that
ai,j − r̃i,j = s̃i (else Pi is deleted from REC). Thus, we conclude that s̃j = s̃i holds.
Given this, it is immediate that all parties output s′ = s̃i.
Second, suppose Pj did not conflict with Pi. In this case, since Pi is contained
in REC, we conclude that bi,j − r̃j,i = s̃i. Furthermore since Pi is honest, by the
commitment property of ICP, with all but negligible probability, it must hold that
r̃j,i = rj,i. Recall that aj,i = bi,j holds by assumption, so we conclude that aj,i− r̃j,i =
s̃i must hold. Observe that for Pj ∈ REC, when r̃j,i 6= ⊥ (as is the case here) it holds
that aj,i − r̃j,i = s̃j (else Pj is deleted from REC). Thus, we conclude that s̃j = s̃i
holds in this case as well. Given this, it is immediate that all parties output s′ = s̃i.
So far we have that if D neither broadcasted s(D) nor got disqualified during
the sharing phase, then all parties output s′ = s̃i where s̃i is held by an honest
party Pi. By the conditional commitment property of ICP we have that with all
but negligible probability s̃i reconstructed by honest Pi will equal s
′
i received from
D in (round 1 of) the sharing phase. Thus, with high probability, the reconstructed
secret s′ is fixed at the end of the sharing phase. This concludes the proof of the
134
claim.
The following corollary is immediate from the proof of Claim 43.
Corollary 44 Let Pi ∈ S ∪ {D}. Suppose Pi is honest such that Pi holds s′i at the
end of round 1 of the sharing phase. Furthermore, suppose resolvedS(s) = 0 and
cleanS(s) = 1 hold. Then at the end of the reconstruction phase s
′ = s′i holds with
all but negligible probability.
Also, observe that when flagi(s) = 1 holds, honest Pi does not conflict with
any Pj ∈ S ∪{D} \ {Pi}. Following an analysis similar to the proof of Claim 43, we
obtain the following corollary that holds even when cleanS(s) = 0.
Corollary 45 Let Pi ∈ S ∪ {D}. Suppose Pi is honest such that Pi received s′i
at the end of round 1 of the sharing phase. Furthermore, suppose flagi(s) = 1
and resolvedS(s) = 0 hold. Then at the end of the reconstruction phase for every
Pj ∈ REC, we have that s̃j = s′i holds with all but negligible probability.
Claim 46 (Conditional Correctness) Suppose cleanS(s) = 1. Further suppose
that the dealer remains uncorrupted throughout the sharing phase. Then, correctness
holds with all but negligible probability.
Proof Clearly, a dealer that remains uncorrupted throughout the sharing phase
follows the protocol, and thus is never disqualified at the end of the sharing phase.
It is also easy to see that correctness holds when resolvedS(s) = 1 holds since an
honest dealer broadcasts s(D) = s in this case. For the rest of the proof, we assume
that resolvedS(s) = 0 holds. Note that when D is honest, by the commitment
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property of ICPD,i(s), we have that with high probability s̃j ∈ {⊥, s} holds for
every Pj ∈ S ∪{D}\{Pi}. Furthermore, s′i = s holds for every honest Pi ∈ S ∪{D}
at the end of round 1 of the sharing phase. (Recall that since |S∪{D}| > t, there is
party Pi which remains honest throughout the protocol. In particular, Pi is honest
during the entire reconstruction phase.) Given this, the claim follows immediately
from Corollary 44.
We will denote a WICP protocol with D as dealer with input s, and S as the
set of receivers using the notation WICPS(s).
Also, in the protocol constructions that follow, we will execute (exponentially)
many instances of WICP subprotocols in parallel. In each instance, honest parties
will use independent randomness. This will allow us to argue the following. Suppose
` instances of WICP subprotocols are executed in parallel. Then, using a simple
union bound, we see that the conditional correctness property holds for each of the
` WICP subprotocols except with probability O(`n3/|F|). Similarly, we see that the
conditional commitment property holds for each of the ` WICP subprotocols except
with probability O(`n2/|F|).
6.1.3 Information Checking for Multiple Receivers
We will now strengthen the weak ICP protocol described in the previous sec-
tion. In particular, our strengthening will ensure that correctness and commitment
properties are satisfied unconditionally. Formally, we define information checking
for multiple receivers below.
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Definition 10 (Information Checking for Multiple Receivers) A two-phase
protocol SICPS(s) for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a dealer D holds initial input
s and a set of receivers S with |S| = t, is an information checking protocol for
multiple receivers if the following conditions hold for any adversary controlling at
most t parties:
Privacy If D and all parties in S are honest at the end of the first phase (the
sharing phase), then at the end of this phase the joint view of the malicious
parties is independent of the dealer’s input s.
Correctness Each honest party Pk outputs a value sk at the end of the second phase
(the reconstruction phase). If the dealer is honest then except with statistically
negligible probability sk = s holds.
Commitment At the end of the sharing phase, except with statistically negligible
probability, the joint view of the honest parties defines a value s′ such that each
honest party will output s′ at the end of the reconstruction phase. ♦
Recall that we designed the WICP protocol by virtualizing the receiver in an
ICP protocol, and that this provided slightly weaker guarantees since the simulation
of the virtual party may not be performed honestly. In order to obtain stronger guar-
antees in our SICP protocol, we virtualize the verifiers of the ICP protocol as well.
Such a virtualization ensures that the conditions in the definition of information
checking (cf. Definition 8) are always satisfied. In more detail, since |S ∪ {D}| > t,
at least one party in S∪{D} is honest. This turns out to be sufficient to strengthen
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the conditional commitment and correctness properties of WICP (and ICP) to their
respective unconditional variants as seen in the definition above.
At a high level, our protocol introduces an additional level of information
checking to the WICP protocol. In more detail, our protocol runs the 3-round WICP
protocol described in Section 6.1.2 using the dealer’s input secret. In parallel with
the above, parties also execute a variant of the ICP protocol that uses a polynomial
of high degree and whose verification points are distributed (using a WICP protocol)
among subsets of parties (i.e., virtual parties).
The easy case is when the WICP execution involving the dealer’s secret input
itself is clean. The commitment property follows directly from the guarantees of a
clean WICP execution. To the deal with the case when the above WICP execu-
tion is not clean, our protocol requires the parties to broadcast their high degree
polynomial when the parties, loosely speaking, sense that there is a possibility that
the WICP execution may not be clean. Polynomials revealed in this fashion will
then be checked (in the reconstruction phase) against all verification points whose
corresponding WICP executions were clean. Thus, in this case, commitment follows
because (a) revealed polynomials are obviously fixed at the end of the sharing phase,
and (b) the verification points that are used for checking the polynomial (i.e., those
involving clean WICP executions) is also fixed at the end of the sharing phase. We
remark that the above is merely an informal overview of our protocol and omits
several minor but important details.
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6.1.3.1 The Protocol
We show a statistical SICP (information checking for multiple receivers) pro-
tocol that tolerates t < n/2 malicious parties. Our protocol requires 3 rounds in the
sharing phase, and an additional 2 rounds in the reconstruction phase.
Sharing phase. The sharing phase consists of three rounds.
Round 1: The dealer holds s. Let S1, . . . , Sη be distinct subsets of P \{D} of size-t.
The following steps are carried out in parallel:
– The dealer chooses a random degree-τ polynomial F (x) such that F (0) =
s, and sends F (x) to each Pi ∈ S. In addition, the dealer sends a random
degree-τ polynomial Ri(x) to each Pi ∈ S. Let F ′i (x), R′i(x) denote the
polynomials received by Pi.
– The dealer executes the first round of the WICP protocol with S as
receivers on input s. We refer to this instance of the WICP protocol as
WICPS(s). We let s
′
i denote the value Pi ∈ S receives from the dealer in
the first round of WICPS(s).
– For each k ∈ [η], the dealer chooses xk ∈ F \ {0} at random and executes
the following.
• The first round of the WICP protocol with Sk as receivers on input
xk. We refer to this instance of the WICP protocol as WICPSk(xk).
• The first round of the WICP protocol with Sk as receivers on in-
put F (xk). We refer to this instance of the WICP protocol as
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WICPSk(F (xk)).
• For each Pi ∈ S, the first round of the WICP protocol with Sk as
receivers on input Ri(xk). We refer to this instance of the WICP
protocol as WICPSk(Ri(xk)).
Round 2: Each party Pi ∈ S chooses a random di ∈ F \ {0}, computes Bi(x) =
diF
′
i (x) + R
′
i(x) and broadcasts (di, Bi(x)). In addition, each Pi ∈ S checks
whether s′i = F
′
i (0) holds. If not, Pi broadcasts “complaint”.
In parallel with the above, the dealer executes the following.
– Run round 2 of WICPS(s).
– For each k ∈ [η], run round 2 of WICPSk(xk).
– For each k ∈ [η], run round 2 of WICPSk(F (xk)).
– For each k ∈ [η] and for each Pi ∈ S, run round 2 of WICPSk(Ri(xk)).
Round 3: If for some Pi ∈ S, it does not hold that diF (x) + Ri(x) = Bi(x), or
Pi broadcasted “complaint” in round 2 of the sharing phase, then the dealer
broadcasts s(D) = s. Else, the dealer executes the following in parallel.
– Run round 3 of WICPS(s).
– For each k ∈ [η], run round 3 of WICPSk(xk).
– For each k ∈ [η], run round 3 of WICPSk(F (xk)).
– For each k ∈ [η] and for each Pi ∈ S, run round 3 of WICPSk(Ri(xk)).
(Recall that each Pi ∈ S maintains a local variables flagi(s) in protocol
WICPS(s).)
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If for some Pi ∈ S, party Pi set flagi(s) = 0, then it broadcasts F ′i (x).
Local computation. Each party locally carries out the following steps.
1. Each party disqualifies the dealer, and outputs some default secret if the dealer
does not follow the protocol.
2. Recall that each party Pk ∈ P maintains a local variable resolvedS(s) in proto-
col WICPS(s). Suppose the dealer broadcasted s
(D) in round 3 of the sharing
phase, then each party Pk sets resolvedS(s) = 1, and terminates the local
computation.
3. Each party disqualifies the dealer, and outputs some default secret if the dealer
gets disqualified within any WICP subprotocol.
4. The local computation of each WICP subprotocol is carried out. In par-
ticular, the values of cleanS(s), cleanSk(xk), cleanSk(F (xk)), cleanSk(Ri(xk)) are
determined for each Pi ∈ S and for each k ∈ [η].
5. Initialize U = {Pi | Pi ∈ S and flagi(s) = 0}.
6. For each k ∈ [η], parties set recflagk = 1 if each of the following are simulta-
neously satisfied:
(.1) It holds that cleanSk(xk) = 1 and resolvedSk(xk) = 0.
(.2) It holds that cleanSk(F (xk)) = 1 and resolvedSk(F (xk)) = 0.
(.3) For every Pi ∈ S, both cleanSk(Ri(xk)) = 1 and resolvedSk(Ri(xk)) = 0
hold.
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Otherwise, parties set recflagk = 0.
7. If there does not exist some k ∈ [η] such that recflagk = 1, then each party
disqualifies the dealer, and outputs some default secret.
Reconstruction phase. The reconstruction phase consists of two rounds. For the
sake of clarity, we handle the following three cases separately. First, if D broadcasted
s(D) in round 3 of the sharing phase of SICPS(s) or WICPS(s), i.e., if resolvedS(s) = 1
holds, then each party Pk ∈ P outputs sk = s(D), and terminates the reconstruction
protocol.
Second, if cleanS(s) = 1, then parties run the 2-round reconstruction phase
of WICPS(s). Each party Pk ∈ P outputs sk as the output of WICPS(s), and
terminates the reconstruction protocol.
The remainder of the reconstruction phase deals with the third case where
cleanS(s) = 0.
Round 1: The following steps are carried out in parallel.
– Run round 1 of the reconstruction phase of WICPS(s).
– For each k ∈ [η], if recflagk = 1, then parties in Sk execute the following.
• Run round 1 of the reconstruction phase of WICPSk(xk).
• Run round 1 of the reconstruction phase of WICPSk(F (xk)).
• For each Pi ∈ S, run round 1 of the reconstruction phase of WICPSk(Ri(xk)).
Round 2: The following steps are carried out in parallel.
– Run round 2 of the reconstruction phase of WICPS(s).
142
– For each k ∈ [η], if recflagk = 1, then parties in Sk execute the following.
• Run round 2 of the reconstruction phase of WICPSk(xk).
• Run round 2 of the reconstruction phase of WICPSk(F (xk)).
• For each Pi ∈ S, run round 2 of the reconstruction phase of WICPSk(Ri(xk)).
Local Computation. Each party locally carries out the following steps:
1. For each k ∈ [η] with recflagk = 1, perform the local computation steps of





i,k denote the corresponding reconstructed values.
2. For every Pi ∈ U , check whether the following is true. For each k ∈ [η] with
recflagk = 1, either





(.2) it holds that Bi(x
′
k) 6= diy′k + z′i,k.
If for some k ∈ [η], neither condition holds, then remove Pi from U .
3. Suppose |U| ≥ 2. If for some Pi, Pj ∈ U it holds that F ′i (0) 6= F ′j(0), then each
party Pk ∈ P outputs sk = ⊥ and terminates the reconstruction protocol. If
after this step, |U| > 0 holds, then each party Pk ∈ P picks any Pi ∈ U and
outputs sk = F
′
i (0).
4. Perform the local computation step of WICPS(s). Each party Pk ∈ P outputs
sk as the output of WICPS(s), and terminates the reconstruction protocol.
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6.1.3.2 Proofs
We now prove that the protocol given in the previous section is a statistical
SICP protocol tolerating t < n/2 parties when κ > max(λ, 10n). (Recall |F| = 2κ.)
Claim 47 (Privacy) If all parties in S ∪ {D} remain uncorrupted throughout the
sharing phase, privacy is preserved.
Proof Let C denote the set of parties corrupted by the end of the sharing phase.
We show that if the dealer remains uncorrupted, then the view of the adversary can
be simulated given the values {xk}C∩Sk 6=∅, {F (xk)}C∩Sk 6=∅, and {Ri(xk)}Pi∈S,C∩Sk 6=∅,
along with simulators for each WICP subprotocol involving receivers that are all
honest. Suppose all parties in Sk are honest. We can apply Claim 42 to conclude
that each WICP subprotocol involving parties in Sk when considered individually,
preserves privacy of dealer’s input of that execution. Furthermore, observe that
honest parties use independent randomness within each WICP subprotocol, and
therefore, parallel executions of these WICP subprotocols still preserves privacy of
each execution. Therefore, simulators that simultaneously preserve privacy for all
WICP subprotocols that involve a honest set of receivers are implied by Claim 42.
Also, honest parties are guaranteed to follow the protocol, and thus will never
conflict (within any ICP subprotocol) with another honest party, nor will they broad-
cast “complaint” and force the dealer to reveal the secret. Thus, for an honest Pi,
the value flagi(s) always remains 1. Therefore, no honest party Pi in S will broadcast
F (x).
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Observe that F (x) and Ri(x) are random polynomials of degree at most τ ,
and that |{Sk | C ∩ Sk 6= ∅}| < η = τ holds when n > 2t. Using a standard
argument it follows that the view of the adversary at the end of round 1 of the
sharing phase is independent of the dealer’s input s, and the values of polynomials
F (x) and {Ri(x)}Pi∈S except at points {xk}C∩Sk 6=∅.
When all parties in S∪{D} are honest, clearly an honest D does not broadcast
s(D) in round 3 of the sharing phase. Thus, it remains to be shown that the view
of the adversary remains independent of the dealer’s input s even after each Pi ∈ S
broadcasts (di, Bi(x)) in round 2 of the sharing phase. Recall that the view of the
adversary is independent of the values of the polynomial Ri(x) except at points
{xk}C∩Sk 6=∅. Thus, using random and independent polynomials Ri(x) to mask the
true value of F (x) (as is the case in Bi(x) = diF (x)+Ri(x) for every honest Pi ∈ S)
does not leak any information about the {F (xk)}C∩Sk 6=∅ that the adversary does not
already know.
We will now make an observation about executing multiple instances of WICP
subprotocols in parallel with one another. Recall that when ` instances of WICP
subprotocols are run in parallel, then (a) the conditional correctness property holds
for each of the ` instances except with probability O(`n3/|F|), and (b) the condi-
tional commitment property holds for each of the ` instances except with probability
O(`n2/|F|). From the claim above, we see that rest of the SICP execution other than
the WICP subprotocols yields no information to the adversary that it already does
not know. Finally, in our WICP subprotocol, we see that ` = O(η) = O(2n), and
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since |F| > 2max(λ,10n), we see that except with negligible probability, correctness
and conditional commitment holds for every WICP subprotocol simultaneously. We
will use this fact repeatedly in our proofs. We are now ready to prove that our
protocol satisfies the commitment and correctness properties.
First, note that the value of recflagk is updated depending on broadcasts made
by parties in S. Thus, by the end of the sharing phase, (honest) parties will agree
on the final value of recflagk.
Claim 48 Suppose Pi is honest and it holds that resolvedS(s) = 0. Then, if flagi(s) =
0 holds and if the dealer is not disqualified at the end of the sharing phase, then with
all but negligible probability Pi is contained in U at the end of the reconstruction
phase.
Proof Clearly, Pi with flagi(s) = 0 is included in U when U is initialized. We
only need to show that honest Pi is never deleted from U .
Fix some k ∈ [η] such that recflagk = 1. (Such a k exists, since otherwise
the dealer is disqualified at the end of the sharing phase.) We will now prove that











k), for the rest of the proof we only consider the case when y
′
k 6= F ′i (x′k)













k) 6= diy′k + z′i,k holds for an honest Pi except when di = 0. However, di = 0
holds for an honest Pi only with negligible probability. Thus, it suffices to consider
the case when y′k 6= F ′i (x′k) and z′i,k 6= R′i(x′k) hold simultaneously.
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Since recflagk = 1, we have that each of the following are simultaneously
satisfied:
1. It holds that cleanSk(xk) = 1 and resolvedSk(xk) = 0.
2. It holds that cleanSk(F (xk)) = 1 and resolvedSk(F (xk)) = 0.
3. It holds that cleanSk(Ri(xk)) = 1 and resolvedSk(Ri(xk)) = 0.
By Corollary 44, we conclude that for every honest party Pj ∈ Sk ∪ {D}, party Pj
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WICPSk(F (xk)), WICPSk(Ri(xk)) respectively. Thus, we conclude that the dealer
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k) − z′i,k)/(F ′i (x′k) − y′k). Since honest Pi chooses di ∈ F at random, the
probability that the above equality is satisfied is negligible. We conclude that with
all but negligible probability Bi(x
′
k) 6= diF ′i (x′k) + R′i(x′k) holds. This completes the
proof of the claim.
Claim 49 Suppose resolvedS(s) = 0 holds. If the dealer remains uncorrupted at the
end of the sharing phase, then at the end of the reconstruction phase s = F ′i (0) holds
for every Pi ∈ U .
Proof We begin by observing that when n > 2t there exists k ∈ [η] such that
all parties in Sk ∪ {D} are honest. Furthermore, since (honest) parties in Sk ∪ {D}
never conflict or contradict with one another, the dealer never broadcasts in round 3
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of the WICP protocols with receiver set Sk. Combining this with the non-triviality
condition, we see that each of the following are simultaneously satisfied:
1. It holds that cleanSk(xk) = 1 and resolvedSk(xk) = 0.
2. It holds that cleanSk(F (xk)) = 1 and resolvedSk(F (xk)) = 0.
3. It holds that cleanSk(Ri(xk)) = 1 and resolvedSk(Ri(xk)) = 0.
We conclude that recflagk is set to 1 at the end of the sharing phase. Furthermore,
by Corollary 44, we have that with all but negligible probability x′k = xk is recon-
structed. Using a similar argument, we conclude that reconstructed values y′k, z
′
i,k
both y′k = F (xk) and z
′
i,k = Ri(xk) are satisfied with high probability.
We now prove that when dishonest Pi broadcasts F
′
i (x) 6= F ′i (x), then with
all but negligible probability, Pi will be removed from U . More concretely, we will
prove that y′k 6= F ′i (x′k) and Bi(x′k) = diy′k + z′i,k both hold. These are precisely the
conditions checked in the reconstruction phase, and if both hold, it is easy to verify
that Pi will be deleted from U . The second condition Bi(x′k) = diy′k + z′i,k is easily
verified to be true for an honest D when resolvedS(s) = 0. In the rest of the proof,
we will show that y′k 6= F ′i (x′k).
First, observe that by the privacy property of WICPSk(xk), WICPSk(F (xk)),











We use the fact that two distinct degree-τ polynomials can have identical values




k) = F (x
′
k) is satisfied with probability at most τ/|F|. When τ = η < 2n and
κ > max(λ, 10n) (recall |F| = 2κ), and since honest D chooses xk at random, we
have that y′k 6= F ′i (x′k) holds except with negligible probability. This concludes the
proof of the claim.
Claim 50 (Commitment) Even when the dealer is malicious, commitment holds
with all but negligible probability.
Proof The claim trivially holds when the dealer is disqualified in the sharing
phase, or when resolvedS(s) = 1 holds. For the rest of the proof, we assume that
resolvedS(s) = 0 holds.
Suppose at the end of the sharing phase, U is non-empty, say U contains
Pj. Note that Pj may or may not be removed from U during the reconstruction
phase. However, we will show that, except with negligible probability, this decision
is determined by the joint view of the honest parties at the end of the sharing phase.
As a first step, observe that for every k ∈ [η] the value of recflagk is determined at the
end of the sharing phase. Now if for some k ∈ [η], it holds that recflagk = 1, then by
Corollary 44, we see that except with negligible probability, the reconstructed values
x′k, y
′
k, and {z′i,k}Pi∈S are completely determined by the joint view of the honest
parties at the end of the sharing phase. Combining this with the fact that F ′j(x)
is broadcasted by Pj during the sharing phase (and since F
′
j(x) remains unchanged
through the end of the protocol), we conclude that the decision to delete Pj from U
is, with high probability, determined by the joint view of the honest parties at the
end of the sharing phase. If |U| > 0 holds at the end of the reconstruction phase,
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we conclude that commitment holds as well.
For the rest of the proof we assume that at the end of the reconstruction
phase it holds that the set U is empty. Observe that in this case (i.e., |U| =
0), the reconstructed value s′ is simply the output of WICPS(s). Note that since
|S ∪ {D}| > t, there is at least one honest party Pi ∈ S ∪ {D}. (For the rest of the
proof, we assume that Pi is honest. Note that Pi could be the dealer.) We consider
two cases depending on the value of flagi(s). If flagi(s) = 0, then by Claim 48 we
see that with high probability Pi is contained in U at the end of the reconstruction
phase. This contradicts the assumption that |U| = 0. Now, on the other hand if
flagi(s) = 1, then by Corollary 45, we see that, except with negligible probability,
the set {s̃j}Pj∈REC contains exactly one value, namely s′i. Since s′i is defined by the
view of honest Pi at the end of round 1 of the sharing phase, we conclude that
commitment holds in this case as well. This completes the proof of the claim.
Claim 51 (Correctness) Suppose that the dealer remains uncorrupted throughout
the sharing phase. Then, correctness holds with all but negligible probability.
Proof Clearly, a dealer that remains uncorrupted throughout the sharing phase
certainly follows the protocol. Observe that when n > 2t there exists k ∈ [η] such
that all parties in Sk ∪ {D} are honest. Furthermore, since (honest) parties in
Sk ∪ {D} never conflict or contradict with one another, the dealer never broadcasts
in round 3 of the WICP protocols with receiver set Sk. Combining this with the
non-triviality condition, we see that recflagk will be set to 1 at the end of the sharing
phase. (See also proof of Claim 49.) Thus, we conclude that the dealer that remains
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uncorrupted throughout the sharing phase does not get disqualified.
Correctness holds when resolvedS(s) = 1 since an honest dealer broadcasts
s(D) = s in this case. For the rest of the proof, we assume that resolvedS(s) = 0
holds. Given this, observe that the protocol can terminate either because |U| > 0,
or by running the local computation step of WICPS(s). In the former case, applying
Claim 49, we conclude that s is reconstructed with high probability. In the latter
case, applying Claim 46, we conclude that, with high probability, s is reconstructed
here as well. This completes the proof of correctness.
We will denote an SICP protocol with D as dealer with input s, and S as the
set of receivers using the notation SICPS(s).
In our VSS protocol, we will execute (exponentially) many instances of SICP
subprotocols in parallel. In each instance, honest parties will use independent ran-
domness. This will allow us to argue the following. Suppose ` instances of SICP
subprotocols are executed in parallel. Then, using a simple union bound, we see
that correctness property holds for each of the ` SICP subprotocols except with
probability O(`n32n/|F|). Similarly, we see that the commitment property holds for
each of the ` SICP subprotocols except with probability O(`n22n/|F|).
6.2 An Inefficient 3-Round Statistical VSS Protocol
Recall that SICP provided the unconditional version of the guarantees pro-
vided by an ICP protocol between the dealer and a virtual party S. Here, we show
that this is sufficient to obtain a statistical VSS protocol. At a high level, our
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protocol runs parallel instances of SICP protocols that are executed between the
dealer (using input an additive share of s) and each of η = O(2n) virtual parties.
The strong properties guaranteed by SICP ensures that every share (and, thus the
secret) is recovered in the reconstruction phase.
6.2.1 The Protocol
We now formally describe our statistical VSS protocol that tolerates t < n/2
malicious parties. Our protocol requires 3 rounds in the sharing phase, and an
additional 2 rounds in the reconstruction phase.
Sharing phase. The sharing phase consists of three rounds.
Round 1: The dealer holds s. Let S1, . . . , Sη be distinct subsets of P \{D} of size-t.
The following steps are carried out in parallel:
– The dealer chooses a random η-sharing s1, . . . , sη such that s = s1 + . . .+
sη.
– For each k ∈ [η], the dealer executes round 1 of the SICP protocol with
Sk as receivers on input sk. We refer to this instance of the SICP protocol
as SICPSk(sk).
Round 2: For each k ∈ [η], the dealer executes round 2 of SICPSk(sk).
Round 3: For each k ∈ [η], the dealer executes round 3 of SICPSk(sk).
Local computation. Each party locally carries out the local computation following
the sharing phase of SICPSk(sk) for each k ∈ [η].
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Reconstruction phase. The reconstruction phase consists of two rounds. If the
dealer is not already disqualified, parties run the 2-round reconstruction phase of
SICPSk(sk) for each k ∈ [η]. Else, each party outputs s′ = ⊥, and terminates the
reconstruction protocol.
Local Computation. For each k ∈ [η], let s′k denote the value reconstructed at the
end of SICPSk(sk). If for some k ∈ [η] it holds that s′k = ⊥, then each party outputs
s′ = ⊥ and terminates the protocol. Else, each party outputs s′ = s′1 + . . .+ s′η and
terminates the protocol.
6.2.2 Proofs
We now prove that the protocol given in the previous section is a statistical
VSS protocol tolerating t < n/2 parties when κ > max(λ, 10n). (Recall |F| = 2κ.)
Lemma 52 (Privacy) If the dealer remains uncorrupted throughout the sharing
phase, privacy is preserved.
Proof Let C denote the set of parties corrupted by the end of the sharing phase.
Given n > 2t and |C| ≤ t, there must exist k ∈ [η] such that C∩Sk = ∅ holds, i.e., all
parties in Sk∪{D} remain honest at the end of the sharing phase. (Recall |Sk| = t.)
We can apply Claim 47 to conclude that SICPSk(sk) when considered individually
preserves privacy of share sk (which is the dealer’s input in that execution. Fur-
thermore, since instances of SICP subprotocols (in particular, those involving some
subset of parties in Sk) employ independent randomness (in particular, independent
of the share sk), privacy is preserved even when exponentially many such subproto-
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cols are run in parallel (even among overlapping sets of receivers). Therefore, at the
end of the sharing phase, the view of the adversary is independent of the value of
sk and consequently, independent of the dealer’s secret s. This completes the proof
of privacy.
We will now make an observation about executing multiple instances of SICP
subprotocols in parallel with one another. Recall that when ` instances of SICP sub-
protocols are run in parallel, then (a) the correctness property holds for each of the
` instances except with probability O(`n32n/|F|), and (b) the commitment property
holds for each of the ` instances except with probability O(`n22n/|F|). From the
claim above, we see that rest of the VSS execution other than the SICP subprotocols
yields no information to the adversary that it already does not know. Finally, in our
SICP subprotocol, we see that ` = O(η) = O(2n), and since |F| > 2max(λ,10n), we
see that except with negligible probability, correctness and conditional commitment
holds for every SICP subprotocol simultaneously. We will use this fact repeatedly in
our proofs. We are now ready to prove that our protocol satisfies the commitment
and correctness properties.
Lemma 53 (Commitment) Even when the dealer is malicious, commitment holds
with all but negligible probability.
Proof The claim trivially holds when the dealer is disqualified in the sharing
phase. Suppose the dealer is not disqualified, we will apply Claim 50 which states
that except with negligible probability, the values s′k reconstructed were all defined
by the joint view of the honest parties (in P) at the end of the sharing phase of
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SICPSk(sk). Since instances of SICP subprotocols employ independent randomness,
commitment holds with high probability even when exponentially many such sub-
protocols are run in parallel. This is because we This follows from a simple union
bound: suppose each instance of SICP fails to satisfy the commitment property with
probability O(n3η/|F|) (as proved in Claim 50), then when η independent instances
of SICP are run, the commitment property fails to hold in any one of them (and con-
sequently in the VSS protocol) with probability O(n3η2/|F|). Recalling that η < 2n
and |F| = 2κ > 2max(λ,10n), we see that the lemma is immediate.
Lemma 54 (Correctness) Suppose that the dealer remains uncorrupted through-
out the sharing phase. Then, correctness holds with all but negligible probability.
Proof Clearly, a dealer that remains uncorrupted throughout the sharing phase
certainly follows the protocol, and never disqualified. We will apply Claim 51 which
states that except with neglligible probability, the value sk is reconstructed at the
end of protocol SICPSk(sk). Since instances of SICP subprotocols employ indepen-
dent randomness, correctness holds with high probability even when exponentially
many such subprotocols are run in parallel. This follows from a simple union bound:
suppose each instance of SICP fails to satisfy the commitment property with prob-
ability O(n2η/|F|) (as proved in Claim 50), then when η independent instances of
SICP are run, the correctness property fails to hold in any one of them (and, con-
sequently in the VSS protocol) with probability O(n2η2/|F|). Recalling that η < 2n
and |F| = 2κ > 2max(λ,10n), we see that the lemma is immediate.
By Lemmas 52, 53, and 54, we conclude that the following theorem holds.
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Theorem 55 There exists 3-round statistical VSS protocol tolerating t < n/2 par-
ties.
Using a standard transformation, any VSS protocol can be used to construct
a protocol for coin-tossing with similar security guarantees and resilience. In more
detail, consider a protocol in which each Pi chooses random ri ∈ F, and executes
VSS in parallel with every other party. At the end of the reconstruction phase, each
party obtains {r′j} as the output of the VSS protocols, and sets the random coin
r′ = r′1 + . . . + r
′
n. The resulting protocol is a secure protocol for coin-tossing since
(a) by the privacy property of VSS, each malicious party’s choice of the random
field element is independent of the choices of every honest party, and (b) by the
commitment property of VSS, each malicious party is committed to some field ele-
ment which cannot be changed later upon knowing the choices of the honest parties.
Furthermore, note that the transformation outlined above is round preserving. We
omit the proofs and merely state the following.
Corollary 56 There exists a 5-round protocol for statistically secure coin-tossing
tolerating t < n/2 parties.
It might be instructive to compare the above corollary with the results of
Katz and Ostrovsky [66], who prove a similar upper bound on the number of rounds
required to perform two-party coin tossing. In more detail, they show a 5-round
protocol for coin-tossing (and for general secure computation) in the two-party set-
ting. Furthermore, they show that no 4-round protocol for coin-tossing exists in the
two-party setting. We remark that the question of whether a 4-round protocol for
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coin-tossing exists in the honest majority setting (i.e., n > 2t) is open. In partic-
ular, we observe that the 2-round impossibility for statistical VSS shown by Patra
et al. [76] might not rule out 4-round protocols for coin-tossing. Finally, we note
that our protocol has complexity exponential in the number of parties, and leave the
construction of an efficient round-optimal coin-tossing protocol as an open question.
6.3 An Efficient 4-Round Statistical VSS Protocol
We now show an efficient 4-round statistical VSS protocol tolerating t < n/2
corrupted parties. In our protocol, the dealer shares a symmetric bivariate polyno-
mial among all parties. We then employ some standard round reduction techniques
from literature. (See e.g., [43].) Our main novelty is to allow the reconstruction
phase of some ICP subprotocols to begin while concurrently executing the (last
round of the) sharing phase of all ICP subprotocols. (We use a sequence of flag
variables to keep track of the state of concurrent executions.) This is a necessary
step in our protocol to ensure that a malicious dealer is committed to some secret
at the end of the 4-round sharing phase.
6.3.1 The Protocol
We now formally describe an efficient statistical VSS protocol that tolerates
t < n/2 malicious parties. Our protocol requires 4 rounds in the sharing phase, and
additional 2 rounds in the reconstruction phase.
Sharing phase. The sharing phase consists of four rounds.
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Round 1: The dealer holds s. The following steps are carried out in parallel:
– The dealer chooses a random symmetric bivariate polynomial F (x, y) of
degree t in each variable such that F (0, 0) = s. Note that F (x, i) =
F (i, x) since F is symmetric. Let fi(x) := F (i, x).
– The dealer executes the first round of the ICP protocol (described in
Section 6.1.1) with Pi ∈ P\{D} as receiver on input fi(j) for each j ∈ [n].
We refer to such an instance of the ICP protocol as ICPD,i(fi(j)). Let
s′i,j denote the value received by Pi.
– Each party Pi ∈ P picks a random value ri,j for every Pj ∈ P \ {Pi} and
executes the first round of the ICP protocol with Pj as receiver on input
ri,j. We refer to this instance of the ICP protocol as ICPi,j(ri,j). Let r
′
i,j
denote the value received by Pj.
– For every j 6= i, party Pi executes the first round of the ICP protocol
with D as receiver on input ri,j (used in the previous step). We refer
to this instance of the ICP protocol as ICPi,D(ri,j). Let r
(D)
i,j denote the
value received by D.
– For all ordered pairs (i, j), each party Pk ∈ P initializes flagD,i(fi(j)) = 0,
flagi,j(ri,j) = 0, and flagi,D(ri,j) = 0.
Round 2: Each party Pi does the following:
– If the values {(j, s′i,j)}j do not lie on a degree-t polynomial, then broadcast
“invalid share”.
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– Run round 2 of ICPi,j(ri,j), for all j 6= i.
– Run round 2 of ICPi,D(ri,j), for all j 6= i.
– For all j 6= i, broadcast ai,j := s′i,j + ri,j.
– For all j 6= i, broadcast bi,j := s′i,j + r′j,i.
In parallel with the above, the dealer D does the following for all ordered pairs
(i, j):
– Run round 2 of ICPD,i(fi(j)).
– Broadcast a
(D)





i,j = fi(j) + r
(D)
j,i .
Round 3: Each party Pi does the following for all j 6= i:
– Run round 3 of ICPi,j(ri,j). If Pi conflicts with Pj, or ai,j 6= bj,i, or
aj,i 6= bi,j, or ai,j 6= a(D)i,j , or bi,j 6= b
(D)
i,j , then Pi does the following steps.
– Run round 1 of the reconstruction phase of ICPD,i(fi(j)).
– Run round 1 of the reconstruction phase of ICPj,i(rj,i).
– Run round 3 of ICPi,D(ri,j). If Pi conflicts with D, then Pi does the
following:
– For all k ∈ [n], run round 1 of the reconstruction phase of ICPD,i(fi(k)).
In parallel with the above, the dealer D does the following for all ordered pairs
(i, j):
– Run round 3 of ICPD,i(fi(j)). If D conflicts with Pi, or ai,j 6= a(D)i,j , or
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ai,j = ⊥, or Pi broadcasted “invalid share” in round 2 of the sharing
phase, then D does the following:
– Broadcast f
(D)
i (x) := fi(x).
– For all k ∈ [n], run round 1 of the reconstruction phase of ICPi,D(ri,k).
– For all k ∈ [n], run round 1 of the reconstruction phase of ICPk,D(rk,i).
Round 4: Define U = {Pi |D broadcasted f (D)i (x) in round 3 of the sharing phase}.
If |U| > t, then each party disqualifies the dealer, and outputs some default
secret.
Each party Pk updates local variables in the following way. For all order
pairs (i, j), if round 1 of the reconstruction phase of ICPD,i(fi(j)), ICPi,j(ri,j),
or ICPi,D(ri,j) was executed in the previous round, then the corresponding
variables flagD,i(fi(j)), flagi,j(ri,j), ICPi,D(ri,j) are set to 1.
Each party Pk does the following for all ordered pairs (i, j):
– Run round 2 of the reconstruction phase of ICPD,i(fi(j)) if flagD,i(fi(j)) =
1.
– Run round 2 of the reconstruction phase of ICPi,j(ri,j) if flagi,j(ri,j) = 1.
– Run round 2 of the reconstruction phase of ICPi,D(ri,j) if flagi,D(ri,j) = 1.
Local computation. Each party locally carries out the following steps.
1. Each party disqualifies the dealer, and outputs some default secret if the dealer
does not follow the protocol.
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2. For all ordered pairs (i, j) do the following.
(.1) If D broadcasted f
(D)
i (x) in round 3 of the sharing phase, then set
s̃i,j := f
(D)
i (j), and flagD,i(fi(j)) = 1. Else if flagD,i(fi(j)) = 1, then
perform the local computation steps following the reconstruction phase
of ICPD,i(fi(j)), and let s̃i,j denote the reconstructed value.
(.2) If flagi,j(ri,j) = 1, then perform the local computation steps following the
reconstruction phase of ICPi,j(ri,j), and let r̃i,j denote the reconstructed
value.
(.3) If flagi,D(ri,j) = 1, then perform the local computation steps following the
reconstruction phase of ICPi,D(ri,j), and let r̃
(D)
i,j denote the reconstructed
value.
3. Each party disqualifies the dealer, and outputs some default secret if for some
pair (i, j) any of the following conditions are violated:
(.1) The points in the set {(k, s̃i,k) | (flagD,i(fi(k)) = 1)∧ (s̃i,k 6= ⊥)} must lie
on a polynomial of degree at most t.
(.2) There is a unique value c ∈ F satisfying each of the following:
i. Suppose D broadcasted f
(D)
i (x), then f
(D)
i (j) = c holds.
ii. Suppose D broadcasted f
(D)
j (x), then f
(D)
j (i) = c holds.
iii. Suppose flagD,i(fi(j)) = 1, then s̃i,j = c holds.
iv. Suppose flagD,j(fj(i)) = 1, then s̃j,i = c holds.
(.3) Suppose flagi,D(ri,j) = 1 holds. Then r̃
(D)
i,j 6= ⊥ also holds.
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(.4) Suppose D broadcasted f
(D)
j (x) and suppose flagi,D(ri,j) = 1 holds. Fur-










Reconstruction phase. The reconstruction phase consists of two rounds.
Round 1: The following steps are carried out in parallel for all ordered pairs (i, j).
– Run round 1 of the reconstruction phase of ICPD,i(fi(j)) if flagD,i(fi(j)) =
0.
– Run round 1 of the reconstruction phase of ICPi,j(ri,j) if flagi,j(ri,j) = 0.
– Run round 1 of the reconstruction phase of ICPi,D(ri,j) if flagi,D(ri,j) = 0.
Round 2: The following steps are carried out in parallel for all ordered pairs (i, j).
– Run round 2 of the reconstruction phase of ICPD,i(fi(j)) if flagD,i(fi(j)) =
0.
– Run round 2 of the reconstruction phase of ICPi,j(ri,j) if flagi,j(ri,j) = 0.
– Run round 2 of the reconstruction phase of ICPi,D(ri,j) if flagi,D(ri,j) = 0.
Local Computation. Each party locally carries out the following steps.
1. For all ordered pairs (i, j) do the following.
(.1) If flagD,i(fi(j)) = 0, then perform the local computation steps following
the reconstruction phase of ICPD,i(fi(j)), and let s̃i,j denote the recon-
structed value.
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(.2) If flagi,j(ri,j) = 0, then perform the local computation steps following the
reconstruction phase of ICPi,j(ri,j), and let r̃i,j denote the reconstructed
value.
(.3) If flagi,D(ri,j) = 0, then perform the local computation steps following the
reconstruction phase of ICPi,D(ri,j), and let r̃
(D)
i,j denote the reconstructed
value.
2. Initialize REC = ∅. Add Pi to REC if either of the following holds.
(.1) Pi is contained in U .
(.2) For all j ∈ [n], s̃i,j 6= ⊥ holds, and the points in the set {(j, s̃i,j)}j lie on
a degree-t polynomial.
3. Delete Pi 6∈ U from REC if for some Pj any of the following hold:
(.1) Pj ∈ U and s̃i,j 6= f (D)j (i).
(.2) r̃i,j 6= ⊥ and s̃i,j + r̃i,j 6= ai,j.
(.3) Pj did not conflict with Pi and bi,j − r̃j,i 6= s̃i,j.
4. For Pi ∈ REC, define f ′i(x) to be the degree-t polynomial which passes through
all of the points in {(j, s̃i,j)}j. Reconstruct a symmetric bivariate polynomial
F ′(x, y) of degree-t from {(i, f ′i(x))}Pi∈REC. Each party outputs s′ = F ′(0, 0).
6.3.2 Proofs
We prove that the protocol given in the previous section is a statistical VSS
protocol that tolerates t < n/2 malicious parties when κ > max(λ, 10n). (Recall
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|F| = 2κ.)
Lemma 57 (Privacy) If the dealer is not corrupted by the end of the sharing
phase, privacy is preserved.
Proof Let C denote the set of parties corrupted by the end of the sharing phase.
We show that if the dealer remains uncorrupted, then the view of the adversary can
be simulated given the polynomials {fi(x)}Pi∈C. Since F (x, y) is a random symmetric
bivariate polynomial of degree at most t and |C| ≤ t, a standard argument implies
that the view of the adversary is independent of the dealer’s input s.
Recall that when the dealer and receiver are honest, by Claim 39, ICP sub-
protocols when considered individually, guarantee privacy of dealer’s input in an
information-theoretic sense. Furthermore, observe that honest parties use indepen-
dent randomness within each ICP subprotocol, and therefore, parallel executions
of these ICP subprotocols (i.e., those involving an honest dealer and receiver) still
preserves privacy of each execution. Also, honest parties are guaranteed to follow
the protocol, and thus will never conflict (within an ICP subprotocol) with another
honest party, nor will they broadcast “invalid share” and force the dealer to reveal
a secret share held by an honest party. Other conditions that force participating
parties to begin reconstruction phase of ICP subprotocols in the sharing phase, are
never satisfied for honest parties. In particular, this implies that no honest party is
contained in U .
As for the values broadcast in round 2, consider an ordered pair (Pi, Pj) of
parties who remain honest throughout the sharing phase. Since the dealer is honest,
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we have s′i,j = F (i, j) = F (j, i) = s
′









j,i . Thus, in round 2, parties Pi, Pj, and D all broadcast the same
“blinded” values F (i, j) + ri,j and F (j, i) + rj,i. Since ri,j and rj,i are completely
random field elements, this does not leak any information about the {fi(x)}Pi 6∈C that
the adversary does not already know.
We will now make an observation about executing multiple instances of ICP
subprotocols in parallel with one another. Recall that when ` instances of ICP sub-
protocols are run in parallel, then (a) the correctness property holds for each of the
` instances except with probability O(`t/|F|), and (b) the conditional commitment
property holds for each of the ` instances except with probability O(`/|F|). We also
observe that concurrently executing round 3 of the sharing phase along with round 1
of the reconstruction phase does not affect the correctness or conditional commit-
ment properties of ICP subprotocols. In more detail, the correctness property is
preserved since “verification points” (held by honest verifiers) are never revealed,
so a dishonest receiver cannot broadcast a different polynomial which will get ac-
cepted by the honest parties. The conditional commitment property is slightly more
complicated. First, note that if the dealer did not conflict with the receiver, then
conditional commitment is preserved since the “multiplier” is chosen by the honest
receiver after the dealer sends out verification points to the honest receivers. Of
course, a malicious dealer can always conflict, and change the secret share that it
originally sent to an honest receiver. (Nevertheless, this conflict happens in the shar-
ing phase, and trivially implies that commitment will hold at the end of the sharing
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phase.) In our proofs we will explicitly apply the conditional commitment property
only in ICP subprotocols where the dealer does not conflict with the receiver.
From the claim above, we see that rest of the VSS protocol other than the ICP
subprotocols yields no information to the adversary that it already does not know.
Finally, in our VSS protocol, we see that ` = O(n2), and since |F| > 2max(λ,10n), we
see that except with negligible probability, correctness and conditional commitment
holds for every ICP subprotocol simultaneously. We will use this fact repeatedly in
our proofs. We are now ready to prove that our protocol satisfies the commitment
and correctness properties. We do this by a series of claims.
Claim 58 If the dealer is not disqualified in the sharing phase, then for every honest
Pi and for every Pj ∈ U , except with negligible probability s̃i,j = f (D)j (i) holds.
Proof Suppose Pi ∈ U . Then in round 4 of the sharing phase, s̃i,j := f (D)i (j).
Furthermore, if f
(D)
j (i) 6= f
(D)
i (j), then D is disqualified during local computation




Suppose Pi 6∈ U . We can conclude that D did not conflict with Pi in the
sharing phase, and except with negligible probability s′i,j= s̃i,j must hold for an
honest Pi. On the other hand, since Pj ∈ U , D must have broadcasted f (D)j (x) and
also must have revealed r
(D)
i,j in the sharing phase. There are two cases to consider.
First, suppose Pi conflicted with D (in round 3 of the sharing phase). In this case,
Pi reveals s
′
i,j during the sharing phase. During local computation of the sharing
phase, parties check if the reconstructed s̃i,j satisfies s̃i,j = f
(D)
j (i), and disqualify
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D if it doesn’t. Since D was not disqualified, it must be the case that s̃i,j= f
(D)
j (i).
Second, suppose Pi did not conflict with D. Then, since Pi is honest, r̃
(D)
i,j = ri,j
holds with all but negligible probability. Furthermore, if a
(D)
i,j 6= ai,j, then D is
required to broadcast f
(D)
i (x), and Pi would be contained in U . But since Pi 6∈ U , we
conclude that a
(D)





i,j = ri,j hold. Recall that when Pi 6∈ U , s′i,j= s̃i,j must hold, and therefore,











j (i), then clearly D is disqualified during local computation of the
sharing phase. Therefore, it must be the case that s̃i,j = f
(D)
j (i).
Claim 59 If the dealer is not disqualified in the sharing phase, then for every honest
Pi, it holds that Pi ∈ REC with all but negligible probability.
Proof If Pi ∈ U , then by construction Pi ∈ REC holds. Suppose Pi 6∈ U . We
can conclude that D did not conflict with Pi in the sharing phase, and except
with negligible probability s′i,j= s̃i,j must hold for an honest Pi. Furthermore, the
values {(j, s′i,j)}j must lie on a degree-t polynomial. Otherwise, Pi would have
reconstructed s̃i,j in the sharing phase (starting from round 2 of the sharing phase),
and consequently, D would have been disqualified in the local computation of the
sharing phase. Since s′i,j= s̃i,j holds except with negligible probability, we conclude
that values {(j, s̃i,j)}j must lie on a degree-t polynomial with all but negligible
probability. Thus, Pi must have been added to REC. Given this, we will now show
that, except with negligible probability, none of the deletion rules apply to an honest
Pi.
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1. For each Pj ∈ U , except with negligible probability, we have s̃i,j = f (D)j (i) by
Claim 58.
2. When Pi 6∈ U , s′i,j = s̃i,j must hold except with negligible probability. Thus,
ai,j = s̃i,j + ri,j. Since Pi is honest, r̃i,j revealed by every Pj must satisfy r̃i,j ∈
{⊥, ri,j} with all but negligible probability. We conclude that ai,j = s̃i,j + r̃i,j
holds with high probability.
3. Suppose Pj did not conflict with Pi. Then, with high probability, r̃j,i= r
′
j,i
holds. Recalling that when Pi 6∈ U , s̃i,j= s′i,j holds with high probability, we




j,i = s̃i,j + r̃j,i holds with high probability.
Thus, every honest Pi is contained in REC.
Claim 60 If the dealer is not disqualified in the sharing phase, then for every honest
Pj, and for every Pi ∈ REC, it holds that s̃i,j = s̃j,i with all but negligible probability.
Proof The case when Pi ∈ U is handled by Claim 58. Also, the case when Pj ∈ U
follows from the deletion rule in local computation of the reconstruction phase. For
the rest of the proof, assume that Pi, Pj 6∈ U . Recall that when Pi, Pj 6∈ U , it is
expected that the reconstructed values s̃i,j, s̃j,i (resp.), are equal to the values s
′
i,j,
s′j,i (resp.) received from D in the first round. Furthermore, the reconstructed values
s̃i,j, s̃j,i are expected to be consistent with broadcasted values, ai,j, bj,i, aj,i, and bi,j.
(Indeed for honest Pj ∈ U , except with negligible probability, s̃j,i = s′j,i holds, and
consequently aj,i = s̃j,i + rj,i and bj,i = s̃j,i + r
′
i,j hold as well.) This will motivate
the rest of the proof.
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Next, suppose ai,j 6= bj,i, or aj,i 6= bi,j, or both Pi and Pj conflicted with each





respectively. In the event that the reconstructed values s̃i,j and s̃j,i are not equal,
D is disqualified in the local computation of the sharing phase. Hence, we conclude
that if any of the above cases hold, then the lemma is true. For the rest of the proof,
assume that ai,j = bj,i, aj,i = bi,j, and at least one of Pi, Pj did not conflict with the
other.
We consider two cases. First, suppose Pj did not conflict with Pi. In this case,
except with negligible probability, Pi can reveal r̃j,i either as ⊥ or the correct value
rj,i. Recall that since Pi ∈ REC, bi,j − r̃j,i = s̃i,j must hold, otherwise Pi is deleted
from REC. Also, recall that for an honest Pj ∈ U , we have aj,i = s̃j,i + rj,i. Thus,
we conclude that r̃j,i = rj,i, and since aj,i = bi,j, we have s̃j,i = s̃i,j.
Second, suppose Pi did not conflict with Pj. In this case, except with negligible
probability, Pj successfully reveals r̃i,j = r
′
i,j. Since bj,i = s̃j,i+r
′
i,j, and by assumption
ai,j = bj,i, we conclude that ai,j = s̃j,i+ r̃i,j. This implies that s̃j,i = s̃i,j, as otherwise
ai,j 6= s̃i,j + r̃i,j, and Pi will be deleted from REC.
Thus, we have shown that in all cases, s̃j,i = s̃i,j holds.
Claim 61 If the dealer is not disqualified in the sharing phase, then for every
Pi, Pj ∈ REC, it holds that s̃i,j = s̃j,i with all but negligible probability.
Proof Observe that when t < n/2, there are at least n− t ≥ t+ 1 honest parties.
By Claim 59, REC contains at least t + 1 honest parties. Denote the first t + 1
such honest parties in REC by H. The polynomials {f ′k(x)}Pk∈H define a bivariate
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polynomial F̂ (x, y) in the natural way: namely, let F̂ be such that F̂ (x, k) = f ′k(x)
for each Pk ∈ H. By Claim 59 and Claim 60, we can conclude that F̂ is a bivariate
symmetric polynomial of degree at most t in each variable.
Since H ⊆ REC, using Claim 60, we see that f ′i(k) = f ′k(i) holds for every
Pk ∈ H. Substituting, we have f ′i(k) = F̂ (i, k) for all Pk ∈ H. Since |H| > t
and f ′i(x) is a polynomial of degree at most t, it must hold that F̂ (i, x) = f
′
i(x).
Similarly, F̂ (j, x) = f ′j(x) for some Pj ∈ REC. Finally, since F̂ is symmetric, we
have that s̃i,j = f
′
i(j) = F̂ (i, j) = F̂ (j, i) = f
′
j(i) = s̃j,i.
Lemma 62 (Commitment) Even when the dealer is malicious, commitment holds
with all but negligible probability.
Proof The lemma trivially holds when the dealer is disqualified in the sharing
phase. For the rest of the proof, we assume that the dealer is not disqualified in the
sharing phase. From the proof of Claim 61, with all but negligible probabiilty there
exists a bivariate symmetric polynomial F̂ of degree at most t in each variable such
that f ′i(x) = F̂ (i, x) for every Pi ∈ REC. Since |REC| > t (follows from Claim 59),
F ′ = F̂ will be reconstructed at the end of the reconstruction phase. The key
observation we make is that F̂ is completely defined by the joint view of the honest
parties at the end of the sharing phase. Indeed, the values {s̃i,j}Pi,Pj∈H (which are all
known by the end of the sharing phase) completely define the bivariate symmetric
polynomial F̂ and consequently the reconstructed secret s′ = F̂ (0, 0). This concludes
the proof of the lemma.
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Lemma 63 (Correctness) If the dealer is not corrupted by the end of the sharing
phase, then correctness holds with all but negligible probability.
Proof When the dealer is honest, it executes ICP subprotocols using the correct
input. In particular, each Pi will obtain s
′
i,j = F (i, j). Furthermore, when Pi is
honest, it is easily verified that s̃i,j = F (i, j). Thus F̂ , which is completely defined
by shares held by honest parties, will be equal to F . If the dealer is not disqualified
during the sharing phase, s = F (0, 0) will be reconstructed at the end of the protocol,
and the lemma holds.
It remains to show that an honest dealer will never be disqualified during the
sharing phase. We first argue that |U| ≤ t when D is honest. Recall that no conflicts
occur in an ICP protocol as long as dealer and receiver are honest. Also, when Pi
is honest, it is easy to see that ai,j = a
(D)
i,j always holds. Thus, parties contained in
U have to be corrupted, and thus |U| ≤ t.
Next, we argue that when D is honest during the sharing phase, none of
conditions checked in local computation of the sharing phase are violated. The
correctness property of the ICP subprotocols implies that except with negligible
probability, every Pi will reconstruct a value s̃i,j ∈ {⊥, F (i, j)}. Since D is honest,
these values will lie on a polynomial of degree at most t. Also, if D broadcasted
f
(D)
i (x), then f
(D)
i (x) = F (i, x) will hold. Similarly, broadcasted f
(D)
j (x) will always







j (i) + r
(D)
i,j also holds. Finally, the commitment property of the ICP






i,j as long as Pi did not conflict with D in the
sharing phase.
From the above it is clear that D is never disqualified in the sharing phase.




In this dissertation, we have explored stronger security models for broadcast,
and shown improvements regarding the round complexity of information-theoretic
VSS.
We have addressed two important issues related to broadcast. The first issue
is that almost all existing protocols do not distinguish between corrupted parties
(who do not follow the protocol) and honest parties whose secret keys have been
compromised (but who continue to behave honestly). The second issue is that all
existing protocols for broadcast are insecure against an adaptive adversary who
can choose which parties to corrupt as the protocol progresses. We have proposed
new security models that capture these issues, and presented tight feasibility and
impossibility results.
We have shown two improvements regarding the round complexity of information-
theoretic VSS. First, we have argued that if the ultimate goal is to minimize round
complexity of VSS for point-to-point networks, then it is important to focus on
minimizing the number of rounds in which broadcast is used in addition to min-
imizing the total number of rounds. Towards this end, we have constructed an
efficient perfectly secure VSS protocol tolerating t < n/3 corrupted parties that is
simultaneously optimal in both the number of rounds and the number of invoca-
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tions of broadcast. Second, we have constructed a statistically secure VSS protocol
tolerating t < n/2 corrupted parties that has optimal round complexity, and an
efficient statistical VSS protocol tolerating t < n/2 corrupted parties that requires
one additional round.
Some problems are left open by this dissertation, and we discuss these below:
Efficient Round Optimal Statistical VSS with Honest Majority. We have
shown an efficient statistical VSS protocol that requires four rounds in the sharing
phase when t < n/2. It will be interesting to see if it is possible to construct an
efficient statistical VSS protocol which is also round optimal.
Total Round Complexity of Statistical VSS with Honest Majority. We
have shown a statistical VSS protocol which is round-optimal in the sharing phase
but requires two rounds in the reconstruction phase. Thus, the total round com-
plexity of our construction is five. The best known lower bound on the total round
complexity of statistical VSS with honest majority is four. It will be interesting to
close the gap between the lower and upper bounds for this problem.
Exact Round Complexity of Information-Theoretic Secure Computation.
In this dissertation we have studied the exact round complexity of perfect VSS when
t < n/3 and statistical VSS when t < n/2. Our study of VSS has been motivated by
the fact that VSS serves as an important building block in protocols for information-
theoretic secure computation. Thus, it is important to extend our study to focus
on the exact round complexity of information-theoretic secure computation. Partial
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